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How actors credibly signal resolve has been an enduring question for
both scholars and policy makers. The existing literature disagrees on the
effects of public threats on signaling resolve and the effects of political con-
straints on crisis outcomes. This dissertation examines how leaders use public
threats to signal resolve from two new perspectives. First, citizens are con-
cerned both about national prestige and about crisis outcomes, the latter of
which are shaped by their resolve. Second, leaders adjust their vulnerability
to political punishment by controlling the publicity of their threats.
By locating resolve in the public and allowing leaders to choose the level
of publicity during a crisis, the dissertation offers an integrated framework to
understand the apparently disparate strategies of leaders under different levels
of political accountability. Moderately accountable leaders increase the level
vii
of publicity to signal the public’s resolve, whereas highly accountable leaders
lower publicity to signal the public’s resolve. I also identify the conditional
effects of political accountability on the risks of war with statistical support.
Finally, assuming that leaders know their citizens’ resolve no better than for-
eign targets, I find that dovish citizens may pretend to be supportive of war
if leaders tend to increase publicity in any crisis.
This project reconciles the conventional audience costs theory and its
critics. It specifies the linkage between a leader’s choice of publicity and signal-
ing resolve. It also suggests that political accountability may produce perverse
outcomes costly to the public. Finally, I discuss the implication of this project
to U.S. foreign policy and mass mobilization in international crisis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Featured with extreme aggression, destruction, and mortality, the out-
break of war is of enduring interest to students of international relations. Ra-
tionalist explanations for war begin with the observation that war is costly to
the parties involved and hence there exists a range of negotiated settlements
that the parties involved prefer to war (Fearon 1995). In other words, states
fight against each other as a result of the failure to achieve an agreement.
One of the main explanations to the failure of negotiated settlements is the
existence of uncertainty among states and their incentives to misrepresent it.1
When negotiating over some disputed goods (e.g. territory, policy change,
leadership, etc), states are uncertain about some unobservable characteristics
of their opponents, such as their military capabilities or valuations of the dis-
puted goods. One of these unobservable characteristics is resolve, or one’s
willingness to fight. If an actor is considered more resolute, it indicates that
this actor is more willing to fight over the disputed goods and with all else
being equal, more likely to achieve a settlement to its favor, than an irresolute
actor. Since these unobservable characteristics may shape the decisions over
1The other approach is to consider war as a commitment problem. Fearon (1995) and
Powell (1999) are foundational works on commitment problems in international relations.
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bargaining postures and outcomes, each state has incentives to bluff about its
own characteristics in order to boost its bargaining leverage. The incentives of
misrepresent thus lead to the incentives to disbelieve, which reduces the effec-
tiveness of diplomatic negotiations and increases the risks of war. Following
this logic, states can learn their opponents’ resolve only by involving costly
actions such as war.
Hence, a serious question posed to scholars and policy makers is how to
make interstate communications more informative without resorting to war.
One general solution is costly signaling: to increase the credibility of commu-
nication, a truly tough state must be willing to pay extra costs that all other
not-so-tough states are unwilling to pay. It is the extra costs that improve
the effectiveness of communication, making it more informative. In addition
to war, scholars examine other mechanisms that enable states to incur extra
costs and thus reveal their resolve. Examples of costly signaling mechanisms
include generating a threat that “leaves something to chance” (Schelling 1960),
military mobilization (Fearon 1997, Slantchev 2005), and diplomatic reputa-
tion (Guisinger and Smith 2002, Sartori 2002). Each mechanism differs in who
imposes extra costs and how. Among the existing mechanisms, audience costs
focus on the domestic interactions between leaders and the public, with extra
costs imposed by the public.2
2Some studies also include international audience (i.e. foreign states or other inter-
national actors) when discussing audience costs theory. I put the works on international
audience in the category of “diplomatic reputation.” Unless specified, an “audience” in this
dissertation refers to a domestic public.
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According to audience costs theory, a domestic public may improve the
effectiveness of crisis communication among states if the public can tie their
leader’s hands. In the context of crisis diplomacy, tying hands refers to extra
costs for being caught bluffing—an actor threatens to use force if its demand
is not satisfied yet fails to carry out its threat later. If leaders can show their
hands tied, they are less likely to bluff and therefore the information they
communicate is more credible. The existing literature argues that domesti-
cally, leaders can make their hands tied by the public. In his foundational
work on audience costs, Fearon (1994) argues that citizens can witness how
leaders communicate as crisis is a public event, and that citizens can punish
their leader for being caught bluffing, which they believe damages national
prestige. Hence, a domestic public is considered the “audience” and the costs
for leaders being caught bluffing is labeled “audience costs.” The more audi-
ence costs leaders are subject to, the more credible their threats of war are
with foreign opponents. The literature suggests that the amount of audience
costs vary with political regimes and the level of public attention involved in
crises (Baum 2004, Fearon 1994, Smith 1998). Following this logic, we should
expect the audience cost mechanism to be more effective in revealing true
resolve when the public pays more attention and/or when threats are issued
by democratic leaders, as people in democracies are more capable of punish-
ing leaders. However, we do observe cases inconsistent with the above logic:
either democratic leaders were caught bluffing without much punishment, or
they were able to achieve settlements by deliberately reducing public attention
3
to their communications with foreign opponents.
In 2012, U.S. President Barack Obama made a widely-noticed threat
to Bashar al-Assad of Syria, warning that “a red line for us is we start see-
ing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized”
(Kessler 2013). Despite the evidence of Assad targeting civilians with chem-
ical weapons, a year later, Obama called off a military attack on Syria and
decided to seek congressional approval. Obama’s new move was largely con-
sidered as inconsistent with his initial threat, since he had known that neither
American people nor the Congress was interested in another military inter-
vention in Middle East and that it mattered to “have the public with him”
(Goldberg 2016). A similar scenario emerged when Chen Shui-bian, the then-
President of Taiwan, challenged Beijing by proposing a referendum on joining
the United Nations under the name “Taiwan” and yet backed down. Chinese
leaders viewed Chen’s proposal of the UN referendum as a challenge to the
status quo, raising tension across the Taiwan Strait (Lauge 2008). To draw
wide attention, Chen conducted campaigns and scheduled the referendum on
the same day of the Presidential election. Concerned about the prospect of
war against mainland China, the majority of Taiwanese citizens chose not to
vote in the referendum. Chen backed down after the referendum was declared
invalid due to a low turnout.3
On the other hand, leaders sometimes choose to reduce public attention
3While the presidential election had a turnout rate at 76%, the turnout rate of referendum
was 35%, less than the 50% threshold to validate the result.
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to crises. In September 1970, when the Nixon Administration detected that
the Soviet Union was building a support base for submarines in the Cuban
bay of Cienfuegos, President Richard Nixon decided not to “force a public
confrontation” with the Soviet Union (Siniver 2008). Instead, the Nixon Ad-
ministration maintained a low-profile, but not fully secret, strategy regarding
the developments in Cuba. Initially, the knowledge of the submarine base
was leaked to the press, with few details and a non-threatening tone (Crall
and Martin 2013).4 But soon U.S. officials were instructed neither to confirm
press inquiries nor to raise this issue in external meetings (Crall and Martin
2013). Kissinger was constantly playing down the severity of the crisis with
the press and avoiding the development of a “crisis atmosphere.” The Nixon
administration played a low-profile strategy and finally reached an agreement
with the Soviet Union.
According to audience costs theory, President Obama and President
Chen were both supposed to pay large audience costs due to the public con-
cerns of national prestige, yet their hands seemed “untied” by their citizens
with little support for war. For Obama’s case, despite some criticisms about
his handling of the Syria crisis, the Congress had no interest in authorizing a
military strike. Similarly, Taiwanese people forced Chen to back down from
the threat of formal independence, with the majority of them not casting
4(Siniver 2008) suggested that the initial knowledge of the base was leaked to the press
because a State Department spokesman mistakenly mentioned the situation in Cuba during
a press briefing. But it is hard to verify whether the leak was unintentional and it did not
involve any details as well.
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votes. If public threats tie a leader’s hands and increase the credibility of
threats (Fearon 1997), why did Obama and Chen make high-profile threats
when their citizens seemed unwilling to fight? More generally, how do pub-
lic threats affect crisis bargaining? Why do leaders make high-profile threats
sometimes and low-profile ones at other times?
The existing literature cannot address these questions for two reasons.
First, most works rely on the assumption that people, as domestic audiences,
are biased against backing down, which they believe hurts national prestige
with negative consequences in the future (Fearon 1994, Guisinger and Smith
2002). However, it is unclear why people should always prefer escalating a cri-
sis to war if they are the direct victims of a costly war (Chiozza and Goemans
2004). What information would public threats reveal or disguise if the public
cares both about their leader’s consistency and about the substance of crisis
outcomes? Considering the public as the direct victims of war leads to further
questions regarding the locus of resolve: Is resolve located in leaders or the pub-
lic? Extant works on audience costs either assume a unitary-state framework
or examine the resolve of leaders without further justification. Nonetheless, if
the public suffers most from war, it seems more reasonable to consider a state’s
resolve located in the public and examine how leaders signal the public’s re-
solve. Second, while extant works consider the levels of publicity as well as
of audience costs fixed largely by regime types, leaders are able to manipulate
public attention with careful plans and thus manage their exposure to politi-
cal costs. Previous examples show that policy makers are able to manoeuvre
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political resources to increase or decrease public attention to foreign crisis, by
repeated statements, the support of political party, the control of bureaucracy,
etc. If we take into account the strategic control leaders have over public at-
tention, the effectiveness of public threats in revealing information may no
longer be an advantage exclusive for democratic leaders.
This dissertation studies how leaders use public threats in crisis bar-
gaining using a combination of theoretical and empirical models. First, after
carefully reexamining the key assumptions of audience costs theory, it estab-
lishes a new crisis-bargaining model to show how leaders strategically use pub-
lic threats to address foreign opponents’ uncertainty about the public’s resolve.
The new model enables us to identify when the uncertainty about the pub-
lic’s resolve matters in crisis bargaining, as opposed to the uncertainty about
leaders, and to outline the conditions under which increasing public attention
signals the public’s resolve. Second, it shows how the interactions between
leaders and the public can reveal to foreign opponents private information
about the public’s resolve. By separating the public’s preferences about policy
substance from its concerns about national prestige, it highlights two factors
that explain the effectiveness of public threats in reducing uncertainty: po-
litical accountability to the public’s policy preferences, and the distribution
of military power between states.5 I construct a new index of political ac-
countability and test the key hypotheses derived from the theoretical model.
Finally, it explores the role of public threats in crisis bargaining if leaders are
5Throughout, I use “political accountability” or “accountability” for short.
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also uncertain about their citizens’ resolve. Whether the public reveals its
true resolve, or lack of it, depends on how the public anticipates its leader
to manipulate public attention. In particular, it shows how the tendency of
mobilizing public attention under all circumstances may prevent leaders from
learning the public’s true preferences.
1.1 Rethinking Audience Costs Theory
This dissertation examines the domestic mechanism of signaling resolve
in international crisis. While there are various domestic actors that affect lead-
ers’ international behaviors, such as constituents (Slantchev 2005, Smith 1998),
political elites (Saunders 2015, Weeks 2008) or opposition parties (Arena 2015,
Ramsay 2004, Schultz 1998), I focus on the domestic interaction between lead-
ers and the general public, excluding the effects of other political incentives
inherent in opposition parties and political elites. Consistent with audience
costs theory, the dissertation begins with the notion that domestic political
punishment can serve as a costly signal in international bargaining, but it fur-
ther discusses challenges to audience costs theory by revisiting three questions:
Whose resolve do leaders signal? Why does the public punish leaders? How
do leaders signal resolve?
What is resolve in international relations? Kertzer (2016) summarizes
three camps studying the concept of resolve. The first camp, most about
deterrence theory, highlights the importance for states to build or maintain
“reputations for resolve.” Since it is related to emotional belief, scholars in
8
the first camp also suggest the difficulty of changing others’ perception of
resolve.6 The second camp is the crisis bargaining literature in which resolve
is considered as an actor’s private information, indicating the extent to which
the actor is willing to take risk in exchange for advantages in negotiations.7 In
the third camp, scholars of international security define resolve as “willingness
to suffer” and use this concept to explain military outcome. Scholars in the
third camp also examine resolve at a “lower level of analysis” such as military
units or “the public at large.”
While these camps study different aspects of resolve, they are not nec-
essarily contradictory with each other. Resolve can be private information that
helps an actor advance its bargaining power in negotiations. In the context of
security crisis with risks of war, the willingness to “take risk” is equivalent to
the willingness to “suffer from war.”8 From the perspective of uninformed ac-
tors, learning one’s resolve can be a lengthy process, depending on their prior
beliefs and the informed actors’ incentives. Finally, unless a state is assumed
as a unitary actor, students of international relations should specify whose
resolve they examine. My definition of resolve integrates insights from all the
three camps. With the focus on crisis bargaining, I define a state’s resolve as
its willingness to suffer from war if it cannot achieve a peaceful agreement with
6See Mercer 1996; Press 2005; Hopf 1994.
7See Jervis 1970; Schelling 1966; Fearon 1997; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Fearon 1994;
Fearon 1995.
8As Kertzer (2016) recognizes as well, rationalist scholars of conflict have long integrated
crisis bargaining models and models of military outcomes: negotiations during crises are
affected by the anticipation of war outcome, whereas war is also a continuation of the
bargaining process. For example, see Wagner 2000; Filson and Werner 2004.
9
other states. Conceptually, resolve refers to morale, determination, “nerves,”
or sensitivity to the loss in war, which is separate from capabilities or material
resources such as military power, population, and wealth. Considering resolve
as a cost of potential outcomes, I assume that resolve is situational, varying
with specific crises and disputed goods: actors are more resolute if the stakes
are high. In this sense, I do not distinguish between an actor’s resolve and the
stakes (or valuation) of goods in the following theories.9
Assuming that states are unitary actors, models of crisis bargaining
examine why private information about resolve may lead to war and how
states signal their resolve (Fearon 1995, 1997). If we investigate a domestic
mechanism of signaling resolve, it is essential to unpack unitary states and
specify whose resolve is signaled to foreign opponents. Resolve refers to the
willingness to bear costs of war. If breaking unitary-state assumptions, we
should specify which actor—the leader or the public—bears costs in the event
of war. The majority of works on audience costs either assumes unitary states
or imposes costs of war on leaders without further reasoning (Debs and Weiss
2014, Ramsay 2004, Slantchev 2006, Smith 1998). In the conflict literature,
the term—“the cost of war”—often indicates military fatalities and economic
destruction. It refers to the societal aspects of costs “imposed on the popula-
tion” (Fearon 1995, pp. 379). While leaders may have to bear political costs
for fighting, it is the public who directly suffers from the societal costs of war
9Alternatively, resolve can be considered as an enduring trait. Most works in this category
examine reputations for resolve.
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associated with casualties and economic destruction (Chiozza and Goemans
2004). In this dissertation, I investigate how leaders signal the public’s resolve
to foreign opponents during security crises. Focusing on the public’s resolve
has two advantages. First, it is consistent with a state’s resolve—the societal
cost of war—in the unitary-actor framework. Second, it facilitates our under-
standing of how the public weighs fighting against a negotiated settlement,
which, as I argue next, affects its evaluation of the leader’s performance.
A costly signaling mechanism requires an understanding about the
source of extra costs. The conventional audience costs theory suggests that
the public imposes extra costs on leaders for bluffing due to its concerns about
“international credibility, face or honor” (Fearon 1994, pp. 581). Therefore,
the conventional source of extra costs originates from the public’s concerns
about the consistency of leaders. If a leader issues a threat and then backs
down, the public can punish the leader for the latter’s inconsistency between
words and deeds in order to restore national prestige. According to this logic,
backing down is rarely a desirable option. Recent survey experiments have
confirmed that the concerns of consistency or prestige affect individual evalua-
tions of how their leader handles foreign crises (Levy et al. 2015, Tomz 2007).
In addition to prestige concerns, experimental works show that individuals’
policy preferences also affect their approval of leadership: dovish people tend
to disapprove leaders of using force or threatening to use force (Kertzer and
Brutger 2016).
Recent experimental works imply that there exist two competing log-
11
ics of domestic punishment. If the public is concerned about consistency, the
leader is always subject to extra costs for backing down from an initial threat:
this is the conventional logic of audience costs which increase the credibility
of threat. If the public is concerned about the substance of crisis outcomes—a
peaceful settlement or an escalation to war, backing down can be a desirable
outcome for those unwilling to bear the costs of war. Consider the earlier exam-
ple about the UN referendum in Taiwan. According to several surveys before
the referendum, the majority of Taiwanese respondents agreed to increase the
“international space” of Taiwan, that is, more recognition and participation
in intergovernmental institutions, but they became more cautious when asked
about potential conflicts with mainland China. In the question about whether
respondents would be willing to join war if mainland China attacked after the
referendum, only 37% of responses provided a positive answer. Only 30% of
respondents agreed to conduct the referendum after the open opposition from
the U.S.10 Therefore, it is essential to disentangle these competing logics in
the new mechanism. The public is considered not only as a distant audience
judging its leader’s performance, but also as a direct participant in the event
of war. For the second logic, the public’s resolve is the key to understand how
the public weighs militarized conflicts against backing down with a peaceful
settlement.
Finally, the literature on audience costs seems unclear about how the
10Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan), 2008. 2007
Opinion Polls Analysis on Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations (in Chinese).
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=56143&ctNode=6333&mp=1
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amount of extra costs varies, which affects the strength (or costliness) of sig-
nals delivered to foreign opponents. I argue that the problem lies in the am-
biguity between a public event and a public threat. In his original piece on
audience costs, Fearon (1994, pp. 577) recognizes the public aspects of crises:
“measures such as troop deployments and public threats make crises public
events in which domestic audiences observe and assess the performance of the
leadership.” Nonetheless, Fearon and other scholars view the level of publicity
constant across crises and attribute the variation of extra costs only to political
or institutional differences, namely, the audience’s capability to punish their
leader. Their assumptions of publicity create two problems. First, despite
the ability to impose political punishment, citizens in democracies usually pay
low attention to political affairs (Baum 2004, Zaller 1992). Hence, democratic
citizens may be unable to generate sufficiently large political costs to make
costly signaling work. Second, private diplomacy can be effective in settling a
peaceful agreement or achieving cooperation (Kurizaki 2007, Yarhi-Milo 2013).
In fact, most challenges to audience costs theory are concentrated on whether
democratic citizens are (more) capable of punishing their leaders. What if
there are other factors that affect the variation of political costs?
In addition to political differences, the level of publicity—how much
attention the public pays to a crisis—determines the amount of extra costs
imposed on leaders. While the effects of regime types on extra political costs
are largely exogenous, national leaders have much stronger control over the
level of publicity. For instance, authoritarian leaders increase public atten-
13
tion and involvement in foreign affairs by granting unusual permission to anti-
foreign protests (Weiss 2013). Nonetheless, I argue that the strategic control of
publicity is not a unique advantage for authoritarian leaders. Although demo-
cratic leaders are much more limited in controlling mass media or repressing
the freedom of speech, they are able to influence the level of publicity through
their interactions with mass media and the resources they can employ from
administrations or political parties. During the Cienfuegos crisis, the Nixon
administration was able to prevent a “crisis mood” among the public even
after news media were aware of Soviet Union’s nuclear facility. Kissinger and
the NSC staffs were cautious about the wording and tones in their statements
and constantly declined to disclose further details to news media. Hence, the
Cienfuegos incident was not exactly “private,” but it managed to receive low
public attention throughout the negotiation process.
I argue that the distinction between public and private diplomacy is
misleading in studying the domestic signaling mechanism of crisis bargaining.
On one hand, leaders from neither side can keep a crisis completely private,
as the underlying issue of a crisis (e.g. the development of military facilities
in Cuba, the promotion of formal independence of Taiwan, the humanitarian
crisis in Syria) is often a heated topic to the public and mass media.11 On the
other, despite the public aspects of crisis, actual exchanges between leaders are
rarely available to the public immediately. During the Cuban Missile Crisis,
11If a negotiation can be maintained in complete secrecy, the issue involved can hardly
generate a crisis, such as Nixon’s secret visit to the People’s Republic of China. See Yarhi-
Milo 2013.
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what the American public observed was merely an open warning by President
John Kennedy, rather than the exact negotiation process between the U.S. and
the Soviet Union. What affects extra political costs imposed by the public,
I argue, is not a leader’s choice between public and private diplomacy, but a
leader’s choice of publicity given the occurrence of a crisis. If both democratic
and authoritarian leaders are able to manipulate the publicity of threats, the
amount of extra costs conveyed in signals is determined both by regime types
and by the endogenous publicity. Modeling the control of publicity may offer
an integrated explanation about why democratic leaders do not have a unique
advantage in signaling resolve.
1.2 The Argument
To further motivate research questions, Chapter 2 lays out more details
about the challenges to audience costs theory and the new perspectives pre-
sented in the previous section. I propose two types of political costs leaders
are subject to: audience costs and policy costs. Audience costs—matching the
public’s concerns of national prestige—are imposed when a leader’s action is in-
consistent with his initial statement. Policy costs are imposed when a leader’s
decision between war and peace does not match the public’s preference about
crisis outcomes. I further suggest that policy costs indicate a leader’s political
accountability to the public’s policy preference. After clarifying the public’s
concerns and the associated political costs, I begin with a stylized model of
crisis bargaining, in which the public expresses its policy preference during the
15
bargaining process. Introducing the public’s resolve and policy costs provides
new insights to audience cost theory. A leader’s bargaining power may be
undermined by his political accountability to the public’s policy preferences.
If the public is considered unwilling to fight and allowed to punish its leader
for implementing threats, the leader’s bargaining power shrinks as her policy
costs increase.
Chapter 3 presents the core theory on how leaders use the publicity
of threats to signal the public’s resolve in crisis bargaining. Building upon
the baseline model in Chapter 2, the full model not only allows a public to
be concerned both about national prestige and about policy substance, but
also enables a leader to choose the level of public attention. Once the model
takes into account the variation of the public’s policy preferences, increasing
public attention does not always tie a leader’s hands. Analyzing the model
under complete information yields an important finding different from the
conventional wisdom: going public ties a leader’s hands only when the leader
is accountable to a hawkish public rather than a dovish public. This devia-
tion from the conventional wisdom thus changes our understanding about the
signaling behaviors of leaders.
When the public’s resolve is unknown to the foreign opponent, the for-
eign opponent can reduce its uncertainty by observing the leader’s strategy of
publicity, which depends not only on the leader’s political accountability to
the public’s policy preferences but also on the distribution of power. First,
greater publicity does not always signal the public’s resolve. When leaders
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are highly accountable (e.g. democratic leaders), surprisingly, decreasing the
level of publicity signals the public’s resolve. Second, democratic leaders do
not always have an advantage in signaling the public’s resolve. The effects
of political accountability on credible signaling are conditioned on the dis-
tribution of power between a challenging state and a foreign target. When
the foreign target is relatively strong, democratic leaders—highly accountable
to the public’s policy preferences—credibly communicate the public’s resolve
and therefore avoid the escalation of crisis. When the foreign target is rela-
tively weak, democratic leaders are no better at signaling the public’s resolve
than less democratic leaders. With a resolute public, democratic leaders may
choose to hide the true information, provoking the resolute public to support
war. Without directly suffering from war, leaders are better off by fighting
with public support if the foreign target is relatively weak.
Taking into consideration different sources of public preferences, the
theory presented in the previous chapter yields two new findings. First,
without the pressure from the domestic public, unaccountable leaders achieve
peaceful agreements with no need to signal. Second, the credibility of highly
accountable leaders in communicating resolve is conditioned on the distribu-
tion of power: in particular, these leaders have no advantage in delivering
credible signals when their countries have strong military capabilities relative
to those of targets. Chapter 4 provides the empirical support for the sec-
ond finding: the effects of political accountability on bargaining outcomes are
conditioned on the distribution of power between adversaries. When a chal-
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lenging state is relatively weak, the political accountability of its leader has a
non-linear relationship with crisis escalation: the risk of war reaches the high-
est when the leader is moderately accountable, but declines when the leader
becomes highly accountable or not accountable at all. When a challenging
state is relatively strong, increasing the leader’s political accountability has
no effect in delivering credible threats: the pacifying effects of high account-
ability disappears. By modifying one of the most recent measures of Audience
Costs Capacity, I construct a new index for political accountability. Using the
Militarized Compellent Threat dataset, I examine how political accountability
affects the likelihood that a challenger’s threat receives compliance from its
target. The empirical result is consistent with the propositions above: a chal-
lenger’s political accountability affects the outcome of threats, yet such effect
is conditioned on the relative strength between a challenger and its target.
Chapter 5 extends the previous model by (a) further assuming that
the public’s resolve is unknown both to leaders and to foreign opponents, and
(b) making the domestic public express their preferences about crisis out-
comes before the leader’s and the foreign target’s moves. The modified model
shows that war is possible under complete information, as the public support
for war may make peace costly to leaders and thus eliminate the bargaining
range with foreign opponents. This chapter further explores the conditions
under which the public’s expression reveals or masks its true preference about
war and peace. I narrow down the scope such that the public’s support for
war can eliminate the bargaining range between two states, as I am particu-
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larly interested in whether war may occur due to a leader’s overestimation of
the public’s resolve. The modified model shows that the public will express
their true preferences only when the leader makes distinct choices of publicity
based on their expressions: maximizing public attention given their support
for war, yet minimizing public attention given their opposition against war.
Without such distinction, the public has few incentives to reveal its true pref-
erence. Most importantly, the public will always appear supportive of war if
the leader is not expected to reduce the level of publicity after anti-war ex-
pressions. Amplified by a high level of publicity, anti-war expressions would
make the leader “look bad” in front of foreign opponents and potentially lead
to an offer worse than fighting. The leader’s tendency to constantly engage
public attention may prevent the irresolute public from revealing its dovish
preference. It yields some new implications to the research on nationalism or
public mobilization. The undifferentiated tendency of mobilizing the public
in crisis can be ineffective or even counterproductive, not only because it ap-
pears incredible to foreign observers but also because it prevents leaders from
learning the true preferences of their people.
Chapter 6 summarizes the dissertation’s contributions to the literature
of international conflict and costly signaling, suggesting directions for future
research. It presents a more integrated framework which reconciles the con-
ventional audience costs theory and subsequent critics. The main findings
reinforce the conventional wisdom that signaling resolve increases a leader’s
credibility in crisis bargaining, but they challenge the linear linkage between
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increasing public attention and signaling resolve. The conventional mech-
anism of audience costs—increasing public attention signals resolve—exists
when leaders are moderately accountable (i.e. to the resolute type of peo-
ple only). When leaders are highly accountable (i.e. to all types of people),
increasing public attention makes backing down easier and thus signals flex-
ibility. Therefore, highly accountable leaders will decrease public attention
to enhance credibility and bargaining advantage. In terms of future research,
I first discuss how experimental works and theory development can reinforce
each other in advancing our understanding on the domestic impact in crisis
bargaining. I also suggest more research on how leaders make public threats,
including data collection and more experimental works on how individuals
evaluate their leaders conditioned on different levels of attention. Finally, I
explore the implications in this dissertation to U.S. foreign policies and the
growing trend of nationalism and populism.
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Chapter 2
Political Costs, Publicity, and Crisis
Bargaining
Why do leaders choose to increase public attention during crisis bar-
gaining? How does greater public attention affect the outcomes of crises? The
conventional wisdom suggests that increasing public attention, as a costly sig-
nal of resolve, advances a state’s bargaining advantage in crisis bargaining.
The underlying rationale is that bargaining in public may generate so-called
audience costs on the challenger who backs down from its initial threat, mak-
ing it more likely to escalate and thus signaling greater resolve (Fearon 1994,
1997). To further examine audience costs as a domestic mechanism of costly
signaling, subsequent works explore mainly two questions: why backing down
is considered undesirable and how political costs are imposed on leaders. In
this chapter, I review the literature on both questions and discuss their limi-
tations. In particular, I challenge the notion why backing down is considered
unpopular only and discuss when standing firm may incur other political costs
as well. Second, while the literature attributes the variation of the amount
of political costs to political institutions, I explore the role of leaders in de-
termining the amount of political costs. These discussions propose alternative
perspectives which lay the ground for new assumptions and models in the
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following chapters.
I first review the literature on the domestic attitudes towards backing
down from initial threats. While the majority of works attributes the unpop-
ularity of backing down to the concerns of national prestige or reputation,
recent works point out that the preferences about policy substance also shape
the public’s attitudes towards backing down. The concerns of national pres-
tige refer to the (in)consistency between a leader’s words and deeds, which
affects national honor and reputation in future bargaining. The concerns of
policy substance emphasize the public’s calculation of benefits and costs be-
tween escalation and a peaceful agreement in a given crisis. However, the
extant literature treats the public’s policy preference as fixed or exogenously
determined. I argue that it is critical to directly model the variation of the
public’s preference of policy substance, not only because it affects the public’s
attitudes towards backing down but also because it constitutes the essence
of “resolve”—a major source of uncertainty in crisis bargaining—at the state
level. I introduce a baseline model with the following features: First, the atti-
tudes towards backing down are determined both by reputation concerns and
by policy preferences; Second, the public’s policy preferences are shaped by
its payoffs from war and peace.
When examining how audience costs are imposed on leaders, scholars
on audience costs theory debate about whether democratic leaders are indeed
subject to greater audience costs then their authoritarian counterparts. The
general notion is that the more democratic the challenger is, the more polit-
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ical costs are generated and thus the more effective a signal is. Challenges
to this notion suggest either that citizens in democracies are unable to gen-
erate high audience costs due to low attention to politics (Baum 2004, Zaller
1992), or that autocratic leaders are also subject to audience costs under cer-
tain circumstances (Weeks 2008). Nonetheless, the existing debate focuses on
the exogenous effects of regime types on the domestic audience, such as how
much the audience is capable of coordinating to impose political punishment
or whether the audience pays attention to foreign affairs. Instead of focusing
entirely on the audience side, I argue that individual leaders, independent of
institutional variations, are able to adjust political costs by altering the level of
public attention to crises. The amount of political costs is jointly determined
by exogenous political environments as well as the level of public attention
chosen by leaders.
Before I move on, it is worth mentioning that I focus on the general
public as the domestic audience. Scholars refer domestic audiences to a variety
of actors, such as constituents (Slantchev 2005, Smith 1998), political elites
(Saunders 2015, Weeks 2008) or opposition parties (Arena 2015, Ramsay 2004,
Schultz 1998). In this dissertation, I concentrate on the general public and its
preferences, therefore excluding the effects of other political incentives inherent
in opposition parties and political elites (e.g. political competition).
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2.1 Why is Backing Down Undesirable?
The enduring problems in conflict studies are why war occurs if a peace-
ful agreement is ex post less costly and how states can prevent it. One of the
general explanations attributes the outbreak of war to the problem of uncer-
tainty among states. War occurs when one has some unobservable characteris-
tics, unknown to the other, and has an incentive to deliver wrong information
to advance its own bargaining leverage (Fearon 1995). The incentive to hide
true information leads to ineffective communication and a risk of war. Under
this logic, the tragedy of war can be prevented if states solve the problem of
ineffective communication. A key unobservable characteristic in the choices
between war and peace is one’s subjective assessment of the costs of war, or
resolve. The smaller the costs a state assesses for using force, the more resolute
the state is. How do states address the uncertainty over each other’s resolve
in international crises? To make communication more effective, in principle, a
resolute type must distinguish itself from an irresolute type with costly signals:
a signal must involve sufficient costs such that the irresolute type chooses to
reveal the true information rather than pretend the resolute one.
Audience costs theory proposes a domestic signaling mechanism in crisis
bargaining. In principle, when a state threatens to use force, it has stronger
incentives to carry out the threat if it engages additional costs for backing
down. With all else being equal, as the amount of additional costs increases,
the state will be more likely to escalate when its demand is rejected, implying
that its communication is more credible (Fearon 1997). If the amount of ad-
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ditional costs is sufficiently large, a resolute state is able to fully distinguish
itself from an irresolute state, solving the informational problem. While the
additional costs for backing down can be imposed either by domestic or by in-
ternational audience (hence “audience costs), the majority of literature focuses
on the domestic side. How does the amount of audience costs increase? The
conventional wisdom suggests that it increases with the audience’s capability
of punishing its leader, determined by external political institutions.
But why is backing down a bad idea for the public? The original dis-
cussion highlights the “loss of international credibility, face or honor” (Fearon
1994, pp. 581). Since escalating and then backing down hurt “the state’s rep-
utation for threatening the use of force only when serious” (ibid), a leader
is judged to have performed poorly for making an empty threat. Citizens
have an incentive to remove leaders caught bluffing and thus restore credibil-
ity (Guisinger and Smith 2002). In other words, a leader is able to signal his
resolve because his audiences care about the values of consistency.
Another reason, followed with more theoretical development, is associ-
ated with the competence of leaders. However, scholars vary in terms of how
they think the public evaluates “competence.” First, some argue that a leader
is considered incompetent when people “find out that his behavior was differ-
ent from what they would have done if they had the same information” (Downs
and Rocke 1995, Slantchev 2006). It implies that in the decisions of war and
peace, people may have different payoffs of war from their leader.1 In the con-
1In the rationalist framework, the difference may result from the disagreement over the
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text of crisis bargaining, while backing down may render a leader incompetent
among resolute audiences, carrying out threats may also be labeled incompe-
tent if the public believes that peace is more preferable. Modeling competence
in this way would require some prior knowledge of what the public prefers in
the first place. In other words, inconsistency may not be politically costly to
leaders once we relax the assumption that the public always rejects the idea
of backing down.
Recent survey experiments offer new insights to reconcile the contra-
dictory assumptions about domestic preference. Consistency is only one of the
dimensions upon which people evaluate their leaders. On the one hand, various
studies show that people care about whether the leader is consistent between
words and deeds (Davies and Johns 2013, Tomz 2007). On the other, there
is evidence that in addition to consistency, preferences over war and peace
also affect the public approval of their leader (Chaudoin 2014, Kertzer and
Brutger 2016). What do these experimental findings imply to theorists? In
addition to the costs of backing down after an empty threat, leaders also suffer
from launching escalation with which the audiences disagree. If leaders worry
about the costs of backing down alone, the case where Taiwanese forced their
president to back down is puzzling. However, it makes sense if we consider the
strong domestic opposition against war which the former president could not
afford to ignore. To understand how the public influences its leader, we need
to theorize what people prefer in the first place. That is, instead of assuming
costs of war or the valuation of goods or both.
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“backing down is a bad policy”, we need to specify when the public prefers
escalation, which involves militarized conflicts, to backing down. Hence, mod-
eling the public’s payoffs should focus on its role as a participant in potential
military conflicts rather than as a distant audience who is aloof from war and
only judges its leader after a crisis ends.
2.2 Audience Costs vs. Policy Costs
To examine the domestic mechanism of audience costs, scholars argue
that audience costs originate from the concerns about incompetent leaders to
whom people delegate the power of foreign policies (Slantchev 2006, Smith
1998). As people are uncertain about the competence of leaders, a compe-
tent leader uses public threats to separate himself from an incompetent one.
However, if a leader is considered incompetent when people “find out that his
behavior was different from what they would have done if they had the same in-
formation” (Downs and Rocke 1995), it is unclear why backing down is always
considered undesirable by the public and hence implies incompetence. Recent
experimental studies confirm the conjecture that people worry about the loss
of prestige or reputation (Levendusky and Horowitz 2012, Tomz 2007), but
some also provide new evidence that individuals who prefer peaceful solutions
disapprove of a leader committed to escalation (Kertzer and Brutger 2016).2
Independent from the concerns of national honor, people vary in the degrees
of tolerance of war, which shapes different preferences for war and peace. If
2See a non-militarized example in Chaudoin (2014).
27
the public imposes audience costs on leaders for backing down due to prestige
concerns, it is reasonable to contend that the public can also punish leaders
for the consideration of “policy substance” Snyder and Borghard (2011) or
“merits of policy” in terms of national interest (Levy 2012).
To my knowledge, the literature on audience cost theory has not ex-
plicitly modeled the variation of the public audience’s preferences for war and
peace. Most works on the domestic origin of audience costs assume a “good”
policy exogenously given, as they focus on how the public overcomes informa-
tional asymmetry to learn the competence of leaders (Debs and Weiss 2014,
Slantchev 2006). Instead, I explicitly model the public’s preferences for war
and peace by adopting Fearon’s rationalist framework yet locating the costs
of war in the domestic public. Fearon (1995) first assumes that states are uni-
tary actors and models how unitary states calculate benefits and costs of war.
The assumption—a state bears the costs of war—is appropriate if one seeks
to understand war and peace on the level of interstate interaction. If we are
interested in how the interactions between leaders and the public affects war
and peace, we should reconsider which actor—the leader or the public—bears
the costs of war. According to Fearon’s notion on the “second-image” mech-
anism, “...[leaders] will enjoy various benefits of war without suffering costs
imposed on the population (Fearon 1995, pp. 379).” In other words, if we un-
pack a unitary state, it is people rather than their leader who bears the societal
costs associated with casualties and destruction (Chiozza and Goemans 2004,
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Fearon 1995).3 The minimum offer people accept depends on how many costs
they are willing to bear in the event of war. Small costs of war indicate the
public willingness to fight, or what I call the public’s resolve. Modeling the
public’s resolve allows me to specify the conditions under which people support
backing down and would impose punishment if leaders choose the opposite.
Therefore, I assume that the public is concerned both about national
prestige and about policy substance in the following models. The concerns
of national prestige refer to the (in)consistency between a leader’s words and
deeds, which affects national honor and reputation in future bargaining. Under
this logic, it is undesirable if a leader’s subsequent behavior is inconsistent
with his statement. This is consistent with the original audience costs theory:
after a leader threatens to use force, backing down is undesirable because it
hurts national honor and future bargaining.4 The concerns of policy substance
indicate the public’s calculation of benefits and costs between escalation and
a peaceful agreement in a given crisis. Similar to the rationalist unitary-state
framework (Fearon 1995), whether the public prefers crisis escalation or a
peaceful settlement depends on the relative military capabilities and the costs
of war the public is willing to bear.
The analytical distinction between prestige concerns and policy sub-
3Unless specified, the costs of war in this article refers to the societal costs as indicated
above.
4Although this is not the focus here, according to the logic of national prestige, it is
also undesirable if a leader launches militarized conflict after being committed to a peaceful
negotiation.(Levy et al. 2015)
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stance is crucial: while the pressure of prestige concerns always discourages
leaders to back down, the preferences of policy substance may or may not
work in the same direction, depending on whether people prefer peace to war.
Indeed, the UN referendum was invalid because the Taiwanese public were
unwilling to fight against mainland China. I assume that leaders are there-
fore subject to two types of political costs due to different concerns: (a) the
concern of national prestige generates audience costs that always encourage
leaders to stand firm, and (b) the concern of policy preferences generates pol-
icy costs which may or may not encourage leaders to back down, depending
on the public’s resolve. The greater policy costs are, the more accountable a
leader is to the public’s preference for policy substance.
2.3 The Baseline Model
To illustrate how two types of political costs differ, below I present a
baseline model with complete information. Two states—Home (H) and For-
eign (F )—have disputes over some divisible goods, such as territory, policies,
rights and privileges, etc. The disputed goods are currently under F ’s control,
with the value normalized to one. While F is a unitary state, H is composed of
a leader (L) and a domestic audience (A). The model begins with the foreign
opponent’s response to the leader’s challenge.5 F proposes to H a new share,
5In the full model, I am interested in how leaders choose the publicity of threats. Whether
leaders make threats is not the focus of this chapter.
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x ∈ [0, 1].6 Observing the proposal, A chooses whether to support fighting
before L decides whether to stand firm or back down. F receives 1− x if the
game ends with peace; otherwise it receives its payoffs of war, 1−p− cF . L ei-
ther gains her new share after a peaceful agreement, or fights a winner-take-all
war, defeating F with probability p. L’s political costs depend on A’s prestige
concerns and policy preferences. If A does not support war, L pays audience
costs, r, for backing down, or policy costs, d, for standing firm. If A supports
fighting, L incurs both r and d for backing down as it makes an empty threat
and fails to deliver what A prefers; otherwise, L escalates and receives its war
payoff: with probability p, L wins the whole share and with probability 1− p,
it pays d for losing a popular war. A bears the costs of war, cA. Whether A
supports fighting depends on its new share of goods, x, on one hand, and its
payoffs of war, p− cA, on the other. Figure 2.1 presents the baseline model.
F
x
1
0
A
fight
∼fight
L
stand firm
back down
(
1− p− cF , p− cA, p− d(1− p)
)
(
1− x, x, x− r − d )
L
stand firm
back down
(
1− p− cF , p− cA, p− d
)
(
1− x, x, x− r )
Figure 2.1: The Baseline Model
From F ’s perspective, the minimum offer to avoid war makes both A
6Similar to Tarar and Leventog˘lu (2009), I treat the disputed goods divisible in all the
models.
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and L prefer peace to war, that is, A does not support fighting and L backs
down. The first condition requires an offer no less than p−cA, which I call A’s
reservation value. Similarly, the second condition yields L’s reservation value,
p − d + r. To avoid war, F picks the greater reservation value between two
options so that both L and A would prefer a peaceful agreement to a costly
war. If A has the greater reservation value, F proposes p − cA, which also
prevents L from standing firm. If L has the greater reservation value, offering
p − cA would not be enough to achieve peace because L is able to withhold
domestic oppositions against war and still chooses to stand firm; instead, F
must offer p − d + r.7 It is obvious that which offer F proposes depends on
the relative values between cA and d − r. Figure 2.2 illustrates a non-linear
relationship between F ’s offer (x) and L’s policy costs (d).8
x
x = p− d + r
x = p− cA
cA + r
d
Figure 2.2: F ’s Offer
7Formally, the following strategies constitute F ’s best response functions in the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the baseline model: when d ≥ cA + r, F proposes x = p − cA; when
d < cA + r, F proposes x = p− d+ r. See a complete proof in Appendix A.
8I assume that p = 0.6, cA = 0.4, and r = 0.2.
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Introducing the public’s resolve and policy costs provides new insights
to audience cost theory. First, a leader’s bargaining power may be undermined
by her political accountability to the public’s policy preferences. Once we allow
the public to consider the costs of war and to punish leaders for standing firm
when they do not support fighting, the leader’s bargaining power shrinks as
her policy costs increase. In particular, if policy costs are small (d < cA + r),
F proposes L’s reservation value, p− d+ r, which decreases with the values of
policy costs. L’s bargaining power decreases with its policy costs: the more L
is accountable to the public’s policy preferences, the weaker bargaining power
L has. In other words, an authoritarian leader may be able to take a tough
position and thus gain a better deal than a democratic leader as the former is
less constrained by the domestic inclination against a costly war.
Second, though no war occurs under complete information, the baseline
model highlights whose preferences (and the knowledge about them) matter
in the bargaining outcome under different situations. As shown above, if d <
cA + r, F achieves a peaceful outcome by proposing L’s reservation value,
implying that the key to avoid war lies in the information about L’s political
costs rather than the information about the public’s costs of war. Whether F
knows the value of cA does not affect its bargaining strategy and the overall
outcome. However, if d ≥ cA + r, A has the greater reservation value and
therefore, F must propose p − cA to secure an agreement, which does not
increase with L’s political costs. F ’s full knowledge of cA is necessary to
guarantee a peaceful outcome.
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The second finding sheds lights on the debates over whose resolve—
leaders’ or people’s—matters more in international conflicts (Chiozza and
Goemans 2004, Horowitz, Stam and Ellis 2015, McGillivray and Smith 2008,
Wolford 2007).9 In reality, the opponent’s uncertainty about resolve can ex-
ist in both sources and affect the probability of war. Overall, the knowledge
about the public’s resolve matters more if the opponent bargains with democ-
racies, the knowledge about individual leaders is more critical if it deals with
autocracies.
2.4 Endogenous Publicity and Political Costs
Although the origin of audience cost theory has little to do with the de-
bate of democratic peace (Schultz 2012), the majority of the subsequent works
focuses on whether democracies are capable of generating larger audience costs
than authoritarian regimes. On one hand, scholars modify or strengthen the
original theory by specifying the conditions under which democracies can gen-
erate greater audience costs or providing empirical evidence. Democratic lead-
ers are subject to audience costs or domestic punishment with the presence
of free media (Slantchev 2006) or opposition parties (Ramsay 2004). Recent
empirical works provide evidence that democratic leaders are indeed imposed
audience costs in the form of domestic legislative failure (Gelpi and Grieco
2015). On the other hand, other works are skeptical about the evidence of
9The original debate puts individual leaders in contrast with unitary states. As discussed
above, the resolve of states resides in the public when we examine the domestic mechanism
of states.
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audience costs in democracies or the unique advantage that democratic lead-
ers have in generating audience costs. Some scholars argue that large audi-
ence costs would not be generated in democracies because people tend to pay
low attention to political affairs (Baum and Potter 2008, Trachtenberg 2012),
whereas others suggest that autocracies may be as capable of generating au-
dience costs as their democratic counterparts (Weeks 2008, Weiss 2013). As a
result, there is no agreement regarding whether democratic leaders are more
capable of signaling resolve in crisis bargaining (Downes and Sechser 2012,
Kurizaki and Whang 2015, Moon and Souva 2016). To reconcile the disagree-
ment, I have proposed another dimension of political costs—policy costs based
on the public’s policy preferences—in addition to the conventional audience
costs. In this section, I further argue that another problem is the insufficient
attention to the influence of leaders in managing the level of public attention.
Leaders are capable of adjusting political costs by controlling the pub-
licity of threats. Extant works usually consider political costs as exogenously
determined by regime types or institutional arrangements (Slantchev 2006,
Smith 1998). Recently, scholars also argue that more salient issues generate
greater audience costs in democracies (Gibler and Hutchison 2013). How-
ever, neither political costs nor public attention is entirely predetermined and
moreover, they are connected.10 A recent experiment shows that a stronger
statement of threat results in more public disapproval if leaders do not follow
10While some scholars study the exogenous variation of public attention, for example,
the access to mass media (Potter and Baum 2014), I focus on the leader’s endogenous
management of public attention.
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it through (Trager and Vavreck 2011). Leaders can choose not only whether to
make public or private threats (Kurizaki 2007), but also how to make public
threats. For example, leaders can decide the rank of speaker, the context of
statements (McManus 2016), and the tone or rhetoric of threats (McManus
2014); they can create other opportunities to increase the salience of crisis,
such as referendums, congressional debates (Debs and Weiss 2014),11 the per-
mission of anti-foreign protests (Weiss 2013).
Given the existence of a crisis, I argue that leaders can choose to in-
crease or decrease the level of publicity to the crisis. First, leaders can decide
how to make a public threat by choosing speaker, occasion, rhetoric, frequency,
etc. For instance, the higher a speaker’s rank is, the more attention the public
will pay to the statement. During the Cienfuego crisis, the Nixon administra-
tion tried to draw this incident out of public attention, not to creating crisis
mood among the public. Apart from Kissinger’s ambiguous statements, Pres-
ident Nixon rarely made any public comments on this matter. Instead, Nixon
remained impassive and maintained his planned schedule, including a trip to
Europe (Crall and Martin 2013, pp. 196). Second, leaders can decide whether
to engage additional mass mobilization to manipulate the level of publicity.
Extant works suggest that both democratic and authoritarian leaders are able
to mobilize public attention, though the specific techniques they adopt may
11While Debs and Weiss (2014) discuss the role of public debates in revealing external
circumstances—a component of the costs of war—to audience and foreign adversaries, they
consider public debates as an unconditional feature of democracies, not as a leader’s strategic
choice.
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vary. Since mass mobilization is usually forbidden or restrained under author-
itarian regimes, authoritarian leaders are able to show their intention to draw
public attention by temporarily permitting mass protests in foreign crises. This
technique does not apply to democratic leaders: anti-foreign protests may well
be spontaneous from the bottom, given an overall high level of political free-
dom in democracies. The techniques of additional mass mobilization available
to democratic leaders include increasing the involvement of legislative body or
political parties. Take the Cienfuegos crisis as an example again. One of the
major concerns of Kissinger and the National Security Council was that the
U.S. Congress would “build up” a crisis. In addition to few comments to the
press, Kissinger refused to cooperate with the Congress when asked to share
information (Siniver 2008).
Considering both exogenous environments and strategic choices recon-
cile the conventional audience costs theory and its critics. A leader’s threat
to use force is more credible if he suffers from more political costs for back-
ing down, which, according to the conventional wisdom, tends to occur in
democracies.12 In other words, threats issued by a democratic leader are more
credible, advancing his bargaining position and reducing the risk of war. This
notion receives theoretical challenges in two aspects. First, scholars disagree
on the amount of political costs generated in democracies. Some suggest that
citizens in democracies may be unable to generate large political costs as they
12See Schultz’s (2012) review about the development of audience costs theory, in particu-
lar, how the theory has become one explanation of democratic advantage in crisis bargaining
or democratic peace.
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pay low attention to political affairs (Potter and Baum 2014, Saunders 2015,
Zaller 1992). Given a certain level of public attention, nevertheless, democratic
leaders are able to further increase or decrease public attention through vari-
ous measures listed above. Second, studies show that authoritarian leaders are
sometimes able to tie their hands and signal resolve. By strategically raising
public involvement in international crisis, authoritarian leaders increase the
amount of political costs for backing down (Weiss 2013). In the next chapter,
I will model a leader’s political costs as an interaction between political envi-
ronments and the leader’s choice of publicity.
How does the endogenous control of publicity affect political costs? The
magnitudes of policy costs increase when leaders choose high-profile threats.
Associated with frequent media coverage, sustained open debates, etc, increas-
ing publicity raises the importance of policy preferences and holds leaders more
accountable to public preferences on policy substance. During the Fashoda
crisis, when the foreign secretary of Britain, Lord Salisbury, released to the
public the details of negotiation with France, he hoped that “people would
be able to approach the issue in a more sober way.”13 However, the magni-
tudes of audience costs decrease with publicity if people prefer peace to war.
Recent experiments show that when people are asked to consider both consis-
tency and policy preferences, the dovish respondents do not punish leaders for
13See Courcel to Delcasse´, 6 October 1898, Documents Diplomatiques Franc¸ais (1871-
1914), series 1, vol. 14, 633-35. Cited in Trachtenberg (2012).
38
backing down (Kertzer and Brutger 2016). Since great publicity makes policy
preferences more important, national prestige becomes a secondary concern
to the dovish people. With close attention, if the dovish people prioritize the
preference for peace, they are less likely to impose audience costs on leaders
for backing down.14 With low attention to crisis, however, people downplay
the importance of policy preferences—which makes inconsistency a relatively
salient issue—and thus blame leaders for damaging national prestige.15 Over-
all, if policy preferences are compatible with prestige concerns, that is, if people
prefer war to peace, great publicity further raises the importance of both con-
siderations. If the two concerns are incompatible, great publicity prioritizes the
consideration of policy preferences as it makes the public put more weight on
current policy substance—whether to fight or not—than on prestige concerns
that may affect future bargaining.
Foreign opponents can therefore infer the public’s resolve by observing
how leaders make public threats, for a leader’s political costs are associated
both with the choices of publicity and with public resolve. The relationship
14It also applies to international audiences(Fearon 1994). If international audiences ob-
serve that the leader backs down without public support for fighting, they are more likely
to believe that the leader is subject to domestic pressure instead of desire for bluffing.
15Building on Zaller’s (1992) work, some scholars suspect that people have independent
preferences as they simply take cues from the elites they support (Berinsky 2009, Saunders
2015). However, Zaller argues that elite disagreement can divide public opinion of policies
only among the politically aware, who “pay enough attention to elite discourse” and follow
particular ideological implications; otherwise, people are more likely to evaluate leaders
based on their own preferences. If leaders choose to increase public attention to crisis, with
the incumbency advantage, they are able to reach not only the politically aware ones, but
also a much broader public audience.
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between leaders and the public is similar to a two-level game in the context
of crisis bargaining (Putnam 1988), except that leaders do not directly suffer
from war, which creates the possibility that war may be rational for leaders
“if they will enjoy various benefits of war without suffering costs imposed on
the population” (Fearon 1995, pp. 379). On the international level, a leader,
constrained by the domestic public, bargains with a foreign opponent. On
the domestic level, the public express preferences about whether to accept
the opponent’s offer and decide, upon the leader’s final move, how to impose
political costs on leaders. To minimize political costs, leaders have incentives
either to signal or to mask the types of their people.16
2.5 Summary
In this section, I review the literature on the domestic signaling mech-
anism in crisis bargaining with a particular focus on audience costs theory.
Through extra political costs imposed by the public for backing down, audience
costs theory proposes a causal mechanism of how domestic politics can reduce
uncertainty between states and thus affect the outcome of crisis bargaining.
While audience costs theory introduces the possibility of solving informational
problems of war through domestic politics, scholars in this research program
disagree over when and why signaling resolve is more effective. I argue that
the existing literature has not addressed two fundamental modeling questions
16In reality, a leader may not know the resolve of his people with certainty, but it is
reasonable to contend that he has better knowledge than his foreign counterpart. See Tarar
(2001).
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in audience costs theory. First, why do leaders incur political costs only when
they back down from an earlier threat? Can the public also impose political
costs for carrying out a threat of using force? Second, how do the amount of
political costs vary? Is it determined by external political difference only (i.e.
regime type, institutional constraint, etc)?
I provide answers to these two questions by synthesizing the current
literature on audience costs, especially recent experimental research on the
theory’s microfoundation. I first challenge the notion that the public always
disapproves of backing down and introduce policy costs along with the conven-
tional audience costs. While audience costs discourage leaders from backing
down, how policy costs affect escalation decisions is conditioned on the pub-
lic’s policy preferences. I propose to explicitly model policy preferences by
switching the locale of resolve from leaders to the public. Whether people
support fighting depends on their willingness to fight or what I call the pub-
lic’s resolve, independent of the concerns of national prestige. I then construct
a baseline model that enables the public to express its policy preferences and
to impose both types of political costs on leaders. The baseline model shows
that knowledge about the public’s resolve is crucial to the bargaining outcome.
Finally, I relax the assumption that political costs are purely determined by
political institutions. Rather, leaders are able to adjust the magnitudes of
political costs by choosing the level of public attention to their threats. By
observing how leaders make public threats, foreign adversaries are therefore
able to gain information about the public’s resolve during crisis bargaining. In
41
the next chapter, I construct a crisis-bargaining model with the new features
formalized.
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Chapter 3
Seeking and Avoiding Accountability:
Signaling Resolve to Foreign Targets
This chapter examines how a leader signals the public’s resolve by
choosing a level of publicity during crisis bargaining. Drawing key assump-
tions from the previous chapter, I construct a crisis-bargaining model that (a)
allows a public to care both about national prestige and about policy sub-
stance, and (b) enables a leader to choose a level of public attention. While
the public pays the costs for war if negotiation fails, the leader is subject to
political costs for her choice between war and peace, related to two concerns of
the public. First, the leader pays audience costs for hurting national prestige,
that is, not executing the initial threat. Second, the leader pays policy costs
for not following the public’s preferred policy. If the public prefers war to a
peaceful agreement, prestige concerns and policy preferences are compatible,
as both concerns discourage leaders from backing down. If the public prefers
a peaceful agreement to war, however, it suggests that the public’s concerns
are incompatible or competing.
The leader chooses a level of public attention to adjust political costs.
When the public’s concerns are incompatible, the model assumes that in-
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creasing public attention makes the public put more weight on current policy
substance—whether to fight or not—than on prestige concerns that may affect
future bargaining. In this chapter, I analyze the model with complete infor-
mation and one-sided information where a foreign opponent does not know
the costs of war for the public (or the public’s resolve). In Chapter 5, I further
relax the assumptions about the information structure, allowing the public’s
resolve unknown both to its leader and to the foreign opponent.
Once the model takes into account the variation of the public’s policy
preferences, increasing public attention does not always tie a leader’s hands.
I first analyze the model with complete information. In equilibrium, a leader
can tie her hands by increasing public attention to foreign crises if the pub-
lic is dissatisfied with a peaceful agreement. If the public prefers a peaceful
agreement to a militarized conflict, increasing public attention to foreign crises
unties a leader’s hands instead. The conventional wisdom that going public
ties a leader’s hands exists only when she is accountable to a hawkish public
rather than a dovish public. This deviation from the conventional wisdom
thus changes our understanding about the leader’s signaling behaviors.
When the public’s resolve is unknown to the foreign opponent, the for-
eign opponent can reduce its uncertainty by observing the leader’s strategy of
publicity, which depends not only on the leader’s political accountability to
the public’s policy preferences but also on the distribution of power. First,
greater publicity does not always signal the public’s resolve. When leaders are
highly accountable (e.g. democratic leaders), a high-profile threat may suggest
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the lack of resolve among the public as the irresolute type of people would im-
pose smaller audience costs on leaders for backing down. Second, democratic
leaders do not always have an advantage in credibly communicating the pub-
lic’s resolve. The effects of political accountability on credible signaling are
conditioned on the distribution of power between the challenging state and
the foreign opponent. When the foreign opponent is relatively strong, demo-
cratic leaders—highly accountable to the public’s policy preferences—credibly
communicate the public’s resolve and therefore avoid costly war. When the
foreign opponent is relatively weak, a democratic leader with an resolute pub-
lic chooses not to reveal the information about her people and therefore risks
fighting a costly war with domestic support. In the latter scenario, fighting
with public support brings leaders greater payoffs than a peaceful agreement
does because it is easier to defeat a weak opponent.
3.1 The Model
I develop a Bayesian game in which (a) the opponent is uncertain about
the public’s resolve and (b) the leader chooses the publicity of threats before
the opponent’s offer. Both A and F receive the same set of payoffs as in the
baseline model. The sequence of the model goes as follows. First, Nature
(N) chooses A’s costs of war, generating an resolute public (cA = cA) with
probability φ and an irresolute public (cA = cA) with the complementary
probability, where 0 < cA < cA. Next, L specifies a level of publicity, 0 ≤
λ ≤ 1, when making public threats. F then proposes an offer based on which
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A chooses whether to fight or not. L makes the ultimate decision of whether
to stand firm (a costly war) or back down (a peaceful agreement). Nature
reveals A’s type to L and A only, while the distribution of A’s type is common
knowledge. Everything else is complete information for all players.
As discussed above, I assume that great publicity increases L’s policy
costs for going against A’s choice, but decreases L’s audience costs if A does
not support fighting and L backs down. If L does not follow A’s policy pref-
erence, greater publicity increases the amount of policy costs (d) by λ times.
In particular, if L backs down after A’s opposition against fighting, greater
publicity decreases the amount of audience costs (r) by λ times. Without loss
of generality, I assume that L chooses between a low-profile threat (λ = 0)
and a high-profile threat (λ = 1). When λ = 0, L receives the same political
costs and benefits as in the baseline model. Below I discuss the changes of L’s
political costs when λ = 1.
First, great publicity increases L’s policy costs when it goes against A’s
choice, formally, by λ times. If A opposes fighting but L stands firm, a high-
profile threat increases L’s policy costs by λ times and yields d(1 + λ). More
precisely, if L stands firm despite A’s opposition against fighting, a high-profile
threat (λ = 1) yields p − 2d for standing firm. If A supports fighting but L
backs down, a high-profile threat doubles L’s costs—both policy and audience
costs—and L receives x − 2(d + r). Second, great publicity decreases L’s
audience costs if A does not support fighting and L backs down. As discussed
above, great publicity allows people to prioritize policy preferences and thus,
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they are willing to reduce the leader’s audience costs, by λ times. Thus, if A
does not support fighting, L receives x for backing down after a high-profile
threat (λ = 1). In other words, great publicity leads to no audience costs
if L backs down with A’s support for peace, implying that F will not have
to compensate L’s audience costs to persuade L to back down. Finally, if A
chooses to fight and L stands firm, L receives p − d(1 − p) regardless of its
choice of publicity. Figure 3.1 presents the full model.
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Figure 3.1: Signaling Resolve to Foreign Target
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3.2 Equilibrium under Complete Information
I analyze the full model under complete information to highlight changes
from the literature and implications for the incomplete-information game.
First, I identify the condition under which F ’s offer does not depend on the
values of cA. If the information of A’s type is irrelevant to F ’s strategies, L
would have no need to signal under incomplete information. Then I discuss the
links between L’s choice of publicity and the type of its people, which sheds
light on how the choice of publicity shifts F ’s beliefs of the public’s resolve or
formally, A’s type. Proposition 1 summaries L’s and F ’s strategies as follows.
Proposition 1. The following sets of strategies are each part of a Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium:
(1) When d < cA, L chooses a low-profile threat and F offers p − d + r,
regardless of A’s type.
(2) When cA ≤ d < cA, L with the irresolute A chooses a low-profile threat
and F offers p− d+ r; L with the resolute A chooses a high-profile threat
and F offers p− cA.
(3) When d ≥ cA, L always chooses a high-profile threat; F offers p − cA to
the irresolute A and p− cA to the resolute A.
Similar to the baseline model, F proposes an offer which both L and
A prefer to escalation in order to avert war. There are four options given L’s
choice of publicity and A’s type: to prevent A from fighting, F should offer
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p− cA to the resolute A or p− cA to the irresolute type; to render L indifferent
between standing firm and backing down, F proposes p − d + r to L with a
low-profile threat (λ = 0) and p− 2d to L with a high-profile threat (λ = 1).
By assumption, we have
p− cA > p− cA ⇔ cA < cA, (3.1)
p− d+ r > p− 2d ⇔ −r < d. (3.2)
The first inequality shows that F proposes a greater offer to the resolute
type of A than the irresolute type. In the second inequality, F ’s offer is greater
given a low-profile threat than given a high-profile threat. It implies that if L
goes against A’s support for peace, a low-profile threat increases L’s bargaining
leverage because low public attention reduces L’s difficulty of standing firm.
War never occurs under complete information. F proposes an offer which
meets the greater value between L’s and A’s reservation values, given A’s type
and L’s choice of publicity.
L’s choice of publicity depends directly on its anticipation about what
F would offer. First of all, if F ’s offer is expected equal to A’s reservation
value, p−cA, L always chooses a high-profile threat.1 A is satisfied with p−cA
and prefers backing down to standing firm. If L decides to follow A’s policy
preference, a high-profile strategy makes A more aware of L’s implementation
1Here cA refers to both cA and cA.
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of the popular policy and thus reduces L’s audience costs for backing down.
Thus, L chooses λ = 1 and receives p − cA. Second, if F ’s offer is equal to
L’s reservation value, we know from Inequality 3.2 that L would prefer λ = 0
and receives p− d. L’s choice of publicity is determined by the relative values
between its own policy costs and A’s costs of war. Given A’s type, there are
three possible situations: d < cA, cA ≤ d < cA, and cA ≤ d.
When d < cA, L always prefers a low-profile threat and F proposes
p − d + r, regardless of A’s type. The underlying logic is as follows. If d is
sufficiently small, L can turn down an offer accepted by A. As L dictates
the decision of escalation, F ’s priority is to propose an offer which L prefers
to escalation. To maximize F ’s offer, L opts for a low-profile threat which
minimizes the influence of A’s anti-war preference. Since F ’s offer, p−d+r, is
not a function of either type of cA, the bargaining between F and L does not
require the knowledge of A’s type. Since the public’s resolve does not affect
the outcome of crisis bargaining given d < cA, L has no need to address the
informational problem when the private information of cA is introduced later.
When cA ≤ d < cA, L’s choice of publicity varies with the type of
people it has. On one hand, L with the irresolute A still prefers a low-profile
threat and F offers p−d+r to render L indifferent between standing firm and
backing down. On the other, L with the resolute A deviates to a high-profile
threat and F proposes p− cA. With a moderate value of d, L backs down as
long as the resolute A chooses not to fight. Given the resolute A, therefore,
F ’s goal is to render the resolute A rather than L indifferent between war
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and peace. F proposes p− cA which explains why L deviates to a high-profile
threat. When A does not support war, a high-profile threat helps L relieve
from audience costs.
When d ≥ cA, L always prefers a high-profile threat to a low-profile
one, regardless of A’s type. L’s escalation decisions are highly constrained by
A’s policy preferences, that is, L always backs down as long as A prefers a
peaceful agreement to war. Thus, F proposes an offer equal to A’s reservation
value based on the latter’s type. Formally, F offers p−cA to the resolute A and
p− cA to the irresolute A. Again, L considers a high-profile threat preferable,
as F ’s offer never compensates L’s audience costs.
Solving the model with complete information sheds light on whether
and how the opponent’s uncertainty over the public’s resolve matters to crisis
bargaining. Whether the public’s resolve shapes the opponent’s offer is con-
ditioned on the leader’s policy costs. When policy costs are extremely small,
an offer that the public accepts may be rejected by the leader. To avoid the
bargaining failure, the opponent thus proposes an offer that renders the leader
indifferent between standing firm and backing down. The opponent’s strate-
gies are determined by the leader’s political costs rather than by the costs
of war. Hence, the knowledge of the public’s resolve does not matter to the
bargaining outcome and leaders always keep low-profile threats to maximize
bargaining advantage.
With the increase of policy costs, since it is more difficult for leaders
to stand firm against the possibility of public support for peace, the opponent
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may be able to compensate the public’s reservation value to avoid war. When
policy costs are moderate, on one hand, the opponent still proposes p− d+ r
to the irresolute people and their leader; on the other, as the leader with the
resolute people follows public opinion, the opponent offers p−cA and the leader
adopts high-profile threats to minimize audience costs. What do the changes of
offers imply to the opponent if it is uncertain about the public’s resolve? Under
moderate policy costs, the real uncertainty is about whether the opponent faces
the resolute people or the leader unaccountable to the irresolute public, rather
than about which type of people it faces. When policy costs are sufficiently
large, leaders always follow public opinion. It is the public who dominates the
decision of escalation. The opponent proposes p − cA to the resolute people
and p− cA to the irresolute one. Since its offers are tailored to different values
of cA, the opponent must figure out which type of people it deals with in the
incomplete-information game.
3.3 Equilibrium under Incomplete Information
Now I turn to the incomplete-information game in which L and A,
as a grouped entity (i.e. the Home country), keep the private information
of cA from F . F infers A’s type by observing L’s choice of publicity. From
the previous discussion, we know that A’s resolve may or may not shape F ’s
offers and the links between publicity and A’s resolve are conditioned on policy
costs. In this section, I analyze L’s signaling strategies under three conditions
of policy costs identified in Proposition 1. Each condition differs in (a) how
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F ’s uncertainty affects its strategies, if any, and (b) what message L’s choice
of publicity conveys about A’s type.
Proposition 2. When d < cA, no signaling is necessary; L chooses a low-
profile threat regardless of A’s type.
When d < cA, under complete information, F proposes p − d + r to
both types of A. Since the offer does not require the knowledge of A’s type,
A has no need to update beliefs and thus no signaling is required. L always
chooses a low-profile threat and ends bargaining with a peaceful agreement.
When d ≥ cA, however, F ’s offers are shaped at least partially by A’s costs
of war, which gives L incentives to either reveal or mask A’s type. The key
difference between the remaining two conditions is how the choice of publicity
updates F ’s belief. To summarize, when cA ≤ d < cA, a high-profile threat
signals the public’s resolve in the sense that it increases F ’s belief of facing the
resolute A; when d ≥ cA, in contrast, a low-profile threat signals the public’s
resolve or increases F ’s belief of facing the resolute A. Proposition 3 describes
L’s signaling strategies of public threats when cA ≤ d < cA.
Proposition 3. When cA ≤ d < cA, the following sets of strategies are each
part of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: L with the resolute A chooses a high-
profile threat; L with the irresolute A randomizes between a high-profile and a
low-profile threat.
With moderate policy costs, the leader’s choice of publicity varies with
the type of people under complete information (Proposition 1): a high-profile
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threat given the resolute people, and a low-profile threat given the irresolute
people. Under incomplete information, L with the resolute A stays with a high-
profile threat but L with the irresolute A bluffs probabilistically, randomizing
between a high-profile threat and a low-profile one. Neither a separating nor
a pooling equilibrium exists. On one hand, L with the irresolute A sometimes
chooses a high-profile threat as bluffing is not too costly. On the other hand,
L with the irresolute A has no incentives to entirely deviate from the type
of its people. Pooling on high-profile threats would not update F ’s beliefs,
further reducing F ’s offer to the amount smaller than p−d, an offer L receives
by revealing the irresolute people.2 In other words, L with the irresolute
A would be worse off if completely deviating from the type of its people.
When observing a high-profile threat, F randomizes its offer between a greater
offer always accepted, and p − cA which the resolute A rejects and leads to
escalation.3 Therefore, while a high-profile threat partially updates F ’s belief
of the public’s resolve, it is unable to eliminate the risks of war.
When d ≥ cA, F ’s goal is to render people, rather than the leader,
indifferent between war and peace. Since F ’s offer does not compensate L’s
audience costs, under complete information, L would always choose a high-
profile threat to minimize audience costs regardless of the types of people.
2 Formally, if L with the irresolute A always bluffed, F would offer p − 2d or p − cA,
depending on the relative values between 2d and cA. Given cA ≤ d < cA, neither of them is
greater than p− d.
3The larger offer is either p − d + r if cA > d − r or otherwise p − cA. In either of the
cases, L with the resolute A chooses a high-profile threat and receives an offer greater than
or equal to p− d.
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Given F ’s uncertainty over A’s type, L with the resolute A must be willing
to pay additional costs that the other type would not want to, if it prefers a
peaceful agreement to war. Hence, a low-profile threat serves as a costly signal
to demonstrate the public’s resolve as people would impose greater costs on
leaders for backing down. The principle of costly signaling applies here not
only because leaders with the resolute people have to pay additional costs
in order to be distinguished from the irresolute type, but also because those
leaders would rather not pay additional costs with the absence of informational
problems. The second factor tends to be overlooked in the discussions of costly
signaling. Proposition 4 specifies L’s signaling strategies in detail.
Proposition 4. When d ≥ cA, the following sets of strategies are each part of
a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium:
(1) If d(1 − p) ≥ r + cA and r ≥ cA − cA, L with the resolute A chooses a
low-profile threat and L with the irresolute A chooses a high-profile threat;
(2) If d(1− p) ≥ r+ cA and r < cA− cA, L with the resolute A chooses a low-
profile threat; L with the irresolute A randomizes between a high-profile
and a low-profile threat;
(3) If d(1− p) < r+ cA, L chooses a high-profile threat regardless of A’s type.
A separating equilibrium requires two conditions simultaneously: (a)
L with the resolute A does not hide the true information, and (b) L with
the irresolute A does not bluff. The former condition is guaranteed when
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a peaceful agreement makes L better off than fighting with the support of
the resolute A, which yields d(1 − p) ≥ r + cA. Substantively, the political
costs for losing a popular war, d(1 − p), outweigh the costs for a peaceful
agreement after revealing the public’s resolve, r + cA. The latter condition is
satisfied by sufficiently large audience costs or r ≥ cA − cA. Considering the
sufficiently large costs for mimicking the resolute type, L with the irresolute A
would rather reveal the lack of resolve than suffer political costs by deviating
from the type of its people. If the former condition holds but not the latter,
we observe a semi-separating equilibrium where L with the irresolute A bluffs
probabilistically: since losing a popular war is still costly, L with the resolute A
prefers a high-profile threat to be separated from the irresolute type; however,
a smaller amount of audience costs makes bluffing less costly.
When d(1 − p) < r + cA, counterintuitively, L chooses a high-profile
threat regardless of the type of people, meaning that L with the resolute A
masks its resolve and traps its people into war. Abandoning the opportunity
of information updates increases the risks of war, but why does L with the
resolute A prefer war to a peaceful agreement? Without paying the costs
of war, leaders sometimes prefer fighting with public support to a peaceful
agreement. But since war is inherently costly to the public and leaders always
follow public preferences, why would the public support fighting in the first
place? An informational account of war suggests that bargaining fails when
the uninformed opponent is unable to update information and proposes an
offer to be rejected by the resolute type (Fearon 1995). Put it in the context,
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war occurs when F fails to update information and proposes an offer that the
resolute A rejects. As the public does not deliver information directly, war
occurs when L with the resolute A hides the true information and mimics the
irresolute type with a high-profile threat. On the surface, the leader stands
firm “because of” the support from the resolute people, but if we examine the
underlying logic closely, it is the leader who blinds the opponent to the true
information and indirectly provokes the resolute people to support fighting.
When L with the resolute A considers a popular war more attractive than a
peaceful agreement, L strategically induces a suboptimal demand doomed to
be rejected by her own people.
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Figure 3.2: The Equilibrium Spaces
Figure 3.2 plots L’s equilibrium strategies in each proposition as a func-
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tion of L’s policy costs and audience costs.4 Proposition 2 is represented by
the black bottom area where F ’s offer meets L’s reservation value. The un-
certainty over the public’s resolve does not matter. L and F bargain as if
with complete information and divide the disputed goods peacefully. L always
chooses low-profile threats to maximize F ’s offer. The middle area in white
illustrates Proposition 3 when policy costs are moderate. As L with the reso-
lute A switches to a high-profile threat, L with the irresolute A has incentives
to bluff probabilistically for a better deal. A high-profile threat increases F ’s
belief of facing the resolute A, however, without full certainty. Finally, L’s
strategies of publicity in Proposition 4 are divided in the top area. When
policy costs are large, L with the resolute A can reveal the information of its
resolve by lowering publicity (the top-left area in white), or hide the informa-
tion, leaving the risks of war open (the top-right area in gray). Which direction
L with the resolute A takes, depends on whether fighting with public support
is more profitable than a peaceful agreement. If the answer is negative, L
with the resolute A sends a costly signal to demonstrate the public’s resolve
by choosing a low-profile threat. If the answer is positive, however, L with the
resolute A masks the true information, induces a suboptimal offer only to be
rejected by its own people and then escalates to war with their support.
4 The resolute L’s choice of public threats is specified in parentheses. The values of other
parameters are as follow: cA = 0.4, cA = 0.8, p = 0.6.
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3.4 Discussion
The conventional wisdom emphasizes the public’s role as an audience
concerned about whether leaders keep their promises (Fearon 1994), but schol-
ars tend to overlook the role of the public as a direct participant in the event
of war. In addition to prestige concerns, people are concerned about “policy
substance” by weighing the payoffs of war against the payoffs of a peaceful
agreement (Snyder and Borghard 2011). When the public prefers war to a
peaceful agreement, prestige concerns are compatible with policy preferences
and thus the unconditional notion seems reasonable that great publicity sig-
nals resolve. However, when people prefer peaceful solutions, which makes the
two concerns incompatible, it is unclear why great publicity still signals the
public’s resolve. The existing literature also ignores the initiatives of leaders in
managing the amount of political costs. I argue that leaders are able to choose
various strategies to increase or decrease the level of publicity of their threats.
Considering the public’s policy concerns and the leader’s choice of publicity
helps us reconcile the conventional audience costs theory and its critics.
In this section, I first identify the strategic linkages between the leader’s
choice of publicity and signaling the public’s resolve under different political
environments. Policy costs indicate the extent to which the public holds lead-
ers accountable to their policy preferences, an exogenous feature determined
by political regimes. The conventional logic of audience costs theory exists
only when leaders are moderately accountable: given moderate policy costs,
greater publicity ties a leader’s hands, increasing the opponent’s belief of facing
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a resolute public. When leaders are highly accountable, in contrast, lower pub-
licity increases the opponent’s belief of facing a resolute public. The findings
also uncover the conditional links between publicity and signaling the public’s
resolve and highlight the advantages and disadvantages of leaders in prevent-
ing war under different political regimes. The probability of crisis escalation is
relatively high when leaders are moderately accountable. Highly accountable
leaders are able to fully address the informational problem and avoid war only
when their opponents have strong military capabilities. While the majority of
discussions focus on a comparison between moderate and high accountability,
I close this section by discussing the advantage of unaccountable leaders in
avoiding war and what it implies to the research on informational problems of
war.
3.4.1 Endogenous Publicity and Signaling Resolve
The model explores how leaders choose the publicity of threats to signal
the public’s resolve in crisis bargaining. The audience costs theory highlights
public threats as a mechanism of signaling resolve, solving the informational
problem of war (Schultz 2012). Although scholars debate about whether public
threats issued by democratic leaders are more credible, the underlying mech-
anism remains unchallenged: public threats signal resolve of fighting as they
make leaders more difficult to back down than private threats. The possibility
that people favor peace and can impose policy costs on leaders for escalation
casts doubt on the link between publicity and signaling resolve. When peo-
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ple’s policy preferences are taken into account, the model shows that greater
publicity does not always tie a leader’s hands.
Increasing the publicity of threats makes leaders more difficult to back
down only when leaders are moderately accountable. With moderate policy
costs, leaders back down only when the resolute public chooses not to fight.
Under complete information, leaders make distinct choices of publicity based
on the public’s type: if the resolute public chooses not to fight, leaders will
back down and thus prefer great publicity to minimize political costs for back-
ing down; if the irresolute public chooses not to fight, leaders will dominate
the final decision of escalation and thus prefer lower publicity to minimize
the negative impact of anti-war pressures in bargaining. Under incomplete
information, leaders with the resolute public still choose great publicity, but
leaders with the irresolute public sometimes make high-profile threats in order
to mimic the resolute type. Upon observing high-profile threats, the opponent
increases its belief of facing the resolute type of people.5 By considering the
variation of the public’s policy preference, Proposition 3 identifies a critical
condition for the conventional logic of audience costs theory to work: increas-
ing publicity signals the public’s resolve only when the public who holds lead-
ers accountable is relatively willing to fight. This is an implicit condition in
audience costs theory which assumes no political costs for standing firm.
When policy costs are sufficiently high, leaders decrease the publicity
5There remain some degrees of uncertainty.
61
of threats to signal the public’s resolve. It is easier for leaders to back down
not despite but because of great public attention. With high policy costs,
leaders are highly accountable and always back down if the public chooses not
to fight, regardless of the latter’s type. Since the public dominates escalation
decisions, under complete information, the opponent is able to propose an
offer that guarantees a peaceful settlement. To minimize political costs for
backing down, leaders always choose to increase public attention: with close
attention, the public prioritizes its policy preference in the current crisis over
the concern about future reputation, which makes it easier for leaders to back
down. In other words, increasing publicity unties a leader’s hands. Under
incomplete information, there exists conditions under which leaders with the
resolute public have incentives to signal the public’s resolve and receive a
better offer. Based on the logic of costly signaling, leaders with the resolute
public must be willing to pay additional costs to distinguish themselves from
the irresolute type. Since increasing publicity unties a leader’s hands, leaders
decrease the level of publicity to signal the public’s resolve.
Result 1. When leaders are moderately accountable, the choice of greater
publicity signals the public’s resolve. When leaders are highly accountable, the
choice of lower publicity signals the public’s resolve.
3.4.2 Political Accountability and Risks of War
A peaceful agreement is possible if states are able to solve the problem
of uncertainty. With moderate accountability, leaders are able to reduce the
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risks of war to some extent but the overall risks remain relatively high. With
high accountability, whether leaders reduce the risks of war depends on the
opponent’s relative military capability. If the opponent has strong military
capabilities, leaders with the resolute public do not want to fight a strong
target, distinguishing themselves from the irresolute type. If the opponent
is sufficiently weak, leaders with the resolute public have few incentives to
address uncertainty and secure peace in the first place.
The semi-separating equilibrium in Proposition 3 indicates that mod-
erately accountable leaders cannot entirely remove the opponent’s uncertainty
and thus the risks of war. It corresponds to recent works on the strategic per-
mission of anti-foreign mass movements in weakly institutionalized regimes.
First, the finding that leaders with the resolute people tend to increase public
attention during crises explains why we often observe aggressive anti-foreign
protests but very few antiwar moves in weakly institutionalized or transition-
ing regimes. Second, it illuminates why anti-foreign or nationalistic protests
is a double-edged sword for leaders in foreign crises. On one hand, leaders
may be able to signal the public’s resolve and increase bargaining leverage
by allowing anti-foreign protests; on the other, the finding that leaders with
irresolute people bluff probabilistically confirms the notion that the tolerance
of anti-foreign protests may lead to war. Critically, the risks of war emerge
not from the hawkish people who are more willing to fight, but from the oppo-
nent’s inability of fully distinguishing “sincere” from “manufactured” protests
(Weiss 2013). Moreover, it is impossible for the opponent to distinguish be-
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tween two types of protests simply by looking for external traits of protests, for
the problem is the incentive of bluffing inherent in leaders with the irresolute
people.
Surprisingly though, peace is not always in the best interest of leaders
with high accountability. Without directly suffering from war, leaders with the
resolute people may consider fighting with public support more profitable than
a peaceful agreement. Given that war is costly to people, the only way to mo-
bilize their support is using a high-profile threat to mimic the irresolute type
and induce a suboptimal offer. The pooling equilibrium of high-profile threats
in Proposition 4 yields new implications to the literature of public threats and
coercive diplomacy. First, Snyder and Borghard (2011) use historical cases
to contend that the opponent does not perceive the logic of audience cost
theory or costly signaling in general, but the pooling equilibrium provides an
alternative explanation consistent with the logic of signaling—the opponent
is simply unable to update information when the informed leader sometimes
forgoes the signaling opportunity deliberately. Second, while the conventional
wisdom emphasizes the disadvantage of flexibility in signaling as it unties a
leader’s hands, the potential advantage of flexibility is less explored (Schultz
2012, Trachtenberg 2012). Flexibility refers to great public attention as it
makes backing down easier. The pooling equilibrium implies that flexibility
may bring advantages not to the public but to leaders. To induce public sup-
port for war, leaders with the resolute people sometimes mimic the irresolute
type and therefore prefer flexibility to tying hands. Third, the space of the
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pooling equilibrium expands when the opponent is weak, implying that lead-
ers of great powers are more reluctant to update the opponent’s beliefs. It
provides a domestic explanation of why threats against weak opponents tend
to fail.6 Empirically, when examining the effects of public threats on crisis
escalation, we should be cautious about the cases with power asymmetry.
Result 2. When the target is strong, highly accountable leaders discourage
war, but when the target is weak, highly accountable leaders encourage war.
3.4.3 Autocratic Advantage and Sources of Uncertainty
The model shows that unaccountable leaders, or autocrats, may have
an advantage in achieving peaceful agreements precisely because of small pol-
icy costs. This is different from audience costs theory which suggests that the
inability to generate audience costs puts autocrats at a disadvantage. If we de-
viate from the unitary-state framework and assign the costs of war to people,
small policy costs allow autocrats to render public preferences irrelevant, re-
moving the risks of war driven by the opponent’s uncertainty over the public’s
resolve. Given small policy costs, an autocrat can afford to ignore the public’s
preferences and turns bargaining into a “one-level” game. The opponent’s goal
is not to figure out how much people are willing to fight, but to propose an
6Sechser (2010) argues that threats against weak targets fail because the challenger and
the target have different expectations about the likelihood of future interactions. However, it
is unclear why power asymmetry contributes to the divergence of expectations. In my model,
power asymmetry increases the challenger’s prospects of victory, which makes fighting with
public support more profitable.
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offer which the autocrat prefers to escalation. A peaceful agreement can be
achieved easily if the opponent knows the autocrat’s costs for escalation.
The result raises the importance of the source of uncertainty in the
studies of crisis bargaining. If the opponent is uncertain about the resolve
of leaders or unitary states as assumed in audience cost theory, small policy
costs are ineffective in distinguishing the resolute type from the irresolute one.
However, if it is uncertain about the resolve of people who directly bear the
costs of war, small policy costs make the leader immune from public pressures
and thus remove the source of uncertainty. The advantage of autocrats depends
on the assumption that the opponent knows the leader’s costs for escalation.
This is not an implausible assumption as it maybe easier for the opponent to
know a leader’s costs than the public’s, for instance, the resolve of new leaders
can be learned through frequent interactions over time (Wolford 2007).
3.5 Summary
The analysis begins with the puzzle why democratic leaders sometimes
raise public attention during crises when the public seems unwilling to fight,
which is inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that increasing publicity
signals resolve. Drawing from recent developments of audience cost theory, I
build a crisis-bargaining model that highlights two elements of domestic inter-
actions between the public and leaders during crisis bargaining: the public’s
policy preferences based on their resolve, and the leader’s control of publicity
of threats to adjust political costs. In addition to audience costs driven by
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prestige concerns, the public can impose policy costs on the leader whose pol-
icy does not match their preferences, that is, the public can hold the leader
accountable to their policy preferences. Leaders use publicity to affect the rel-
ative importance of policy preferences and prestige concerns: when the public
supports war, great publicity increases the importance of both policy prefer-
ences and prestige concerns; when the public supports peace, great publicity
allows the public to weight policy preferences more than prestige concerns.
Under complete information, leaders with low accountability to public pref-
erences prefer low public attention, while leaders with high accountability
lean towards great public attention. With the opponent uncertain about the
public’s resolve, the model uncovers whether uncertainty matters to crisis bar-
gaining and if so, how leaders choose the publicity of threats to influence the
opponent’s beliefs under different levels of political accountability to public
preferences:
• Under low accountability, the public’s resolve does not affect crisis bar-
gaining; leaders always choose low publicity without changing the oppo-
nent’s beliefs.
• Under moderate accountability, great publicity increases the opponent’s
belief of facing the resolute people, but no separating equilibrium exists.
• Under high accountability, low publicity increases the opponent’s be-
lief of facing the resolute people; surprisingly, leaders with the resolute
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people sometimes choose great publicity to mask their true resolve and
escalate with public support.
The model provides an integrated framework to understand the roles of
the public’s resolve in crisis bargaining under different political environments.
It first shows that a negotiation may end peacefully despite the public’s resolve
unknown to the opponent, if a challenging leader is unaccountable to public
preferences.7 By separating the public’s costs of war from the leader’s political
costs, the model specifies the conditions under which the information about
the public’s resolve matters. From the opponent’s perspective, the leader’s
costs are more important when the challenging leader is autocratic, whereas
the public’s resolve is more important when the challenging leader is at least
moderately accountable. It reconciles the debates over the locale of resolve in
international relations, particularly whose resolve matters in crises (Saunders
2011, Singer 1961, Wolford 2007). Second, if the opponent’s uncertainty in-
creases the risks of war, how leaders signal the public’s resolve also depends
on their political accountability to public preferences. When leaders are mod-
erately accountable, increasing the publicity of threats raises the opponent’s
belief of facing the resolute people. Under moderate political accountability,
leaders follow the preferences of the resolute people but not the irresolute peo-
ple. Therefore, great publicity further amplifies the hawkish voices, increasing
the difficulty of backing down. When leaders are highly accountable to the
7The autocrat’s advantage requires the full information about the leader’s costs and
benefits, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
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public regardless of its type, low publicity raises the political costs for backing
down, increasing the opponent’s belief of facing the resolute people. Taking
policy preferences into account yields a different story of how open threats
signal the public’s resolve.
If war is driven by the opponent’s uncertainty over the public’s resolve,
great political accountability does not necessarily reduce the risks of war. Au-
tocrats may have advantage in promoting peace as low political accountability
renders the uncertainty over the public’s resolve irrelevant to bargaining. In
contrast, it is impossible to completely avoid war when leaders are moderately
accountable, often in transitioning states. Empirical analyses show that states
tend to experience more conflicts in the period of democratization or unstable
regime changes (Gleditsch and Ward 2000, Mansfield and Snyder 1995). In-
stead of arguing that people in transitioning states are more aggressive or have
stronger nationalist appeals, the model attributes bargaining failures to the in-
centives of bluffing inherent in leaders with the irresolute people. Hence, while
increasing publicity alleviates the opponent’s uncertainty, it fails to remove the
possibility of war. Finally, if democratic leaders are considered highly account-
able, the model shows that whether democracy promotes peace depends on the
distribution of power. Democratic leaders tend to reveal the true information
and achieve peaceful agreements if it is less likely to defeat the opponent. War
is more likely to occur, however, when leaders of great powers target weaker
states. The strong prospects of winning induce democratic leaders to hide
the information of the public’s resolve and trap the resolute people into war.
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High-profile threats issued by democracies are sometimes uninformative, not
because the opponent does not understand the signaling logic (Snyder and
Borghard 2011), but because the opponent is unable to update information
under the signaling logic.
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Chapter 4
Empirics
How do leaders use public threats to communicate resolve in crisis bar-
gaining, and how does political accountability affect the probability of crisis es-
calation? Scholars have not reached the consensus on the relationship between
political accountability and the effectiveness of public threats in communicat-
ing resolve. Yet we know that leaders are often careful in choosing the publicity
of their threats. While the conventional audience cost theory contends that the
effectiveness of public threats increases with political accountability and that
democratic leaders are more capable of signaling resolve by increasing public
attention than their autocratic counterparts, other scholars challenge audience
costs theory with the lack of empirical evidence (Downes and Sechser 2012),
and the inability to parse out the sources of political costs—whether the public
dislikes backing down due to prestige concerns or hawkish preferences (Snyder
and Borghard 2011). Taking into consideration different sources of public pref-
erences, the theory presented in the previous chapter yields two new findings.
First, without the pressure from the domestic public, unaccountable leaders
achieve peaceful agreements with no need to signal. Second, the credibility
of highly accountable leaders in communicating resolve is conditioned on the
distribution of power: in particular, leaders of great powers have no advantage
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in credible signals.
This chapter examines the empirical support for the second finding,
that is, the conditional relationship between political accountability and threat
effectiveness. The effects of political accountability on bargaining outcomes
are conditioned on the distribution of power between adversaries. When the
challenging state is relatively weak, highly accountable leaders have advantage
in solving informational problems and avoiding crisis escalation. When the
challenging state is relatively strong, however, a highly accountable leader
is no better in delivering credible threats than a moderately accountable one
and thus, the pacifying effects of high accountability disappears. Empirically, I
argue that after the theoretical model distinguishes policy costs from audience
costs, it is more appropriate to use the extant measures of audience costs to
operationalize policy costs than audience costs. By constructing a new index
for political accountability, the empirical result illustrates a similar conditional
relationship between a challenger’s political accountability and the likelihood
of target’s voluntary compliance in the Militarized Compellent Threat dataset.
4.1 Empirical Implications of the Model
In this section, I derive testable hypotheses from the theoretical model.
While the theoretical model provides an equilibrium relationship between po-
litical accountability, strategies of public threats, and crisis escalation, the
equilibrium space shown in the previous chapter only identifies the regions
in which war is possible, without a straightforward link between the param-
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium probability of threat failure
eters and the probability of threat failure. Therefore, I translate the logic
of the theoretical model to the probability of threat failure as a function of
the challenger’s political accountability and its national power relative to the
target’s.
Figure 4.1 presents the graphs of equilibrium probabilities of threat
failure for a weaker challenger and a stronger one, respectively.1 A comparison
of two graphs indicate that the probabilities of threat failure appear the same
under low and moderately accountability but, as illustrated in Proposition 4,
differ under high probability. Below I will first discuss the predicted patterns
of threat failure under low and moderate accountability and then how the
patterns under high accountability vary with the distribution of power between
two states. This section closes with two testable hypotheses regarding the
conditional effects of political accountability on the rate of threat failure.
1Parameters are fixed at cA = 0.3, cA = 0.6, cF = 0.05, r = 0.7 (ensuring a separaing
equilibrium), and φ = 0.4 (ensuring that F will risk war given its prior belief).
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The model predicts no risk of threat failure under low accountability,
that is, leaders are never accountable for the public’s support for peace. If a
target is uncertain about the public’s resolve only, Proposition 2 in the pre-
vious chapter suggests that unaccountable leaders are always able to settle a
peaceful agreement. In reality, it is possible that even though the information
about the public does not matter, the risks of war emerge if a foreign target is
uncertain about something else. For instance, threats issued by an unaccount-
able leader can fail if the opponent is uncertain about the leader’s costs rather
than the people’s. In sum, when unaccountable leaders make public threats,
the probability of war or threat failure is zero in the equilibrium but we should
expect a nonzero but low rate of failure in the empirical model, considering
the potential uncertainty about the leader’s information and the aggregation
bias.
When leaders are accountable to the resolute public only, the risks of
threat failure increase with the amount of political accountability. The semi-
separating equilibrium suggests that while leaders with the resolute public stay
true to its type, leaders with the irresolute republic have incentives to mimic
the resolute type probabilistically. As the amount of political accountability
grows, such incentive becomes stronger, further reducing the effectiveness of
high-profile threats as a signal of resolve.
When leaders are always accountable to the public’s support for peace,
the equilibrium probability of war is determined by a leader’s political account-
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ability and its relative military power. 2 According to Proposition 4, leaders
play the pooling strategy with high risks of war if d ≤ d∗ = r+cA
(1−p) ; otherwise,
they play the separating strategy with no risks of war. As the value of d in-
creases, whether leaders can switch from the pooling strategy to the separating
one depends on the position of the threshold, d∗, which is determined by the
distribution of power between the challenging state and the opponent. If the
challenging state is weak, the threshold is relatively low (p = 0.1), meaning
that high political accountability can easily encourage leaders to choose the
separating strategy and lead to a peaceful settlement (Figure 4.1a). If the
challenging state is sufficiently strong (p = 0.6), the threshold to switch to the
separating equilibrium can be very high, such that even the most accountable
leaders play the pooling strategy and the risks of war remain high (Figure
4.1b).
Put together, when the challenging state is weak, we expect a concave
downward relationship between the leader’s political accountability and threat
failure. It begins with a nonzero yet low rate of threat failure for unaccountable
leaders. The probability of threat failure then increases with the leader’s
accountability and reaches the peak, before decreasing rapidly to zero again.
High political accountability encourages the challenging leaders to choose the
separating equilibrium and eliminates the risks of war, because the challenging
2To focus on the conditional effects of political accountability, I assume audience costs at
a moderate value (r ≥ cA − cA) to ensure the comparison between the pooling equilibrium
and the separating equilibrium.If r < cA − cA, according to Proposition 4, highly account-
able leaders simply play a semi-separating strategy, similar to the strategy of moderately
accountable leaders.
75
leaders prefer a peaceful settlement to being defeated by a strong target.
When the challenging state is strong, the concave downward relation-
ship disappears. As discussed earlier, the patterns of threat failure do not
change when leaders are moderately accountable or not accountable at all. In
other words, the rate of threat failure are expected low under low accountabil-
ity and then gradually increases. However, as political accountability continues
to grow, its effect on threat failure quickly becomes constant. When it is easy
to defeat a weak target, high political accountability encourages the challeng-
ing leaders to stay with the pooling strategy and fight with public support
if necessary. Below I summarize two hypotheses regarding the relationship
between the challenging state’s power, the challenging leader’s accountability
and the probability of threat failure.
Hypothesis 1. When the challenging state is weak, there is a concave down-
ward relationship between the leader’s political accountability and the probabil-
ity of threat failure.
Hypothesis 2. When the challenging state is strong, there is no clear relation-
ship between the leader’s political accountability and the probability of threat
failure.
4.2 Testing the Effectiveness of Threat
Before moving to the details of research design, this section reviews ex-
isting empirical analyses on how political institutions influence the effective-
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ness of threats. The debate of appropriate empirical analyses covers nearly
all aspects of research design from the scope of samples, the construction of
dependent variables and independent variables, to model specifications. Two
observations emerge from the review of empirical analyses. First, it is more ap-
propriate to focus on militarized compellent threats and their outcomes to test
the hypotheses derived from the model which begins with a compellent threat.
Second, since the extant measure of audience costs highlight the capability
of audiences to punish leaders rather than the incentive of punishment, these
measures do not necessarily capture audience costs in a way distinguishable
from policy costs as separated in the model.
4.2.1 Threat Failure
To test the effectiveness of information revelation in conflicts, schol-
ars focus on the target’s response but disagree on specific measures and the
selection of sample. Earlier works adopt the Militarized Interstate Dispute
(MID) dataset and identify whether the target reciprocates with force as the
failure of threats and hence the failure of information revelation (Schultz 1999,
2001, Weeks 2008). However, as Downes and Sechser (2012) show, whether
a target responds with force is not necessarily associated with acquiescence.
Some studies simply consider the outcome of threat as failure if a target uses
force by the definition of the hostility of level in the MID dataset. Again, this
approach does not directly measure whether a target rejects or concedes to
the challenge. Even though a dispute ends with a target’s concession, it is
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essential to examine why it concedes—by negotiation or violent compulsion—
which the extant outcome variable in the MID dataset is unable to parse out
(Downes and Sechser 2012). Another problem lies in the sample selection
in the MID dataset, in which many of the disputes are incidental or minor
skirmishes without an explicit coercive threat from disputants (Sechser 2011).
Empirical analyses using the International Crisis Behavior dataset are subject
to similar problems.
Alternatively, it is more appropriate to use the Militarized Compellent
Threat (MCT) dataset to test the hypotheses derived in my model for the
following reasons. First, the MCT dataset focuses on cases in which an explicit
compellent threat can be identified. A compellent threat is defined as “an
explicit demand by one state (the challenger) that another state (the target)
alter the status quo in some material way, backed by a threat of military
force if the target does not comply” (Sechser 2011, pp. 380). By excluding
irrelevant cases such as incidental skirmishes or military exercises, the disputes
selected to the MCT dataset match the setup of my model which begins with
a challenger’s threat. Second, as the MCT dataset measures whether and
how much a target concedes voluntarily to a challenger’s initial demand. By
focusing on voluntary concession, it eliminates the possibility of concession by
virtue of violent compulsion. Hence, it is appropriate to use this dataset to
examine whether a target concedes to a compellent threat short of military
confrontation—an indicator of success in coercive demand.
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4.2.2 Political Punishment: Capability vs. Incentive
In terms of theoretical variables, empirical analyses of audience cost the-
ory look for domestic institutional features to capture the variation of audience
costs. The majority of empirical analyses adopts political regime types, mea-
sured by the 21-point Polity score, as an indicator of audience costs (Marshall
and Jaggers 2013). This approach of measurement—linking audience costs to
regime types or more specifically Polity scores—forms the connection between
audience cost theory and democratic peace, which, as Schultz (2012) points
out, did not exist originally and leads to inconsistent results and challenges.
While Schultz (1999, 2001) demonstrates empirical support for democratic ad-
vantage with the MID dataset, Downes and Sechser (2012) find no evidence
in the MCT dataset that democracies are more effective than autocracies in
achieving success in compellent threats. Challenges come from both sides: on
one hand, by breaking down the types of autocracies, Weeks (2008) show that
some autocratic leaders are also able to generate audience costs; on the other,
others are suspicious about whether audience costs generated by democratic
leaders are “small to negligible” due to low public attention or the leader’s
ability to talk their way out of being punished (Schultz 2012).
A recent effort to improve empirical analysis of audience cost theory
looks for an alternative measure of audience costs. Instead of focusing on the
leader’s ability to punish domestic dissidents, Uzonyi, Souva and Golder (2012)
redirect the attention to the costs the principal bears for punishing the agent
(leader). They conceptualize “audience cost capacity” (ACC) as a function of
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the availability of alternative leaders and the level of political participation.
The key difference from Polity scores or other measures of regime types is
that ACC focuses on ex post punishment, highlighting the “institutions that
allow for the leader to be punished,” rather than on the arrangement that
constrain the choice set of a leader (pp. 765). The ACC score is better than a
dichotomous variable of regime types in the sense that (a) its conceptualiza-
tion directly captures the audience’s capability of punishment, and that (b)
it allows for variation both within democratic regimes and within autocracies.
However, as I describe in more detail below, because the ACC score captures
the audience’s capacity of punishment, it is a more appropriate measure of
audience costs if a leader is concerned about audience costs only.
If a leader’s political costs contain more than one type, however, nei-
ther ACC nor the measures of regime types is able to distinguish audience
costs from the other types of costs. The existing measures of audience costs
all seek to capture the audience’s capability to punish the leader, rather than
their incentive of punishment. While Fearon (1994) originally attributes the
audience’s disapproval of backing down to concerns of national prestige, sub-
sequent works simply identify the disapproval of backing down as that of bad
policy: leaders pay audience costs for implementing bad policy. As Uzonyi,
Souva and Golder’s (2012) discussion illustrates,
“Audience costs are the mechanism through which the audience
attempts to limit moral hazard (Fearon 1994). If the leader is
subject to punishment for bad foreign policy, she is tied more closely
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to the risk associated with her policies and is less likely to engage in
foreign policies that do not benefit her audience. Thus, to reduce
moral hazard, the audience must be able to punish the leader,
exposing her to the cost associated with a poor foreign policy”
(pp. 768).
Assuming away a variety of incentives leads to a serious challenge to the
literature of audience cost theory: even though an audience opposes backing
down, it is unclear whether the opposition is driven by the concerns of national
prestige or the preferences of hawkish policy (Snyder and Borghard 2011). The
distinction between prestige concerns and policy preferences has important
implications to the content of signal conveyed in public threats, especially if
an audience has dovish preferences and supports backing down instead. As
discussed in the previous chapter, the previous literature did not examine
the variation of domestic policy preferences and its implications to a leader’s
signaling strategies. To fill this gap, I model how an audience decides policy
preferences independent from prestige concerns, separating the dimension of
policy costs, driven by policy preferences, from the dimension of audience
costs driven by prestige concerns. Since the new theoretical model includes
multiple dimensions in political costs, it is inappropriate to use the variables
of political features—both ACC and regime types—to measure the prestige-
driven audience costs.
Instead, I argue that the ACC score is a more appropriate candidate
to measure policy costs, or political accountability, after the model specifies
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two types of political costs. In the theoretical model, political accountability
is represented by the amount of policy costs that the public can impose on the
leader for deviating from their policy preferences. The ACC score matches the
operationalization of political accountability in two aspects. First, the ACC
score, composed of the availability of election competitions and the degrees of
political participation, emphasizes the potential bottom-up punishment after
a leader has made a decision. Policy costs in the model are also realized after
the leader finally decide whether to stand firm or back down. Hence, the ACC
score is better than Polity scores whose variation is mostly driven by changes
in executive constraints. Second, the ACC score is designed to, as quoted
above, measure the costs a leader must pay for implementing “bad foreign
policy,” or policies that “do not benefit her audience.” Without modeling
the audience’s preference between war and peace, previous studies used to
link the ACC score and other political variables to audience costs. Since my
theoretical model singles out policy preferences as well as policy costs, it is
reasonable to connect the ACC score—measuring the audience’s capability
to punish leaders for bad foreign policy—with policy costs or more generally,
political accountability.
4.3 Research Design
The review of previous empirical works on public threats yields two
implications. First, the MCT variable fits my theoretical model more closely
than the other variables—the MID reciprocation and the ICB outcome—in
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measuring threat failure. Second, the measures of political features are no
longer suitable to capture the variation of audience costs when a leader’s po-
litical costs consist of both audience costs and policy costs. In this section, I
further discuss the choice of the dependent variable, theoretical variables and
controls, and the model specification.
I sample on the MCT dataset which includes the militarized compellent
threats from 1918 to 2001. As discussed above, a militarized compellent threat
is defined as “an explicit demand by one state (the challenger) that another
state (the target) alter the status quo in some material way, backed by a threat
of military force if the target does not comply” (Sechser 2011). The unit of
analysis is the compellent threat, as my theory focuses on the outcome of
threat and considers the initiation of threat as given.
The dependent variable, Threat failure, is a dichotomous variable where
the failure of a compellent threat is coded 1 and the success is equal to 0. In
the theoretical model, a successful threat means that both A and F prefer an
offer proposed by F to fighting a costly war, whereas the outbreak of war (i.e.
L chooses to stand firm) indicates the failure of threat. Following Downes
and Sechser (2012), a threat is considered successful if it satisfies both of the
conditions: (a) a threat achieves full compliance from the target, and (b) the
target decides to fully comply with fewer than 100 military fatalities. Other-
wise, a threat fails to achieve its objective. Among 242 compellent threats, 93
of them succeeds will full compliance and small casualties while 149 threats
fail.
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The first independent variable, Challenger’s accountability, refers to
policy costs (d) in the theoretic model, indicating the extent to which peo-
ple from the challenging state are able to punish their leader for unfavorable
policies. As discussed in the previous section, I argue that most of the ex-
isting measures of audience costs capture the capability of people to punish
the leader, rather than the incentive of punishment. This is one of the rea-
sons why, despite the empirical tests of audience costs theory, some scholars
disagree with the conclusion drawn from the evidence—that prestige concerns
of the public contributes to the tying-hand effect. Instead, they contend that
these tests at best show the international consequences of being able to hold
leaders accountable (Baum 2004, Snyder and Borghard 2011). Essentially, the
public may hold leaders accountable for unfavorable policies, which does not
mean that the public is always object to the decision of backing down. To ad-
dress these criticisms, my theoretical model explicitly separates audience costs
from policy costs. In my model, the term of audience costs is restricted to
how much the public values prestige and honesty, whereas I use policy costs to
represent people’s capability to hold leaders accountable for unfavorable poli-
cies without predetermining what unfavorable policies are. The hypotheses
derived from the theoretical model depict the probability of threat failure as
a function of political accountability rather than of audience costs. Nonethe-
less, since most of the existing measures of audience costs actually capture the
public’s capability of political punishment, they are considered as candidates
to measure a leader’s political accountability.
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Among the existing measures, I choose the “audience cost capacity”
(ACC) score as a candidate to measure Challenger’s accountability. In contrast
to other measures that focus on ex-ante constraints leaders have, ACC high-
lights the ex-post feature of punishment. Instead of using regime types, ACC
examines “how institutions affect the specific costs that the principal bears for
challenging the incumbent” (Uzonyi, Souva and Golder 2012, pp. 766). In the
theoretical model, political accountability, from high to low, indicate whether
the entire public, the hawkish portion, or none of them can hold leaders ac-
countable. It matches the conceptualization of ACC that shifts the focus to
the principal’s costs of holding leaders accountable. The operationalization
of ACC consists of two components: (a) the cost of exit for individual chal-
lengers, captured by the Polity measure on openness of executive recruitment
(xropen), and (b) the cost of mobilizing against the agent, captured by the
Polity measure on restrictions on political participation (parcomp). Table 4.1
lists the indications of these two components.
Table 4.1: Components of ACC
xropen Openness of Executive Recruitments parcomp Competitiveness of Political Participation
0 unregulated 0 unregulated
1 closed 1 repressed
2 dual executive-designation 2 suppressed
3 dual executive-election 3 factional
4 open 4 transitional
5 competitive
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Nonetheless, I do not use the original ACC score. The original coding
rule attaches more importance on xropen than on parcomp. The ACC score
is zero, meaning no costs at all, unless there is some form of election (i.e.
xropen > 2). In other words, the original coding rule indicates that public
participation can have some constraints on leaders only with the presence of
election. However, the literature has suggested that leaders are sometimes
constrained by the pressure of people even without an election (Weeks 2008,
Weiss 2014).3 By lumping these moderate constraints together with those
without public participation at all, the original ACC score fails to capture the
distinction between low policy costs and moderate ones, which is related to
the main findings of the model.
I construct Political Accountability Index by modifying the “audience
cost capacity” (ACC) score. Political accountability is coded zero if the value
of xropen is smaller than two. If xropen is equal to two, the score of politi-
cal accountability ranges from zero to two, depending on the competitiveness
of political participation (parcomp). If some form of election is present (i.e.
xropen > 2), the score of political accountability ranges from one to three
as political participation becomes more competitive. Table 4.2 presents the
coding rule in detail.
Therefore, the value of Challenger’s accountability ranges from 0 (no
accountability) to 3 (high accountability). When the variable Challenger’s ac-
3See the coding details in (Uzonyi, Souva and Golder 2012).
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Table 4.2: Political Accountability Index
parcomp
xropen 0–2 3–4 5
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
2 0 1 2
3 1 2 3
4 1 2 3
countability equals zero, the challenging state has extremely limited political
participation without an open competition of leadership; as the value increases,
it suggests an openness of leadership recruitment and the growing population
in political participation.4 To test the concave relationship between threat
failure and political accountability, I include the second independent variable,
Challenger’s accountability2, by squaring the variable Challenger’s account-
ability.
I include three sets of control variables to tease out the effects of polit-
ical accountability. The first set of control variables separates other domestic
factors that may influence threat outcomes through the challenging leader’s
accountability. Though not explicitly modeling the target’s domestic politics,
we should expect that the targeted leader’s political accountability may also
affect the challenging leader’s accountability and the outcome of threat. Previ-
ous studies model crisis bargaining in which both the challenger and the target
have domestic audiences, suggesting that the challenging leader may be more
4See the coding details in (Uzonyi, Souva and Golder 2012).
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cautious with compellent threats considering the target’s domestic pressures
(Kurizaki 2007, Tarar and Leventog˘lu 2009). Without controlling for the tar-
geted leader’s political accountability, therefore, we might underestimate the
effects of Challenger’s accountability. I code Target’s accountability from the
Political Accountability Index. Despite my focus on the principal’s capability
of punishing its agent, political regimes have other mechanisms to affect war
and peace (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, Debs and Goemans 2010, Russett
and Oneal 2001). To control for the correlation between regime types and
political accountability, I include Challeger’s Polity score and Target’s Polity
score, both drawn from version IV of the Polity dataset (Marshall and Jaggers
2013).
The second set of control variables captures similarity of external inter-
ests and external sources of conflicts. Following Schultz’s (2001) operational-
ization, I include the following variables: (i) Contiguity, to measure whether
two states share a land border or are separated by 150 miles of water or less;
(ii) Alliance portfolio similarity, measuring the similarity of alliance portfolios
within a given dyad; and (iii) evaluations of Status quo for both the challenger
and the target, a proxy of their satisfactions with the international system. As
the evaluations of external circumstances may also affect leaders’ incentives of
signaling resolve in crises, separating these factors make sure that the effects
of independent variables illustrated in statistical results focus on the leaders’
political payoffs from war and peace.
For both the challenger and the target, some types of goods are typi-
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cally more valuable than other types, which may affect the outcome of crisis
by influencing public preferences and thus the extent to which leaders are ac-
countable to the public. Therefore, the third set of control variables includes
four binary variables regarding the type of issues in dispute—Territory, Lead-
ership, Policy, and Others—obtained from the MCT dataset (Sechser 2011).
The majority of threats are related to territorial disputes or policy disagree-
ment. Finally, since leaders issued threats during World War II not to signal
private intentions but to fulfill other purposes—for example, to coordinate with
members in a military coalition (Wolford 2015), I include binary variables for
each year during World War II (1939–1945).
While most of empirical works on threat credibility control for the
power relationship between states, I do not include it in the main analysis
to follow closely the implications of the theoretical model. The hypotheses
suggest that the effects of the challenger’s political accountability on threat
outcomes may differ, depending on whether the challenger is categorized as
weak or strong relative to the target. Within each category, however, the
specifics of the distribution of power have little impact on how the challenger’s
political accountability affects threat outcomes. Hence, I exclude measures
of the challenger’s relative power as control variables from the main result.
For a comparison to extant empirical works though, I follow Schultz’s (2001)
analysis to include in the appendix (i) Challenger’s relative power, measured
by the challenger’s share of dyadic military capabilities, (ii) three dichotomous
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variables indicating the status of major power in a given dyad.5 As shown in
the appendix, the effects of independent variables are similar.6
The hypotheses suggest that the effects of political accountability on
threat failure differ in the challenging state’s relative strength. Under high
political accountability, as Figure 4.1 shows, the challenging state’s relative
strength serves as a division between the pooling equilibrium where the risk of
war driven by the target’s uncertainty remains unsolved, and the separating
equilibrium where highly accountable leaders avoid war by solving the target’s
informational problem. The more powerful the challenging state is, the more
the space of separating equilibrium shrinks. To examine the conditional effects
of political accountability on threat credibility, therefore, it is critical to set a
cutpoint of the challenging state’s relative strength. I propose two candidate
cutpoints to separate stronger challengers from weaker ones. The first one
is its mean value (0.67) of Challenger’s relative power and the second one is
the median (0.78). Challengers are considered weaker if its relative military
strength is below the cutpoint, or stronger otherwise.
Since the public’s resolve may vary with each crisis, I use binary probit
5Major-Major dyad is coded one if both the challenger and the target are considered as
major powers, and zero otherwise. Major-Minor dyad is coded one if the challenger is a
major power and the target is a minor power, and zero otherwise. Minor-Major dyad is
coded one if the challenger is a minor power and the target is a major power, and zero
otherwise.
6I use the EUGene program to genearte the Polity scores and the challenger’s relative
military capabilities (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972). Unless specified, the rest of control
variables are obtained from Downes and Sechser’s (2012) data.
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regression models with standard errors clustered on the challenger.7 The full
model specification is as follows:
Pr(Failure=1) =Φ(β0i + β1Challenger’s accountabilityi+
β2Challenger’s accountability
2
i + βkΩi + µi)
From Hypothesis 1, we expect that given a weaker challenger, the probability
of Threat failure is initially small at a low level of Challenger’s accountability
and as the value of accountability increases, the probability of failure reaches
the highest point before declining finally. Formally, the sign of β1 is expected
positive while the sign of β2 is expected negative. Given a stronger challenger,
nevertheless, Hypothesis 2 implies no statistical significance in either β1 or β2.
4.4 Results
Table 4.3 reports the coefficients of independent and control variables,
with standard errors in parentheses. I separate the sample of weaker chal-
lengers (Model 1) from that of stronger challengers (Model 2), using the mean
of Challenger’s relative power (0.67) as a cutpoint. In Model 3 and 4, I esti-
mate the failure of threats issued by weaker challengers (Model 3) and stronger
challengers (Model 4), using the median of Challenger’s relative power (0.78)
as a cutpoint. The effects of dummy variables for World War II years are
controlled but not reported in the tables.8
7Results are similar when standard errors are clustered by the MCT threat, as shown in
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Table 4.3: Estimating Compellent Threat Failure (1918–2001)
Threat failure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(p < 0.67) (p ≥ 0.67) (p < 0.78) (p ≥ 0.78)
Challenger’s accountability 3.505∗∗∗ 0.301 2.846∗∗∗ 0.449
(0.787) (0.733) (0.697) (0.915)
Challenger’s accountability2 –1.158∗∗∗ –0.087 –0.836∗∗∗ –0.229
(0.222) (0.178) (0.201) (0.218)
Target’s accountability 1.074∗∗∗ –0.199 0.810∗∗ –0.311
(0.353) (0.209) (0.252) (0.225)
Challenger’s polity score –0.041 0.001 –0.067† 0.045
(0.046) (0.037) (0.041) (0.039)
Target’s polity score –0.178∗∗∗ 0.015 –0.150∗∗∗ 0.020
(0.047) (0.030) (0.042) (0.038)
Contiguity –0.712 –0.510 –0.880† –0.419
(0.504) (0.343) (0.450) (0.408)
Alliance portfolio similarity 1.629∗ 0.378 1.648∗∗ –0.046
(0.784) (0.385) (0.605) (0.524)
Challenger’s status quo 1.288† 0.078 0.799 0.115
(0.730) (0.437) (0.603) (0.522)
Target’s status quo –3.932∗∗∗ 0.541 –2.821∗∗∗ 0.748
(0.648) (0.523) (0.388) (0.687)
Territory –0.357 0.210 –0.117 0.526†
(0.346) (0.285) (0.298) (0.277)
Government –2.110∗ –1.278∗∗∗ –2.064∗∗ –0.767∗
(0.623) (0.356) (0.589) (0.365)
Policy –1.178† 0.374 –1.252∗∗ 0.768∗∗
(0.610) (0.330) (0.444) (0.280)
Other –0.725∗∗∗ 0.196 –0.223 0.113
(0.268) (0.349) (0.380) (0.439)
Constant –2.444∗ 0.470 –2.020∗ 0.627
(1.241) (0.862) (0.841) (1.081)
Observations 94 130 113 111
Model χ2 112.12 107.07 98.74 80.64
Standard errors in parentheses. Dummy variables for world war years are included but
not reported here.
†p < 0.1, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.001
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The results are consistent with the hypotheses described above. In
each of the model, the coefficient of Challenger’s accountability2 has a neg-
ative sign, indicating a quadratic relationship between Challenger’s account-
ability and the likelihood of compellent threat failure, with the parabola facing
downward. In Model 1, both the quadratic coefficient and the linear one are
statistically significant at p < 0.001, implying that the non-linear effects of
Challenger’s accountability in the group of weaker challengers. The non-linear
effects are insignificant in Model 2, however, when a challenging state is rela-
tively stronger than its target, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. Chang-
ing the cutpoint from the mean to the median of Challenger’s relative power
yields similar results. Next, Model 3 and 4 show a similar pattern using the
median of Challenger’s relative power (0.78) as a cutpoint. Model 3 suggests
that when a challenging state is weaker, that is, its relative power is below the
median, compellent threats are more likely to succeed if the challenging leader
is unaccountable or highly accountable, but more likely to fail if the leader is
moderately accountable. When a challenging state is stronger (Model 4), the
quadratic relationship is again statistically indiscernible.
Since it is difficult to assess the substantive effects of quadratic terms
by examining coefficients and standard errors in probit regressions, I present
the appendix.
8Some of the dummy variables are omitted by the computing program due to collinearity,
which is why the sum of observations in the sub-samples are fewer than the observation
numbers of the entire sample.
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(b) Stronger challengers
Figure 4.2: Predicted probability of compellent threat failure
the figures of the predicted probability of compellent threat failure as a chal-
lenging leader becomes more politically accountable. I generate the predictions
based on specifications in Model 1 and 2, which separate weaker challengers
from stronger ones with the mean of Challenger’s relative power. To make
the predicted probability more concrete, I present the simulated results of the
probability of threat failure for a contiguous dyad, holding other variables at
the in-sample mean.9 Figure 4.2 illustrates the estimations of threat failure,
with a weaker challenger on the left and a stronger one on the right. When a
challenger is weaker (Figure 4.2a), the risks of threat failure initially increase
in Challenger’s accountability, after maintaining at a high level (with the fail-
ure rate over 85%) in the middling values of accountability, and then decline
9Following (Downes and Sechser 2012), I use Clarify to generate all the charts with 90%
confidence intervals (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000). Except issue types, I estimate the
probability of threat failure between two contiguous adversaries during the non-World War
II period, holding other variables at the in-sample mean.
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quickly to less than 60% once the challenger’s ACC score exceeds 2. When a
challenger is stronger, however, Figure 4.2b shows a much flatter curve with
the probability of failure ranging roughly between 50% and 60% across the
spectrum of political accountability.
This is consistent with the equilibrium predictions shown in Figure 4.1.
On one hand, high political accountability encourages the challenging leader
to send clear signals to avoid war when it is unlikely to defeat the target;
but when it is likely to achieve military victory, high political accountability
discourages the leader with resolute people from signaling credibly as fighting
would easily bring the leader political benefits. We observe a similar pattern
when leaders demand for changes in both territory and policy alone.
In addition to the effects of independent variables, there are other re-
sults worth discussing. The results of the variables of target’s domestic politics
suggest the importance of differences between measures. In Model 1 and 3,
where the theory expects that the credibility of threat increases in the chal-
lenging leader’s accountability, two measures of the target’s domestic politics
present opposite effects on the probability of threat failure. First, the out-
come variable is positively associated with Target’s accountability. With all
else being equal, the more a targeted leader is accountable to her constituents,
the more she is likely to reject the threat at the risk of war. This result is
consistent with the implication of previous models where domestic audiences
are present in both the challenger and the target: a threat is more likely to fail
because with the presence of domestic audiences, the targeted leader less likely
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to concede (Kurizaki 2007, Tarar and Leventog˘lu 2009). Second, the probabil-
ity of threat failure declines with Target’s polity score, again, in Model 1 and
3. Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) show that the variation in Polity
scores is mostly driven by changes in the dimension of executive constraints,
which refers to “the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision mak-
ing powers of chief executives” (Marshall and Jaggers 2013, pp. 24). Thus, a
negative relationship between Target’s polity score and threat failure implies
that a targeted leader, under greater institutionalized constraints on the deci-
sion making power, seems more likely to concede, consistent with Filson and
Werner’s (2004) theory.10 In sum, Model 1 and 3 demonstrate some evidence
on the target’s side that democratic regimes can “both inform and constrain,”
which suggests that scholars should be more cautious in matching empirical
measures of political regimes with theoretical mechanisms.
A comparison across issue types suggests that territorial threats issued
by weaker challengers are no more likely to fail than those issued by strong
challengers. A potential explanation is that some of the territorial threats
are associated not with an informational problem but with a commitment
problem, the latter of which, as Moon and Souva (2016) suggest, is irrelevant
to the information-based theory presented here. If a territorial threat presents
a credible commitment problem, a currently stronger target worries that its
concession would lead to a large and rapid shift in the distribution of power
10The correlation coefficient between Target’s accountability and Target’s polity score is
0.542 with statistical significance.
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favor to the currently weaker challenger, hence rejecting the challenger’s threat
and launching a preventive attack.11 Nevertheless, I am refrained from reading
too much from the differences between issue types without strong theoretical
support.
4.5 Summary
This chapter conducts an empirical analysis on the conditional rela-
tionship between political accountability and threat effectiveness derived from
the theoretical model. The distribution of power between adversaries condi-
tions the effects of political accountability on bargaining outcomes. When the
challenging state is relatively weak, the model identifies a non-linear relation-
ship between political accountability and threat effectiveness, such that crisis
bargaining are most likely to fail when the challenging leader is moderately
accountable, but more likely to succeed when the leader is highly accountable
or not accountable at all. When the challenging state is relatively strong, how-
ever, a highly accountable leader is no better in resolving private information
problems than a moderately accountable one, implying that high political ac-
countability has little pacifying effect in crisis bargaining. Empirically, I argue
that after the theoretical model distinguishes policy costs from audience costs,
the extant measures of audience costs, such as the ACC score, approximate to
the operationalization of policy costs. Building upon the ACC score, I create
11Given a relatively smaller sample of observations, I keep the territorial disputes as-
sociated with a commitment problem according to Moon and Souva (2016), producing a
conservative test.
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the Political Accountability Index to illustrate both the openness of executive
recruitment and the openness of political participation. With the Political
Accountability Index, the empirical result illustrates a similar conditional re-
lationship between a challenger’s political accountability and the likelihood of
target’s voluntary compliance in the MCT dataset.
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Chapter 5
Dragging Themselves to War: Signaling
Resolve to National Leaders
In Chapter 2, I propose two new perspectives to examine the domestic
impact on crisis bargaining: (a) the public’s concerns both about consistency
and about substantive crisis outcomes, the latter of which is mainly determined
by the public’s resolve; (b) a leader’s strategic control of publicity when issuing
threats. Building on these observations, in Chapter 3, I use a game-theoretic
model to examine how leaders strategically choose the level of publicity of their
challenges to signal the public’s resolve to foreign targets. The conclusion in
Chapter 3 requires a key assumption that leaders have full knowledge, or at
least better knowledge than foreign targets, about the amount of resolve their
people have—that is, how willing their people are to fight—in a given foreign
crisis.
However, there exist some situations under which national leaders are
no better informed of the public’s preferences than their foreign counterparts.
The knowledge about the public’s preferences requires the smooth transmis-
sion of public opinion to the top as well as the accumulation of governing
experiences. While these two requirements seem natural in a well-functioned
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and stable government, they are more likely to fail during a regime transition
and/or a leadership turnover. A regime transition is often associated with
changes in how national governments gather and spread information and how
different groups of people are represented at the national level (Mansfield and
Snyder 1995). While new leaders may have incentives to demonstrate their
individual resolve (Wolford 2007), they are less experienced in gathering and
assessing public opinion, especially on foreign affairs. A transition of leader-
ship may also come with changes in the domestic political coalition, shifting
the composition of relevant domestic audiences and their policy preferences
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Croco 2011, Leeds, Mattes and Vogel 2009,
Licht 2010, Weeks 2012). Hence, with changes in political regimes, individual
leadership, or political coalitions, leaders’ prior knowledge about the public’s
preferences may not apply to new situations. Even without changes in regime
or leadership, facing a new enemy may also generate a new set of preferences
among the public, unknown to leaders.
Take China’s intervention to the Korean War as an example. While
scholars have long focused on the uncertainty of the US about China’s resolve,
they pay less attention to the fact that Chinese leaders were uncertain about
whether the Chinese people would tolerate the huge costs of fighting against
the US. The historical evidence suggests that even before the success of the
Inchon landings in September 1950, Mao Zedong was determined to support
North Korea, including military intervention if necessary (Yang 1999, pp. 373).
What Mao and other Chinese leaders worried about was the public’s resolve—
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whether the Chinese public would be willing to fight another war against the
most powerful country immediately after a century-long domestic turmoil and
foreign invasion. If the public lacked strong resolve, the leaders feared that such
a costly intervention would stimulate “reactionaries” who remained hostile to
the new Communist regime and create social instability (Chen 1994, pp. 128).
When does the public reveal or hide its preferences about war and
peace if such information is unknown to leaders? How does the additional
uncertainty of leaders affect crisis bargaining? I modify the model in Chapter 3
by making the domestic public express their preferences about crisis outcomes
before the leader’s and the foreign target’s moves. This is more likely if the
public has some existing knowledge about the underlying issue of crisis or
the underlying issue has been covered before the emergence of crisis, such as
territorial disputes. For example, the tensions on the South China Sea have
been accumulating in the past few years, featured with the Hague Tribunal’s
ruling and China’s continual construction of military bases; if a security crisis
occurs in this area, the public should be able to gather basic information and
express their preferences before leaders decide whether to further mobilize
public attention or to nip it in the bud.
With complete information, I first identify the condition under which
(a) the public’s preferences about war and peace vary with its type, and (b)
the leader maximizes the level of publicity given public support for war and
minimizes publicity without public support for war. Under this condition,
I further analyze the model with incomplete information. In particular, I
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examine when and why one type of people mimics the other type when the
risk of war is relatively high (i.e. small costs of war for the foreign target).
There exists an equilibrium in which the irresolute people will mask its
unwillingness to fight and thus suffer from crisis escalation, even though they
would not express support for war under complete information. Why would
the irresolute people drag themselves into war? The key lies in the leader’s off-
the-equilibrium strategy of publicity, that is, what the irresolute people expect
their leader to do if they do not support war initially. When the irresolute
people are unwilling to fight, in fact, it is in their best interest that the leader
minimizes public attention to the bargaining process: by reducing the influence
of irresolute people as much as possible, the leader can maximize the foreign
target’s offer, which benefits both the leader and the people. However, if the
irresolute people expect their leader to maintain a moderate level of publicity
during crisis bargaining, their expression against war would make the leader
“look bad” in public, further jeopardizing his bargaining position to the extent
that a peaceful offer can be worse than their payoffs from war. Therefore, it
is possible that the irresolute people would rather fake their support for war
from the very beginning.
I identify another pooling equilibrium in which the resolute people pre-
tend to be the irresolute type. Although the resolute public and the foreign
target are both willing to fight if necessary, they also have incentives to pre-
vent a crisis from escalating as well. In this pooling equilibrium, war can be
avoided for two reasons. First, since the resolute people pretends to be irreso-
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lute by opposing war, the domestic anti-war opinion makes both sides always
prefer negotiation to war. In other words, a bargaining range always exists
between two states. Second, the foreign target decides not to tolerate the risk
of war and hence proposes an offer that both types of people prefer to war.
The equilibrium exists when neither the resolute people nor the foreign target
is extremely willing to fight.
5.1 The Modified Model
The modified model is presented in Figure 5.1. The first change is the
information structure: Nature (N) reveals the public’s (A) type, resolute (cA)
or irresolute (cA) toA only this time. Both the leader (L) and the foreign target
(F ) only know the distribution of A’s type such that the prior probability of
encountering the resolute A is φ.
Consistent with the new information structure, secondly, I change the
sequence of the game by making the public move before the leader and the
foreign target. As mentioned earlier, this is possible if the public faces an
enduring enemy or the underlying issue of crisis has been well known, such
as territorial disputes. Since the public is considered a direct participant in a
crisis and gains a share of external bargaining with the foreign opponent, the
public will have incentives to boost its leader’s bargaining position if allowed
to. By allowing for the public’s input before the external bargaining, it may
open for novel explanations for war.
Formally, after Nature (N) determines A’s type, resolute or irresolute,
103
NcA φ
cA 1− φ
A
A
fight
∼fight
fight
∼fight
L
1
0
λ
L
1
0
λ
L
1
0
λ
L
1
0
λ
F
1
0
x
F
1
0
x
F
1
0
x
F
1
0
x
L
stand firm
back down
(
p− cA, p− d(1− p), 1− p− cF
)
(
x, x− (d+ r)(1 + λ), 1− x )
L
stand firm
back down
(
p− cA, p− d(1 + λ), 1− p− cF
)
(
x, x− r(1 + λ), 1− x )
L
stand firm
back down
(
p− cA, p− d(1− p), 1− p− cF
)
(
x, x− (d+ r)(1 + λ), 1− x )
L
stand firm
back down
(
p− cA, p− d(1 + λ), 1− p− cF
)
(
x, x− r(1 + λ), 1− x )
Figure 5.1: Signaling Resolve to National Leader
A first expresses its opinion about war: support or no support. After observing
A’s expression, L then decides a level of publicity, λ ∈ [0, 1], when issuing an
open challenge. The rest of the sequence remains the same: F offers a share
of the goods, x ∈ [0, 1], and finally L decides whether to stand firm or back
down.
The third change is related to the leader’s payoff for backing down
when the public does not support fighting. Recall that in Chapter 3, the
public chooses whether to fight or not after it pays a certain level of attention
and observes the target’s offer. If the bargaining process draws great attention
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(i.e. λ = 1) from the public who then prefers a peaceful offer to war, in this
case, I argued that the public would relieve their leader from reputation costs
if the latter chooses to back down. Formally, if the public chooses not to fight,
in Chapter 3, the leader’s payoff for backing down is x− r(1− λ).
In the modified model, the public expresses its opinion about war before
the leader chooses the publicity of his threats and the target proposes its offer.
After the actual offer proposed by the target, the public does not further
express its opinion about crisis escalation (or not). Without the immediate
expression of public opinion, it is more difficult to justify that the leader should
be relieved from reputation costs if he chooses to back down. Therefore, if the
leader backs down, reputation costs always increase with the level of publicity,
that is, r(1+λ). In the modified model, the public’s initial opinion about crisis
outcomes may affect the leader’s choice of publicity, but it does not matter to
the amount of reputation costs.
In summary, there are three major changes compared to the original
one in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.1). First, the public’s resolve (cA or cA) is unknown
both to the leader and to the foreign target. Second, when a crisis occurs, the
public expresses its preferences about war and peace first; after that, the leader
decides a level of publicity of his threat and then the foreign target proposes
an offer. Third, since no direct input of public opinion is involved after the
target’s offer, I assume that the leader’s reputation costs always increase with
the level of publicity he chooses earlier.
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5.2 Equilibrium under Complete Information
In this section, I analyze the model under complete information. Al-
though the results are straightforward and not particularly interesting, we can
see how the new sequence changes some basic dynamics among the three ac-
tors, highlighting the strategic role of the public. In particular, if the foreign
target is willing to make great concessions, the public takes advantage of that
and always shows support for war as doing so involves few costs; if the foreign
target is tough enough, the public becomes more cautious and decides whether
to support fighting based on their costs of war. Proposition 5 describes part
of the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
Proposition 5. The following sets of strategies are each part of the Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium:1
(1) If cF ≥ clF :
• Both types of A support fighting;
• L is indifferent between λ = 0 and λ = 1 given A’s support for
fighting, but chooses λ = 0 without A’s support for fighting;
• If cF ≥ chF , F offers xl given λ = 0 or xh given λ = 1; if clF ≤ cF <
chF , F offers x
l given λ = 0 or zero given λ = 1.2
(2) If cF < c
l
F :
1See all the proofs in the appendix.
2clF = r + dp; c
h
F = 2r + d+ dp; x
l = p+ r + dp; xl = p+ d+ 2r + dp.
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• Both types of A support fighting if cA < cA < d− r; only the resolute
A supports fighting when cA < d−r ≤ cA; neither types of A supports
fighting when d− r ≤ cA < cA;
• L’s strategy is the same as above.
• F offers zero with A’s support for fighting; F offers p − d + r with
A’s opposition against fighting.
One of the most obvious changes in the modified model is that F bar-
gains only with L whose position is influenced by A’s preference between war
and peace. Recall the model in Chapter 3: Since F proposes an offer before
the moves of A and L, F is able to propose an offer that both of them pre-
fer to war. In the modified model, F bargains with L who alone makes the
decision of whether to escalate a crisis to war. A’s preferences between war
and peace only affects L’s bargaining position. For instance, with A’s support
for fighting, L would suffer from greater political costs (policy and reputa-
tion costs) for backing down and yet pay very small costs for standing firm.3
In other words, F has to offer a huge share of goods in order to avoid war.
Knowing that its support for war would strengthen L’s bargaining leverage,
A may have an incentive to express support for fighting, which will make L
excessively aggressive.
Regardless of its true willingness to fight, A always supports fighting
and strengthens L’s position, if the former never has to pay the real costs
3The amount of political costs grows further with a higher level of publicity.
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of war. If cF ≥ clF , war is too costly to F such that F is willing to make
great concessions to compensate L’s costs for backing down. Since peace is
guaranteed in this case, both types of A will take advantage of F ’s weakness
and act (or pretend) tough without considering their payoffs from war.
A becomes more cautious when the risk of war is real. If cF < c
l
F , A’s
support for fighting would strengthen L’s bargaining position to the extent that
it eliminates the bargaining range between L and F , even when L minimizes
the publicity of its threat. In this case, A must compare its war payoff to an
agreement without its support for war (p− d + r). The cut point is d− r: A
shows support for fighting when its costs of war are smaller than d − r, but
opposes fighting if its costs of war exceed this threshold. Obviously, if the
costs of war for both types are too large or too small, A’s move does not vary
with its type. There exists the condition, cA < d− r ≤ cA, under which only
the resolute A supports fighting.
Proposition 5 shows that war can occur under complete information.
Using the unitary-actor framework, the existing literature suggests that a
costly war can be avoided under complete information, because a peaceful
transfer of payment is possible between two states.4 Even when we break the
unitary actor assumptions, as Chapter 3 demonstrates, this insight holds as
long as the foreign opponent can propose an offer directly to the public who
bears the costs of war. In this chapter, I assume that the pubic only influences
4We do not consider the commitment problem here.
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the leader’s bargaining position, rather than directly bargain with the foreign
opponent. By increasing the costs for backing down, the public support for
war can advance the leader’s bargaining position: on one hand, the leader will
face severe political punishment for backing down given the public support for
war; on the other, the leader does not bear the societal costs of war directly.
However, it is possible that the public support for war eliminates the bargain-
ing range between the leader and the foreign opponent (i.e. cF < c
l
F ). Why
does the public still choose to support fighting if such choice guarantees the
escalation of crisis? The public will support fighting if its opposition against
war damages the leader’s bargaining position such that it produces an offer
smaller than its payoffs of war, or formally if cA < d − r. With all else be-
ing equal, the public is more likely to support and risk war if the difference
between policy costs and audience costs increases.
The equilibrium with complete information also sheds light on where
to look for the equilibria when the public’s resolve is unknown. First of all,
it is meaningful to examine how uncertainty matters to crisis bargaining only
when the risk of war is real. If F ’s costs of war are too high, A always ex-
presses support for war to maximize F ’s offer, with any concern about the
danger of war. Whether L or F has knowledge about A’s resolve does not
affect the bargaining outcome. Therefore, I will analyze the model with in-
complete information cF < c
l
F . Second, even though the risk of war is real, the
uncertainty about A’s type does not matter if the costs of war for both types
are either too small (cA < cA < d− r) or too large (d− r ≤ cA < cA). Again,
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this is different from the previous model in which F tailors its offer sometimes
based on A’s costs of war. In the modified model, while A’s initial opinion
may influence L’s bargaining position, the value of cA is irrelevant to the exact
offer proposed by F . In addition to cF < c
l
F , therefore, I further restrict the
condition to cA < d− r ≤ cA when introducing incomplete information in the
next section.
5.3 Equilibrium under Incomplete Information
When does A reveal or hide its type to the other players? There ex-
ist multiple equilibria under incomplete information. When cF < r + dp and
cA < d − r ≤ cA, Proposition 5 shows that A’s choice of fighting varies with
its type. It is not surprising that a separating equilibrium exists such that
war occurs with the resolute A only. Given their distinctive strategies under
complete information, I am interested in when one type pretends to be the
other type, in particular, whether the irresolute A fakes resolve and drags
itself to war. This section focuses on the existence and conditions of two pool-
ing equilibria. After briefly introducing the separating equilibrium, I begin
with the first one in which both types of A supports fighting, and then dis-
cuss the second pooling equilibrium in which both types oppose fighting. As
the following discussion shows, a key condition of pooling strategies is that L’s
off-the-equilibrium strategy cannot differ too much from its on-the-equilibrium
strategy.
110
Proposition 6. If cA < d − r ≤ cA, the following sets of strategies are each
part of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium:
• The resolute A supports fighting; the irresolute A opposes fighting;
• L chooses λ = 1 given A’s support for fighting, and λ = 0 given A’s
opposition against fighting;
• F offers zero given A’s support for fighting, and p − d + r given A’s
opposition against fighting.
Proposition 6 presents a separating equilibrium: war occurs with the
presence of the resolute A only. F and L are able to update their knowledge
about A’s type by observing its strategy. When the irresolute A reveals its type
by opposing war, L needs to minimize the negative impact of domestic anti-
war opinion on its bargaining position; formally, L chooses λ = 0 to minimize
the amount of policy costs for standing firm. Given λ = 0, F proposes p−d+r
which both L and the irresolute A prefer to war. Since F ’s offer is greater than
the irresolute A’s war payoff, the irresolute A has no incentive to mimic the
resolute type, which would simply lead to war.
If A is the resolute type, it reveals resolve with the support for war.
A’s support for war boosts L’s bargaining position by reducing L’s costs for
standing firm drastically. Given the existing assumptions, there is no bargain-
ing range between F and L if A expresses support for war. Hence, F would
rather offer L nothing and both sides end up fighting. With smaller costs
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of war, the resolute A will not deviate from the support for war, as its war
payoff is greater than p − d + r. In this separating equilibrium, even though
leaders fully update their information, it does not always guarantee a peace-
ful outcome: war still occurs when A is the resolute type. This is similar
to the equilibrium under complete information: knowing that its support for
war eliminates the bargaining range between F and L (i.e. cF < r + dp), the
resolute A is willing to support fighting and escalate the crisis to war when
cA < d− r ≤ cA.
Proposition 7. If cA < d − r ≤ cA < (1 + λ)(d − r), the following sets of
strategies are each part of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium:
• Both types of A support fighting, which leads to war;
• L chooses λ = 1 given A’s support for fighting, and λ ∈ (0, 1) given A’s
opposition against fighting;
• F offers zero given A’s support for fighting, and p− (1 + λ)(d− r) given
A’s opposition against fighting.
If either F or L alters its strategy after A’s opposition against war, a
different equilibrium may emerge. Both types of A express their support for
fighting in Proposition 7. It is not very surprising to see that the irresolute type
mimics the resolute type per se. In most of the signaling games, the irresolute
type usually faces no risk of war: it has the option of backing down if mimicking
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the resolute type fails to achieve a better offer. In fact, the irresolute type’s
threat is incredible precisely because of no risk involved. However, one of the
key features in this pooling equilibrium is that war occurs regardless of A’s
type. A’s support for war will eliminated the bargaining range between L
and F . Therefore, once it decides to mimic the resolute type, the irresolute
A knows for sure that the support for fighting will lead to crisis escalation, a
path it is unwilling to take under complete information.
Why does the irresolute A hide its type, knowing that it would cer-
tainly lead to war? The answer lies in the off-the-equilibrium strategies of
L and F . Suppose that the irresolute A opposes fighting, we know from the
previous discussion that it is optimal that L minimizes the value of λ: by min-
imizing the level of public attention, L is able to reduce the negative impact
of anti-war opinion on its bargaining position as much as possible. If A is
the irresolute type, choosing λ = 0 would maximize F ’s offer and thus benefit
the home country as a whole. In Proposition 7, however, I specify that L
does not reduce λ to zero in the off-the-equilibrium path (i.e. A’s opposition
against fighting); as a result, F would be able to avoid war by proposing an
offer smaller than p− d+ r. The off-the-equilibrium offer, p− (1 + λ)(d− r),
can be smaller than the irresolute A’s payoff from war, if cA < (1 + λ)(d− r).
Therefore, if L is expected to keep λ at a moderate value, it is possible that
the irresolute A would rather fake their support for fighting. As long as the
value of cA is not too high, the irresolute A would rather support fighting than
make its leader look bad openly during crisis bargaining.
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Proposition 8. If d− r − φd(1− p) < cA < d− r ≤ cA, the following sets of
strategies are each part of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium:
• Both types of A oppose fighting, and there is no risk of war;
• L chooses λ ∈ (0, 1] given A’s support for fighting, and λ = 0 given A’s
opposition against fighting;
• F offers zero given A’s support for fighting, and p− cA if cF ≥ c∗F given
A’s opposition against fighting.5
Proposition 8 illustrates the second pooling equilibrium under which
neither types of A supports fighting. The bargaining ends with a peaceful
agreement not because the problem of uncertainty is solved, but because the
resolute A is willing to mimic the irresolute type. The resolute A is more
willing to fight than the irresolute type, but it also prefers peace as long as F
proposes an offer greater than or equal to p− cA.
Without updating its belief about A’s type, F faces a typical risk-return
tradeoff: whether to propose a smaller offer which risks war with the resolute
A, or to propose a greater offer which both types of A prefer to fighting. The
analysis shows that if cF ≥ c∗F , F prefers greater concessions to the risk of war
and therefore proposes p − cA given A’s opposition against war. Combined
5c∗F =
(1−φ)(d−r)−cA
φ . For c
∗
F ≤ cF < r + dp to exist, it requires d− r − φd(1− p) < cA.
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with cF < r + dp, formally, we should have c
∗
F ≤ cF < r + dp. This range
exists as long as the value of cA is not too small, or d − r − φd(1 − p) < cA.
Substantially, given A’s support, it is impossible for F to bargain with L;
given A opposition against fighting, there always exists some bargaining range
unless both F and the resolute A are extremely tough.
5.4 Summary
Despite the constant evaluations of public opinion, it is still possible
that leaders understand the public’s preferences no better than foreign tar-
gets. I present a modified model by allowing the public to express its opinion
about crisis outcomes before crisis bargaining between its leader and a foreign
target. In the modified model, while the public does not directly bargain with
the foreign target, public opinion affects the target’s offer and the bargaining
outcome by changing the leader’s bargaining position. With complete infor-
mation, the model shows that (a) the leader tends to maximize the level of
publicity given public support for war and minimize publicity without public
support for war, and (b) public support for war may eliminate the bargaining
range between the leader and the foreign target. I further analyze the model
with incomplete information. In particular, I examine when and why the pub-
lic reveals or hides its preferences about war and peace when the risk of war
is relatively high (i.e. small costs of war for the foreign target).
I identify an equilibrium in which the irresolute people will pretend
its willingness to fight and drag themselves to war, even though they would
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oppose fighting under complete information. The answer depends on what the
irresolute people expect their leader to do and how it affects the target’s offer if
they do not support war initially. Strategically, the public wants to enjoy the
share of goods without necessarily suffering from war. If the irresolute people
anticipate their leader to minimize their impact in international bargaining,
they are more willing to express their true preference without worrying that
their dovish opinion might jeopardize the leader’s bargaining power. However,
if the leader is expected to maintain a moderate level of public influence, for
example, by allowing for open debate or protest, the irresolute people would
refrain from completely revealing their unwillingness to fight. Even a moderate
level of publicity amplifies the public’s dovish voice and puts their leader in
a weaker position, which may yield a share of goods worse than their payoffs
from war.
I identify another pooling equilibrium in which the resolute people pre-
tend to be the irresolute type. Although the resolute public and the foreign
target are both willing to fight if necessary, they also have incentives to pre-
vent a crisis from escalating as well. In this pooling equilibrium, war can be
avoided for two reasons. First, since the resolute people pretends to be irreso-
lute by opposing war, the domestic anti-war opinion makes both sides always
prefer negotiation to war. In other words, a bargaining range always exists
between two states. Second, the foreign target decides not to tolerate the risk
of war and hence proposes an offer that both types of people prefer to war.
The equilibrium exists when neither the resolute people nor the foreign target
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is extremely tough.
The modified model yields new findings about how different choices of
publicity affect the problem of uncertainty and crisis outcomes. First, war
may occur in equilibrium under complete information even without repeated
interactions. The previous literature shows that inefficient fighting may occur
under complete information when unitary state are able to use war to impose
costs on their opponents (Slantchev 2003). This chapter provides a domestic
explanation on the occurrence of war under complete information when we
break the unitary actor assumptions. In general, war is possible when (a)
leaders do not bear the societal costs of war, and (b) foreign opponents cannot
directly compensate the public’s costs of war. When the public does not
directly participate in external bargaining, its preference between war and
peace affects crisis outcomes only by changing the leader’s bargaining position.
Under certain conditions, when the public expresses its support for war to
demonstrate resolve, it advances the leader’s bargaining position to the extent
that any peaceful settlement cannot compensate the leader’s political costs for
backing down. The public’s resolve does not lead to a greater offer, but makes
it impossible for both sides to look for a mutually preferable agreement.
Second, the modified model provides a domestic origin of aggressive
(hawkish) leaders. The term “aggressive” or “hawkish” indicates that the cost
for fighting is small relative to the cost for peace. The majority of literature
considers aggressiveness as an exogenous yet private trait of leader and thus
examines the conditions under which leaders reveal or hide their true prefer-
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ences (Cukierman and Tommasi 1998, Schultz 2005). Instead of focusing on
individual traits, this chapter shows how and why a seemingly aggressive leader
on the negotiation table is created by an aggressive public. In this sense, a
leader serves as an agent of the public. Whether a leader appears aggressive in
external bargaining depends largely on the public’s resolve. It is complemen-
tary to the model of political bias and war established by Jackson and Morelli
(2007), who offer an alternative principal-agent model of war: under complete
information, war may occur if citizens select a politically-biased leader who
sees more gains from war than the country he represents. Jackson and Morelli
(2007) examine when citizens select a politically-biased individual to be their
leader, while this chapter studies when citizens choose to support fighting,
encouraging their leader to act more aggressively in external bargaining.
Finally, by reversing the informational asymmetry in principal-agent
games, the modified model focuses on uncertainty about the principal and
discusses when the principal may or may not address the informational asym-
metry. Chapter 3 shows that increasing publicity may not signal the public’s
resolve because the leader with the irresolute people sometimes mimics the
one with the resolute people—the foreign target is unable to fully distinguish
between two types of the public. Many analyses on nationalism or public
mobilization in general fall in this category. This chapter discusses how the
tendency of publicizing crisis may exacerbate the problem of uncertainty, in-
creasing the risk of war. If people sense that their leader tends to mobilize their
attention or involvement in any crisis, they always act supportive of fighting,
118
which prevents their leader and the foreign target from learning new infor-
mation. This is a problem of nationalism or public mobilization that existing
studies ignore. The undifferentiated tendency of involving and mobilizing the
public in crisis can be ineffective or counterproductive, not only because it ap-
pears incredible to foreign observers but also because it prevents leaders from
learning the true preferences of their people.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This dissertation begins with the question about the role of public
threats in signaling resolve and the risk of escalation in international con-
flict. According to the conventional wisdom, one of the major reasons to the
failure of a peaceful settlement is the existence of uncertainty among bar-
gaining states and their incentives to misrepresent (Fearon 1995). One of the
sources of uncertainty is resolve, which I define the costs of war an actor is
willing to bear in the event of war. To address the problem of uncertainty,
a resolute state sends a costly signal which invokes extra costs on concession
and thus makes crisis escalation more attractive, separating itself from an ir-
resolute state (Fearon 1997). What do such extra costs originate from? The
audience costs theory proposes an answer from the perspective of domestic
politics. After publicly threatening to use force against a foreign opponent, a
leader is subject to extra costs—imposed by the domestic public—for making
concessions to the opponent; a leader’s threat to use force is more credible if
the public is capable of imposing greater costs (Fearon 1994).
The audience costs theory contributes to our understanding of costly
signaling by highlighting the public as a critical source of extra costs for con-
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cession, but it raises more questions about how the logic of costly signaling
operates in a domestic context. For instance, scholars explore other sources
of extra costs for concession (Arena 2015, Ramsay 2004, Schultz 1998, Weeks
2008), the rationale of extra costs for concession (Slantchev 2006, Smith 1998,
Snyder and Borghard 2011, Tomz 2007), and the initiatives or reactions of
leaders in this logic (Debs and Weiss 2014, Kurizaki 2007, McManus 2014,
2016, Weiss 2013). Despite numerous works on domestic audience costs, we
need a new domestic mechanism of costly signaling integrating theoretical,
experimental, and empirical insights scholars have generated in the past two
decades. It is no longer satisfying to argue whether democracies or autocra-
cies have advantages in signaling their resolve credibly. Instead, scholars have
shown that both democracies and autocracies can have advantages and lim-
itations in credible signaling. A more important question becomes when or
under what conditions states with certain political features can credibly signal
their resolve.
To establish an integrated framework, Chapter 2 revisits three assump-
tions related to audience costs theory. First, since resolve refers to the costs of
war associated with human costs and economic destruction, I argue that it is
the public rather than their leader who bears those costs in the event of war.
This is a major deviation from the majority of existing literature in which
the public was usually considered as a judge evaluating their leader’s perfor-
mance after the end of crisis. Instead, I focus more on the public’s role as a
direct participant in militarized conflict if negotiation fails. Related to the first
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change, I further assume that the public evaluates their leader’s performance
based not only on the leader’s consistency between words and deeds, but also
on whether the leader’s final decision represents their own preferences between
war and a peaceful settlement. While one of the most frequent challenges to
audience costs theory is that the public cares both about national prestige and
policy substance, scholars have not suggested how to model the public’s policy
preference or explicitly theorized how these concerns might affect their evalua-
tions of leadership and ultimately our understanding of costly signaling. With
resolve located in the public, it is straightforward to model how the public
weighs war against a peaceful settlement, similar to the way scholars model a
unitary state’s preference in crisis bargaining. Finally, I incorporate the recent
evidence that leaders have leeway in adjusting how they issue a public threat,
arguing that the amount of political costs leaders are subject to depends both
on exogenous institutional difference and on their endogenous control of public
attention to crisis.
Building from the new assumptions, Chapter 3 presents a crisis-bargaining
model examining how leaders signal the public’s resolve by choosing a level of
publicity in their threats. With the opponent uncertain about the public’s re-
solve, the model uncovers whether uncertainty matters to crisis bargaining and
if so, how leaders choose the publicity of threats to influence the opponent’s
beliefs under different levels of political accountability to public preferences.
The model shows that a leader’s signaling pattern—how a level of publicity
signals the public’s resolve—varies with a leader’s political accountability to
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the public’s policy preferences. If leaders are rarely accountable to the public’s
policy preferences, the information about the public’s resolve does not affect
crisis bargaining; leaders always choose low publicity with nothing to do with
signaling the public’s resolve. If leaders are moderately accountable, a high-
profile threat will increase an opponent’s belief of facing the resolute people,
but leaders with the irresolute people may have incentives to exaggerate the
public’s resolve. The logic is similar to that of audience costs theory, but
it applies to leaders with moderate accountability only. If leaders are highly
accountable, the signaling logic is opposite. To avoid war, leaders with the res-
olute people will choose a low-profile threat while leaders with the irresolute
people will choose a high-profile threat. Surprisingly though, leaders with the
resolute people sometimes prefer a popular war to a peaceful settlement and
thus, those with the resolute people will make high-profile threats to mask the
public’s resolve and engage into war. In brief, greater publicity is not always
a signal of resolve.
Chapter 3 also establishes a conditional relationship between political
accountability and the risk of war. Whether higher political accountability
reduces war depends on the target’s capabilities relative to the challenger’s.
A higher level of political accountability reduces the risk of war only when a
target is strong, as leaders with the resolute people have incentives to address
uncertainty and thus avoid war. If a target is weak, a high level of political
accountability does not reduce the risk of war, because leaders with the resolute
people may gain more benefits by defeating a weak target and thus choose not
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to reveal true information. The empirical implication of the model is supported
by the statistical results in Chapter 4.
Finally, Chapter 5 explores how leaders use public threats to learn the
public’s resolve in crisis bargaining. It expands the original model by assuming
that the public’s resolve is unknown to both leaders and a foreign target.
The modified model shows that war is possible under complete information,
as the public support for war may make peace costly to leaders and thus
eliminate the bargaining range with foreign opponents. Under incomplete
information, war may also occur if leaders are unable to learn the pubic’s
preferences. More specifically, there exist conditions under which the irresolute
people exaggerate their willingness to fight even when they anticipate that a
peaceful negotiation will fail. If the irresolute people anticipate that their
leader tends to raise public attention or involvement into a crisis, regardless
of their true preferences, revealing their lack of resolve would put the leader
at a disadvantage in crisis bargaining.
By locating the costs of war in the public and allowing leaders to the
level of publicity during a crisis, the dissertation offers an integrated frame-
work to understand the apparently disparate strategies of leaders under differ-
ent levels of political accountability. It explains why moderately accountable
leaders can signal public resolve with high-profile threats, and why highly ac-
countable (i.e. democratic) leaders may back down easily after high-profile
threats or even give up signaling sometimes. Second, it contributes to the do-
mestic explanations of war and peace by integrating the variation of political
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institutions with the variation of domestic preferences. The audience costs
theory emphasizes the capability of domestic punishment, yet it is puzzling
why citizens in democracies should always support crisis escalation if war is
costly to citizens and they are able to punish leaders. The earlier democratic
peace literature simply assumed that the public held preferences for peace. By
explicitly modeling the interaction between the capability and the incentive of
public punishment, I show new insights about how institutions and interests
influence the intervening variable of publicity, which influences information
revelation and negotiation outcomes. Finally, it also identifies the conditions
under which a high level of political accountability produces perverse outcomes
costly to the public. By tracing the divergent interests between leaders and
the public, the dissertation shows that high political accountability can either
increase or decrease the risk of war, depending on the target’s relative strength.
Democratic leaders are highly accountable to the public’s policy preferences,
yet they influence crisis outcomes—a peaceful settlement or war—by choosing
whether to reveal true information to foreign opponents. When bargaining
with a weak target, democratic leaders from powerful states are tempted to
provoke the resolute people and trap them into war.
In the rest of this chapter, I discuss its contributions and possible ex-
tensions in three aspects. First, I emphasize the connections between experi-
mental works and the theory developed in Chapter 3. Existing experimental
works not only confirm some assumptions of audience costs theory, but also
provide new micro-foundations to improve the domestic mechanism of signal-
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ing. New assumptions and findings developed in this dissertation will also rely
on further experimental analysis. Second, by focusing on the endogenous con-
trol of publicity, this dissertation examines when increasing publicity enables a
leader to signal the public’s resolve. Future research in this direction includes
(a) constructing measurement on the variation of publicity, (b) collecting data
about how leaders make public threats in foreign crises, and (c) conducting
experiments to see whether new assumptions in this dissertation have a micro-
foundation. This chapter closes with discussions on how theoretical insights
help us understand the international behaviors of great powers and the impact
of anti-foreign mass protests.
6.1 Experiments and Theory Building
Building upon recent developments on audience costs theory, this dis-
sertation reexamines the roles of leaders and the public in crisis bargaining.
The emergence of experimental studies in international relations enables schol-
ars to identify the microfoundations of audience costs theory: whether and
why the public punishes their leader in a foreign crisis. On one hand, experi-
ments have shown the evidence that individuals are more likely to punish their
leader for not carrying out threats as they are concerned about the loss of na-
tional prestige (Davies and Johns 2013, Tomz 2007). On the other, scholars
gain new insights from survey experiments that individuals also evaluate their
leader based on their dispositional preferences between a peaceful settlement
and fighting (Kertzer and Brutger 2016). Experimental works advance our
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understanding of audience costs theory, by confirming the original assump-
tion of the theory’s microfoundation and generating new insights about the
public’s preferences. They have provided important insights about “how to
move forward our thinking about domestic politics, regime type, and strategic
interaction in international crises (Schultz 2012, pp. 373).”
To my knowledge, this dissertation is the first attempt to incorporate
the new insights from experimental studies to improve the model of audience
costs theory or more broadly, a domestic theory of crisis bargaining. Experi-
ments show that the consistency between words and deeds is only one of the
dimensions when individuals evaluate their leader’s performances. Throughout
this dissertation, I emphasize that the public should be considered not only as
a distant audience judging its leader’s performance, but also as a direct partic-
ipant in the event of war. The public’s new role suggests (a) the importance of
modeling the public’s preference between militarized conflicts and a peaceful
settlement, and (b) a new type of political costs—policy costs—that leaders
would pay for not following the public’s preferred policy.
With more solid microfoundations, this dissertation presents an inte-
grated framework which reconciles the conventional audience costs theory and
subsequent critics. The main findings reinforce the conventional wisdom that
signaling resolve increases a leader’s credibility in crisis bargaining, but they
challenge the linear linkage between increasing public attention and signaling
resolve. The original mechanism of audience costs—increasing public attention
signals resolve—exists when leaders are accountable to the hawkish (resolute)
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type of people only. When leaders are accountable to all types of people, hawk-
ish (resolute) or dovish (irresolute), increasing public attention makes backing
down easier and thus signals flexibility. To enhance credibility and bargaining
advantage, highly accountable leaders will decrease public attention.
This dissertation also provides new areas for future experimental re-
search on the microfoundation of public threats in costly signaling. Previous
experiments on audience costs theory focus more on the features of individual
respondents without considering the strategic impacts of leaders. Recently,
there is growing interest in experimental studies regarding the role of leaders
in public opinion but most of them focus on elite as the source of information.1
In this dissertation, I contend that the amount of political costs imposed on
leaders vary with the level of public attention. For instance, I assume that the
public puts more weights on current crises than on future reputation; therefore,
greater attention to current crises makes the public weigh their policy prefer-
ence over national prestige related to future reputation. Future experimental
research can examine whether and how individuals evaluate their leader’s per-
formance in the context of international crisis given different levels of attention.
6.2 Publicity of Threat and Beyond
Different from audience costs theory, this dissertation is the first at-
tempt modeling a leader’s choice of publicity in international crisis. I argue
1See Bullock (2011), Guisinger and Saunders (forthcoming).
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that the distinction between public and private action is misleading, as schol-
ars on audience costs are conflating different concepts such as threat, crisis,
negotiation, and diplomacy. As a result, scholars sometimes disagree with
each other regarding whether an event or action is considered public, which
has direct impact in the validity of audience costs theory. For instance, some
scholars consider China’s threat to the United States during the Korean War
a private threat based on the private mediation by the Indian Ambassador
(Fearon 1994); the failure of a private threat is thus consistent with audience
costs theory. Other scholars believe that Chinese leaders made public threats
from the evidence of several public warnings and propose an alternative the-
ory to explain the failure of those threats (Sartori 2002). One of the most
frequently cited examples of private crisis is the Cienfuegos crisis (Kurizaki
2007). However, the U.S. media were fully aware of the military facilities de-
veloped by the Soviet Union. What Nixon and Kissinger were manipulating
was how to prevent a “crisis mood” given that the public’s awareness of this
crisis or tension (Crall and Martin 2013). Instead of comparing public to pri-
vate negotiations, I focus on how a leader further increases or decreases the
level of publicity given that a crisis is known to the public.
This new approach not only avoids the confusions about public threats
as mentioned above, but also separates the effects of individual leaders from
those of exogenous political environments, opening areas for further research.
In addition to new experiments on the microfoundation of publicity, future
research can explore the effects of publicity on crisis outcomes. Due to the
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data limitation, I only test the empirical predications about the conditional
effects of political accountability on crisis outcomes. In fact, the model in
Chapter 3 also yields empirical predictions about the effects of publicity on
crisis outcomes. For instance, whether increasing publicity advances a leader’s
bargaining position depends on a leader’s political accountability. If a leader
is moderately accountable, increasing publicity partially signals resolve, in-
creasing the leader’s bargaining position. If a leader is highly accountable,
increasing publicity hurts a leader’s bargaining position; the leader either ac-
cepts a smaller offer which his irresolute people prefer to war, or fights with
the resolute people’s support. Further research can build new datasets about
the publicity of threats and test these empirical implications.
Scholars can begin with the existing dataset on international crisis or
militarized conflict and examine how leaders involve public attention in each
case. Despite the differences of political environments, I contend that both
democratic and authoritarian leaders are able to manipulate the level of pub-
licity, sometimes with different approaches. I propose two aspects of leaders’
behaviors. The first collects the information about public statements, such
as the rank of speaker, location, and frequency, etc. If a cross-national com-
parison is possible, scholars can further investigate the wording or tone of
public statements (McManus 2014). The second aspect examines whether
leaders take additional actions to increase or decrease public involvement. In
democracies, leaders can increase public involvement by holding congressional
debates, hearings, conducting referendums, etc (Debs and Weiss 2014). In
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authoritarian regimes, leaders can manipulate public involvement through its
control of state-owned media and political participation, e.g. editorials in the
state-owned media, permission of anti-foreign protests, etc.
This dissertation highlights the initiatives of leaders across different
political environments. By allowing leaders to choose the level of publicity,
the theory explains why both democratic and authoritarian leaders are able
to signal the public’s resolve under certain conditions. In addition to the
choice of publicity, I propose two directions for future research. The first
one is related to the content of threat. The majority of literature examines
whether a leader fails to implement threats to use force. Will leaders be
punished if they fail to honor promises of staying out of a conflict? On April
6, 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump authorized a military strike against
a Syrian airbase after Trump’s enduring position about staying out of Syria
and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s statement hinting no intervention of
the U.S. On March 30, Secretary Tillerson commented that Assad’s long-term
status “will be decided by the Syrian people.” A recent experiment suggests
that individuals also punish leaders for not honoring promises of staying out
of a conflict (Levy et al. 2015). Future research can examine why leaders send
a benign signal in international crisis and when they break their promises.
Second, while this dissertation takes the public’s policy preference as
given, future research can explore how the formation of public opinion may
affect crisis bargaining. Existing studies, mainly drawn from the literature of
American politics, focus more on the role of political elites in shaping public
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opinion (Berinsky 2007, 2009, Bullock 2011). The current development in
the U.S. politics shows the importance of leaders in shaping public opinion.
Future research can explore (a) when leaders can influence public opinion
about foreign policies (even with fake news), and (b) how such capability
influences bargaining outcomes. In the context of security crisis, an analysis
on how leaders shape public opinion on disputed issues may extend the scope
of research to the pre-crisis stage. Despite numerous works on the escalation
from crisis to war, we do not know much about the pre-crisis stage. One
may consider the pre-crisis stage as a process in which leaders can cultivate
the public’s preferences about disputed goods and its tolerance of war. These
preferences may not be clear until leaders bring these issues to public attention.
6.3 Policy Implications
This dissertation has implications for the U.S. foreign policy. It shows
that democratic leaders have an advantage in revealing information and avoid-
ing war only when their targets have strong military capabilities. When their
targets have weak military capabilities, democratic leaders are either prone to
war (given the hawkish public) or put at a disadvantage in bargaining (given
the dovish public). Therefore, a democratic great power, such as the U.S., does
not reduce the risk of war. Based on this logic, the U.S. should be cautious
in involving a crisis with a smaller or weaker state: either the U.S. leaders
are likely to risk war as an easy defeat leads to political benefits, or they may
receive an unfavorable deal by revealing the lack of domestic resolve. The first
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scenario occurs when the American public is considered “resolute” or more
tolerate with the costs of war. Two more questions remain to be answered.
First, Trump’s “America First” idea is gaining popularity, which may indicate
a new wave of isolationism among the American public. Will the rise of iso-
lationism make the American public more or less resolute when dealing with
potential international crises? Will their attitudes switch with the feature of
crisis—less resolute in a third-party intervention and more resolute in a direct
confrontation? Second, how do we consider smaller states with close allies
or partners? In particular, do we consider Syria and North Korea as a weak
target or a strong target given their external support from Russian and China,
respectively? The answers to these questions will be critical in understanding
the U.S. foreign policy in the near future.
Also, this dissertation offers new perspectives in understanding mass
movement in international crises or tensions. I define mass movement loosely,
with various forms in different regime types, such as anti-foreign protests, mass
mobilization through party-controlled organizations, referendums, public de-
bates, etc. How does mass movement matter in international crisis? Recent
studies suggest that authoritarian leaders can signal resolve to foreign oppo-
nents by giving a green light to anti-foreign protest (Weiss 2014), which is
confirmed in Chapter 3. I argue that moderately accountable leaders can sig-
nal resolve by raising the level of publicity, but the risk of war cannot be fully
eliminated as the irresolute type of people has incentives to mimic the resolute
one. In other words, mobilizing anti-foreign protests, or mass movement in
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general, may signal resolve and increase bargaining leverage to some extent,
but it is still a risky move as foreign opponents are unable to fully distinguish
between genuine protests and manipulated ones. In Chapter 5, mass move-
ment is viewed as a process through which the public expresses opinion and
leaders learn its preference. The key argument is that the tendency of mobiliz-
ing mass movement under all circumstances will prevent leaders from learning
the public’s true preference, leading to a costly war which would not occur if
leaders are more selective in mass mobilization.
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I solve the baseline model under complete information, using backward
induction. The solution concept is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). Since
the focus is how much F should offer in order to prevent war, I further as-
sume that cF > r − d, assuring that F has sufficient incentives to achieve an
agreement.
I begin with L’s strategy. Given that A chooses not to fight, L will
back down if x ≥ p − d + r. Given that A chooses not to fight, L will back
down if x ≥ p+ dp+ r.
A chooses whether to fight or not based on its expectation about L’s
strategy. If x ≥ p+dp+r, since L always backs down, A is indifferent between
fighting and no fighting. If x < p− d+ r, since L always stands firm, A is also
indifferent between fighting and no fighting. If p − d + r ≤ x < p + dp + r,
L stands firm only when A chooses to fight, meaning that A’s preference over
fighting will directly affect L’s decision. In the last situation, A chooses not
to fight as long as x ≥ p− cA.
F ’s goal is to achieve a peaceful agreement with a minimum offer. Since
p+dp+r is greater than the other two options, F ’s best strategy is to propose
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an offer such that L will back down after A chooses not to fight. Formally, F
must propose the greater value between p− d+ r and p− cA. Therefore, when
d ≥ cA + r, F proposes x = p− cA; when d < cA + r, F proposes x = p−d+ r.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Define L’s reservation value as the offer that makes L indifferent backing
down and standing firm after A does not support war: p−d+r if λ = 0, or p−2d
if λ = 1. Define A’s reservation value as the offer that makes A indifferent
between fight and no fight: p− cA given the resolute type, or p− cA given the
irresolute type. Since war is costly to F , under complete information, F can
avoid war by proposing an offer that both A and L prefer to war. The key is
to identify whose reservation value is larger given L’s choice of publicity and
A’s type. To simplify the proof, I first do not specify A’s type, that is, A’s
reservation value is p− cA.
When p−cA < p−2d or 2d < cA, A’s reservation value is always smaller
than L’s, regardless of L’s choices of publicity. F should make an offer that
renders L indifferent. The offer is p − d + r if λ = 0 or p − 2d if λ = 1. A
always chooses not to fight. L would receive p− d if λ = 0 or p− 2d if λ = 1.
Since p− d > p− 2d, L prefers λ = 0.
When p− d+ r ≤ p− cA or cA ≥ d− r, A’s reservation value is always
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greater than L’s, regardless of L’s choices of publicity. F proposes p − cA,
making A indifferent between fight and no fight. L would receive p− cA− r if
λ = 0 or p− cA if λ = 1. Thus, L prefers λ = 1.
When p− 2d ≤ p− cA < p− d+ r, to make both A and L indifferent,
F must propose p− cA if λ = 1 but propose p−d+ r if λ = 0. L would receive
p− cA if λ = 1 or p− d if λ = 0. Thus, L prefers λ = 1 if d ≥ cA or λ = 0 if
d < cA.
Put together, if d < cA, L chooses λ = 0 and F proposes p − d + r; if
d ≥ cA, L chooses λ = 1 and F proposes p − cA. A and L always accept the
offer.
Suppose A has two types. If d < cA < cA, A’s type does not affect the
equilibrium. All actors play the same strategies as in d < cA. If cA < cA ≤ d,
while L always chooses λ = 1, A’s type affects F ’s offer. F proposes p− cA to
the resolute type, and p− cA to the irresolute type.
If cA ≤ d < cA, A’s type affects both F ’s offer and L’s choice of λ. On
one hand, since d ≥ cA, we know from above that given the resolute type of
A, L chooses λ = 1 and F proposes p − cA. On the other, we have d < cA,
meaning that given the irresolute type of A, L chooses λ = 0 and F proposes
p− d+ r.
The four reservation values identified above are the potential options
for F . In any given situation, L’s choice and A’s type yield a pair of reservation
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values and F picks the larger value to propose an offer. What F would offer
under complete information has strong impacts on L’s choice of publicity under
incomplete information. By assumption, we have known that
p− d+ r > p− 2d ⇔ −r < d,
p− cA > p− cA ⇔ cA < cA.
More importantly, we need to compare the reservation values between
L and A under different circumstances. Formally, we need compare the values
of d− r, 2d, cA and cA.
To facilitate the proofs, I use A to represent the resolute A and A to
represent the irresolute A. LA refers to L with A and LA refers to L with A.
Proof of Proposition 2
When d < cA < cA, we know from Proposition 1 that L always chooses
λ = 0 and F always proposes p− d+ r. F ’s uncertainty about A’s type does
not affect their strategies.
Proof of Proposition 3
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When cA ≤ d < cA, we have the following possible circumstances: 1
d − r < cA < 2d < cA, 2 d − r < cA < cA ≤ 2d, 3 cA ≤ d − r < 2d < cA,
and 4 cA ≤ d− r < cA ≤ 2d.
First, I show that the separating equilibrium does not exist in which
LA chooses λ = 1 and LA chooses λ = 0. Then, I prove the nonexistence of
the pooling equilibrium in which L always chooses λ = 1. Finally, I present
a semi-separating equilibrium in which LA chooses λ = 0 and LA randomizes
between λ = 0 and λ = 1.
I propose a separating equilibrium when cA ≤ d < cA. Strategies and
beliefs are as follows.
• LA: choose λ = 1 and back down iff x ≥ p− cA. LA: choose λ = 0 and
back down iff x ≥ p− d+ r.
• F : believe φ0 = P (cA|λ = 0) = 0 if λ = 0 and propose x∗ = p − d + r;
believe φ1 = P (cA|λ = 1) = 1 if λ = 1 and propose x∗ = p− cA.
• A: accept iff x ≥ p− cA. A: accept iff x ≥ p− cA.
With λ = 0, LA is offered p−d+r. After the audience cost is deducted
from p − d + r, its actual payoff remains p − d. With λ = 1, it would be
mistaken for LA and gains p− cA. For LA to choose λ = 0, it requires
p− d > p− cA ⇔ d < cA, (B.1)
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which is contradictory with cA ≤ d. Therefore, the separating equilibrium
does not exist.1
Next, I prove that LA has no incentive to mimic LA by choosing λ = 1.
If the pooling equilibrium existed, F would make an offer that only LA accepts,
but which offer LA accepts would depend on the relative values between p−2d
and p− cA. Strategies and beliefs are as follows.
• LA: choose λ = 1 and back down iff x ≥ p− cA. LA: choose λ = 1 and
back down iff x ≥ p− 2d under 1 or 3 , and back down iff x ≥ p− cA
under 2 or 4 .
• F : believe φ1 = φ if λ = 1 and propose x∗ = p− 2d under 1 or 3 , and
propose x∗ = p− cA under 2 or 4 ; believe (out of equilibrium) φ0 = 0
if λ = 0 and propose x∗ = p− d+ r.
• A: accept iff x ≥ p− cA. A: accept iff x ≥ p− cA.
It is easy to show that LA has an incentive to deviate from λ = 1.
Under 1 or 3 ,
p− 2d ≥ p− d⇔ d ≥ 2d (B.2)
1Another separating equilibrium in which LA chooses λ = 0 and LA chooses λ = 1 exists
only when d ≥ cA, which I will show later.
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is false; under 2 or 4 ,
p− cA ≥ p− d⇔ d ≥ cA (B.3)
does not hold, either. The pooling equilibrium in which L always chooses
λ = 1 does not exist.
I prove that the semi-separating equilibrium exists. Since F ’s offers are
different given the reservation values of L and A, I present the proof under the
condition 1 or 3 first, then under the condition 2 or 4 . Strategies and
beliefs are as follows.
• LA: choose λ = 1 and back down iff x ≥ p − cA. LA: with probability
µ, choose λ = 0 and back down iff x ≥ p− d+ r; with probability 1− µ,
choose λ = 1 and back down iff x ≥ p − 2d under 1 or 3 , and back
down iff x ≥ p− cA under 2 or 4 .
• F : believe φ0 = 0 if λ = 0 and propose x∗ = p− d+ r; believe φ1 = φ(µ)
if λ = 1, then with probability β, propose x∗ = p − 2d under 1 or 3
and x∗ = p − cA under 2 or 4 , and with probability 1 − β, propose
x∗ = p− cA.
• A: accept iff x ≥ p− cA. A: accept iff x ≥ p− cA.
Under the condition 1 or 3 :
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First, I verify that LA chooses λ = 1. If LA chooses λ = 1, with
probability 1−β, it may gain the offer p−cA consistent with its people’s type;
with probability β, LA faces the risks of war, which it would fight with public
support. If LA chooses λ = 0, it would be mistaken for LA and gain p − d.
Given 1 , LA prefers λ = 1 to λ = 0 when
β(p− d(1− p)) + (1− β)(p− cA) ≥ p− d⇔ d ≥ cA, (B.4)
which exists. Since A accepts an offer x ≥ p − cA, it would reject the offer
p − d + r given cA ≤ d − r, that is, part of the condition 3 . Therefore, war
would still occur if LA chooses λ = 0 and F offers p− d+ r. LA would stand
firm with the resolute A’s support and receive p−d(1−p). Under the condition
3 , LA prefers λ = 1 to λ = 0 when
β(p− d(1− p)) + (1− β)(p− cA) ≥ p− d(1− p)⇔ d(1− p) ≥ cA. (B.5)
Second, I verify that LA randomizes between λ = 0 and λ = 1. To
render LA indifferent between λ = 0 and λ = 1, it requires
p− d = β(p− 2d) + (1− β)(p− cA)⇔ β =
d− cA
2d− cA
, (B.6)
which holds as long as d > cA.
Third, to see F randomizes between p− 2d and p− cA upon observing
λ = 1, we have
1− p+ cA = φ1(1− p− cF ) + (1− φ1)(1− p+ 2d)⇔ φ1 =
2d− cA
2d+ cF
(B.7)
φ1 =
φ
(1− φ)(1− µ) + φ =
2d− cA
2d+ cF
⇔ µ = 1− φ(cF + cA)
(1− φ)(2d− cA)
. (B.8)
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For 0 < µ < 1 to exist, it requires φ <
2d−cA
cF+2d
.
Under the condition 2 or 4 :
First, the steps to prove that LA prefers λ = 1 are the same as in (4)
and (5). Second, to render LA indifferent between λ = 0 and λ = 1, F chooses
β such that
p− d = β(p− cA) + (1− β)(p− cA)⇔ β =
d− cA
cA − cA
. (B.9)
Since 0 < µ < 1, LA is rendered indifferent given cA < d < cA.
Finally, to see F randomizes between p− cA and p− cA upon observing
λ = 1, we have
1− p+ cA = φ1(1− p− cF ) + (1− φ1)(1− p+ cA)⇔ φ1 =
cA − cA
cA + cF
(B.10)
φ1 =
φ
(1− φ)(1− µ) + φ =
cA − cA
cA + cF
⇔ µ = 1− φ(cF + cA)
(1− φ)(cA − cA)
, (B.11)
which further requires φ <
cA−cA
cF+cA
.
Proof of Proposition 4
When cA < cA ≤ d, the differences between L’s and A’s reservation
values have three possibilities: 1 d− r < cA < cA < 2d, 2 cA < d− r < cA <
2d, and 3 cA < cA < d− r < 2d.
First, I prove the existence of a separating equilibrium when cA ≤
d(1− p)− r and r ≥ cA − cA. Strategies and beliefs are as follows.
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• LA: choose λ = 0 and back down iff x ≥ cA. LA: choose λ = 1 and back
down iff x ≥ cA.
• F : believe φ0 = P (cA|λ = 0) = 1 and propose x∗ = p − cA; believe
φ1 = P (cA|λ = 1) = 0 if λ = 1 and propose x∗ = p− cA.
• A: accept iff x ≥ p− cA. A: accept iff x ≥ p− cA.
Observing λ = 1, F would propose p−cA, which makes A support war;
with A’s support, LA would stand firm and gain p− d(1− p), greater than the
payoff (p− d) with λ = 0.
In 2 and 3 , below I show the conditions under which LA prefers λ = 0
to λ = 1 whereas LA prefers λ = 1
p− cA − r ≥ p− d(1− p)⇔ cA ≤ d(1− p)− r (B.12)
p− cA ≥ p− cA − r ⇔ r ≥ cA − cA (B.13)
Given cA ≤ d(1 − p) − r, the separating equilibrium may exist under
2 and 3 only. It is easy to show that the separating equilibrium does not
exist under 1 as LA would deviate to λ = 1.
2
2Under the condition 1 , LA is offered p−d+r after choosing λ = 0 and its actual payoff
is p− d. However, LA would be better off if it deviates to λ = 1. With λ = 1, as A rejects
F ’s offer p− cA, LA would gain p− d(1− p) by standing firm with public support.
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Second, a semi-separating equilibrium exists when cA ≤ d(1 − p) − r
and r < cA − cA. Strategies and beliefs are as follows.
• LA: choose λ = 0 and back down iff x ≥ p− cA. LA: with probability µ,
choose λ = 0 and back down iff x ≥ p− d+ r under 2 and x ≥ p− cA
under 3 ; with probability 1 − µ, choose λ = 1 and back down iff x ≥
p− 2d.
• F : believe φ1 = 0 if λ = 1 and propose x∗ = p − cA; believe φ0 = φ(µ)
if λ = 0, then with probability β, propose x∗ = p− d + r under 2 and
x∗ = p− cA under 3 , and with probability 1− β, propose x∗ = p− cA.
• A: accept iff x ≥ p− cA. A: accept iff x ≥ p− cA.
I verify that LA chooses λ = 0. If LA chooses λ = 0, with probability
1−β, LA is offered p− cA and its actual payoff is p− cA− r with the audience
costs deducted; with probability β, LA faces the risks of war, which it would
fight with public support. If LA chooses λ = 1, it would be mistaken for LA
and offered p − cA. Since this offer is rejected by A for sure, LA stands firm
with public support and gains p − d(1 − p). Therefore, LA prefers λ = 0 to
λ = 1 when
β(p− d(1− p)) + (1− β)(p− cA − r) ≥ p− d(1− p)⇔ cA ≤ d(1− p)− r
(B.14)
Next, I verify that LA randomizes between λ = 0 and λ = 1. If LA
chooses λ = 1, it reveals its people’s type and gains p − cA. If LA chooses
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λ = 0, with probability 1− β, it is mistaken for LA and receives p− cA minus
the audience costs r; with probability β, it gains p− d under the condition 2
or p− cA − r under 3 . To render LA indifferent under 2 , β is calculated as
follows:
β(p− d) + (1− β)(p− cA − r) = p− cA ⇔ β =
cA − cA − r
d− r − cA
; (B.15)
Similarly, under the condition 3 ,
β(p− cA − r) + (1− β)(p− cA − r) = p− cA ⇔ β =
cA − cA − r
cA − cA
. (B.16)
For both (15) and (16) to hold, it further requires r < cA − cA.
To check whether F randomizes between a smaller yet risky offer that
only LA accepts and a greater offer that guarantees peace, given 2 , we have
1− p+ cA = φ0(1− p− cF ) + (1− φ0)(1− p+ d− r)⇔ φ0 =
d− r − cA
cF + d− r
(B.17)
φ0 =
φ
µ(1− φ) + φ =
d− r − cA
cF + d− r ⇔ µ =
φ(cF + cA)
(1− φ)(d− r − cA)
.
(B.18)
For µ to exist, it requires φ <
d−r−cA
cF+d−r .
Note that F replaces p−d+r with p−cA when cA < cA < d−r. Thus,
under the condition 3 , Equation (17) is replaced with the following:
1− p+ cA = φ0(1− p− cF ) + (1− φ0)(1− p+ cA)⇔ φ0 =
cA − cA
cF + cA
(B.19)
φ0 =
φ
µ(1− φ) + φ =
cA − cA
cF + cA
⇔ µ = φ(cF + cA)
(1− φ)(cA − cA)
, (B.20)
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which further requires φ <
cA−cA
cF+cA
.
Again, there is no such semi-separating equilibrium under 1 . Suppose
that F observes λ = 0, its uncertainty about A’s type does not matter as it
always proposes p − d + r to avoid war given d − r < cA < cA. On the other
hand, F proposes p − cA when observing λ = 1. Since cA < cA ≤ d, LA is
better off by switching to λ = 1.
Third, when cA > d(1 − p) − r, I show that LA mimics LA’s strategy
by choosing λ = 1. Strategies and beliefs are as follows.
• LA: choose λ = 1 and back down iff x ≥ p− cA. LA: choose λ = 1 and
back down iff x ≥ p− cA.
• F : believe φ1 = φ if λ = 1 and propose x∗ = p − cA; believe (out of
equilibrium) φ0 = 0 if λ = 0 and propose x
∗ = p− d+ r under 1 or 2 ,
and x∗ = p− cA under 3 .
• A: accept iff x ≥ p− cA. A: accept iff x ≥ p− cA.
In the event of λ = 0, I assign F ’s out-of-equilibrium φ0 = 0, i.e.
that F believes that only LA would deviate to λ = 0. The assigned belief
satisfies the Intuitive Criterion as LA would have an incentive to bluff. When
cA > d(1 − p) − r, on one hand, LA would gain the best offer, p − d(1 − p),
by choosing λ = 1, meaning that it never does better by switching to λ = 0
regardless of F ’s strategy. On the other hand, LA could do better than its
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equilibrium payoff if F proposes p−cA and r < cA−cA, even though this offer
is not played off the equilibrium path. In sum, if F ever observes λ = 0, it
believes that only LA would have made this choice and proposes x
∗ = p−d+r
under the condition 1 or 2 , or x∗ = p− cA under 3 .
I first prove that LA has an incentive to choose λ = 1. When both
Ls choose λ = 1, F makes an offer that A considers unacceptable. Since A
supports fighting, LA stands firm with the payoff p− d(1− p). If LA chooses
λ = 0, F would believe that it faces LA and offer either p− d+ r or p− cA− r
as specified above. Thus, under the condition 1 or 2 , LA prefers λ = 1 to
λ = 0 if
p− d(1− p) > p− d⇔ dp ≥ 0, (B.21)
which is always true. Under 3 , A would reject the out-of-equilibrium offer,
meaning that LA would also stand firm with public support. LA does no better
by deviating to λ = 0. Formally,
p− d(1− p) ≥ p− d(1− p). (B.22)
LA has no incentive to switch to λ = 0 either. By choosing λ = 1, LA
backs down and gains p − cA. Similarly, I show that under the condition 1
or 2 , LA prefers λ = 1 to λ = 0 when
p− cA > p− d⇔ d > cA, (B.23)
consistent with the assumption. Given 3 , F would offer p− cA if LA chooses
λ = 0; however, LA would be worse off as the audience costs, r, must be
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deducted from the offer, that is,
p− cA > p− cA − r ⇔ r > cA − cA. (B.24)
Finally, I check the conditions under which F prefers an offer that only
LA accepts to an offer that L always accepts regardless of A’s type. Formally,
we have
φ(1− p− cF ) + (1− φ)(1− p+ cA) ≥ 1− p+ cA ⇔ cF ≤
(1− φ)cA − cA
φ
(B.25)
As (1− φ)cA − cA > 0, it requires φ < cA−cAcA .
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Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max Obs
Threat failure 0.616 0.487 0 1 242
Challenger’s accountability 1.4 1.001 0 3 240
Target’s accountability 1.072 0.901 0 3 237
Challenger’s polity score 0.7 7.399 –10 10 240
Target’s polity score –2.029 6.687 –10 10 239
Contiguity 0.636 0.482 0 1 242
Alliance similarity portfolio 0.576 0.357 –0.545 1 237
Challenger’s status quo 0.197 0.416 –0.363 1 242
Target’s status quo 0.055 0.303 –0.342 1 237
Territorial issue 0.591 0.493 0 1 242
Leadership issue 0.116 0.321 0 1 242
Policy issue 0.455 0.499 0 1 242
Other issues 0.211 0.409 0 1 242
World war dummy 0.165 0.372 0 1 242
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Table C.2: Estimating Compellent Threat Failure (1918–2001)
Threat failure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(p < 0.67) (p ≥ 0.67) (p < 0.78) (p ≥ 0.78)
Challenger’s accountability 3.563∗∗∗ 0.301 2.867∗∗∗ 0.449
(0.864) (0.594) (0.746) (0.741)
Challenger’s accountability2 –1.183∗∗∗ –0.087 –0.846∗∗∗ –0.229
(0.254) (0.175) (0.216) (0.219)
Target’s accountability 1.069∗∗∗ –0.199 0.804∗∗ –0.311
(0.319) (0.194) (0.262) (0.212)
Challenger’s polity score –0.043 0.001 –0.067† 0.045
(0.048) (0.033) (0.039) (0.045)
Target’s polity score –0.179∗∗∗ 0.015 –0.150∗∗∗ 0.020
(0.046) (0.028) (0.039) (0.031)
Contiguity –0.722 –0.510 –0.887∗ –0.419
(0.446) (0.346) (0.391) (0.408)
Alliance portfolio similarity 1.649∗ 0.378 1.651∗∗ –0.046
(0.668) (0.505) (0.571) (0.608)
Challenger’s status quo 1.396∗ 0.078 0.843 0.115
(0.713) (0.389) (0.567) (0.446)
Target’s status quo –3.976∗∗∗ 0.541 –2.843∗∗∗ 0.748
(0.792) (0.546) (0.578) (0.737)
Territory –0.343 0.210 0.108 0.501
(0.475) (0.344) (0.393) (0.353)
Government –2.124∗ –1.289∗ –2.070∗∗ –0.772
(0.832) (0.494) (0.728) (0.533)
Policy –1.195∗ 0.374 –1.258∗∗ 0.725∗
(0.569) (0.330) (0.402) (0.336)
Other –0.712 0.196 –0.211 0.157
(0.473) (0.342) (0.411) (0.403)
Constant –2.465∗ 0.470 –2.020∗ 0.143
(1.092) (0.805) (0.900) (0.825)
Observations 95 130 114 111
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by the individual case. Dummy variables
for world war years are included but not reported here.
†p < 0.1, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.001
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Table C.3: Estimating Compellent Threat Failure (1918–2001)
Threat failure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(all) (p < 0.67) (p ≥ 0.67) (p < 0.78) (p ≥ 0.78)
Challenger’s accountability 1.363∗∗ 2.119∗∗ 0.451 2.297∗∗ 0.457
(0.511) (0.766) (0.705) (0.741) (0.833)
Challenger’s accountability2 –0.429∗∗ –0.965∗∗ –0.193 –0.842∗∗ –0.212
(0.160) (0.305) (0.208) (0.221) (0.229)
Target’s accountability 0.253 1.626∗∗ 0.395 0.764∗ 0.124
(0.195) (0.486) (0.313) (0.355) (0.339)
Challenger’s polity score –0.037 0.028 –0.006 –0.042 0.011
(0.027) (0.053) (0.048) (0.058) (0.064)
Target’s polity score –0.038 –0.211∗∗ –0.007 –0.151∗∗ 0.011
(0.025) (0.059) (0.033) (0.045) (0.036)
Major–Major dyad 0.024 2.100 –3.017† 0.875 –2.406
(0.526) (1.391) (1.545) (0.953) (1.553)
Major–Minor dyad 0.699∗ 1.814∗ 0.052 2.072∗∗ –0.231
(0.311) (0.747) (0.471) (0.566) (0.600)
Minor–Major dyad –1.383∗ –1.679∗ (omitted) –0.339 (omitted)
(0.548) (0.753) (0.726)
Initiator’s relative power –0.262 1.141 –0.993 0.885 –1.592
(0.433) (1.542) (1.760) (1.046) (2.572)
Contiguity –0.366 –0.709 –0.692† –0.612 –0.691
(0.266) (0.566) (0.403) (0.485) (0.440)
Alliance portfolio similarity 0.258 2.197† –0.162 1.219 –0.249
(0.436) (1.213) (0.652) (0.874) (0.726)
Initiator’s status quo –0.009 1.337† –0.048 0.678 0.049
(0.345) (0.783) (0.483) (0.612) (0.524)
Target’s status quo –0.756† –4.418∗∗ 1.104 –2.302∗∗ 1.125
(0.409) (1.164) (0.735) (0.724) (0.907)
Territory 0.002 –0.010 0.144 –0.166 0.533
(0.245) (0.476) (0.343) (0.428) (0.373)
Government –1.141∗∗ –1.811∗ –1.233∗ –1.903∗∗ –0.756
(0.381) (0.881) (0.493) (0.721) (0.576)
Policy –0.075 –1.600∗ 0.560 –1.336∗∗ 0.872∗
(0.228) (0.626) (0.343) (0.428) (0.351)
Other –0.022 –1.103† 0.123 –0.453 0.150
(0.267) (0.587) (0.377) (0.474) (0.400)
Constant 0.116 –1.984 1.611 –1.094 2.201
(0.591) (1.605) (1.721) (1.099) (2.541)
Observations 229 95 129 114 111
Model χ2 57.785 56.591 27.391 70.612 26.938
Standard errors in parentheses. Dummy variables for world war years are included but
not reported here.
†p < 0.1, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
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Appendix D
Chapter 5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5
I use backward induction to solve the model under complete informa-
tion. The solution concept is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). To simplify
the calculations without losing generality, I assume for now that L makes a
dichotomous choice, either λ = 1 or λ = 0. Also, since the resolute A’s payoffs
are the same as the irresolute A’s payoffs except the value of cA, I simplify the
solution by considering only one type of A with the costs of war cA, rather
than differentiating between cA and cA.
I start with L’s final move and F ’s proposed offer. Suppose that A
supports fighting: if L chooses λ = 1, L will back down when x ≥ p+d+dp+2r
and F will offer x = p+d+dp+ 2r when cF ≥ d+dp+ 2r; if L chooses λ = 0,
L will back down when x ≥ p + dp + r and F will offer x = p + dp + r when
cF ≥ dp+ r. Suppose that A does not support fighting: if L chooses λ = 1, L
will back down when x ≥ p− 2(d− r) and F will offer x = p− 2(d− r) when
cF ≥ 2(r − d); if L chooses λ = 0, L will back down when x ≥ p− d + r and
F will offer x = p− d+ r when cF ≥ r − d.
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Then I analyze L’s choice of λ given different values of cF and A’s initial
preferences. Below I demonstrate that whether d > r or d ≤ r does not affect
L’s choice.
Assume d > r. Given cF > 0, we have cF > r−d > 2(r−d). Therefore,
if A does not support fighting, F will always propose an offer that L prefers
to standing firm. In this case, L chooses λ = 0 since
UL(λ = 0| ∼ fight) > UL(λ = 1| ∼ fight) ⇔ p− d > p− 2d. (D.1)
If A supports fighting, the choice of λ depends on the value of cF in one of the
three ranges as follows. Suppose cF ≥ d + dp + 2r: L is indifferent between
λ = 1 and λ = 0; no war occurs because F always proposes an offer that
compensates L’s war payoff. Suppose r + dp ≤ cF < d + dp + 2r: L is also
indifferent between λ = 1 and λ = 0; but since war occurs only when λ = 1,
I assume that L chooses λ = 0 instead. Suppose cF < r + dp: L is again
indifferent about the choice of λ, however, because F offers x = 0 and war
occurs in either way.
Assume d ≤ r. The three ranges above still exist, meaning that L’s
choice remains the same if A supports fighting. We need to check whether L
still chooses λ = 0 if A does not support fighting. The value of cF may fall
into one of these ranges: cF ≥ 2(r−d), r−d ≤ cF < 2(r−d), and cF < r−d.1
Regardless of L’s choice, F either chooses war with a zero offer or makes L
indifferent between standing firm and backing down. Either way, L will still
1To make sure 2(r − d) < r + dp, I further assume r < d(p+ 2).
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receive its war payoff. Therefore, regardless of the range of cF , L chooses λ = 0
because (D.1) still holds.
Finally, I analyze the conditions under which A supports fighting or
not. I first assume d > r. Suppose cF ≥ r+dp: obviously, A supports fighting
even if A’s support leads to λ = 0; formally, we have
UA(fight) > UA(∼ fight) ⇔ p+ dp+ r > p− d+ r. (D.2)
Suppose cF < r + dp: A supports fighting when cA < d− r, that is,
UA(fight) > UA(∼ fight) ⇔ p− cA > p− d+ r. (D.3)
Assume d ≤ r. Given that cA > d− r always exists, we know from (D.3) that
A never supports fighting.
Given d > r, below is a summary of equilibrium with two types of A.
• A: if cF ≥ r + dp, A always supports fighting; if cF < r + dp,
– both A and A supports fighting when cA < cA < d− r;
– only A supports fighting when cA < d− r ≤ cA;
– neither A nor A supports fighting when d− r ≤ cA < cA.2
• L: if A supports fighting, L is indifferent about the choice of λ and stands
firm as long as F offers x < p+d+dp+ 2r given λ = 1 or x < p+dp+ r
2If d ≤ r, neither types of A supports fighting.
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given λ = 0;3 if A does not support fighting, L chooses λ = 0 and backs
down as long as F offers x ≥ p− d+ r.
• F : if A does not support fighting, F offers x = p− 2(d− r) given λ = 1
and x = p− d+ r given λ = 0; if A supports fighting,
– F offers x = p+ d+ dp+ 2r given λ = 1, and x = p+ dp+ r given
λ = 0 when cF ≥ d+ dp+ 2r;
– F offers x = 0 given λ = 1, and x = p + dp + r given λ = 0 when
r + dp ≤ cF < d+ dp+ 2r;
– F offers x = 0 regardless of λ when cF < r + dp.
There exist multiple equilibria under incomplete information. Since I focus
on the risks of war and A’s different strategies given its type, to solve the
model under incomplete information, I further assume that cF < r + dp and
cA < d−r ≤ cA. I prove the existence of three equilibria: a separating equilib-
rium in which only A supports fighting; a pooling equilibrium in which both
types of A support fighting; another pooling equilibrium in which neither types
of A supports fighting.
Proof of Proposition 6
3I assume earlier that L chooses λ = 0 if r + dp ≤ cF < d+ dp+ 2r to avoid war.
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Strategies and beliefs of the separating equilibrium are as follows.
• A: A supports fighting; A does not support fighting.
• Updated beliefs: Pr(cA|fight) = 1; Pr(cA| ∼ fight) = 0.
• L: if A supports fighting, L chooses λ = 1 and stands firm as long as
F offers x < p + d + dp + 2r; if A does not support fighting, L chooses
λ = 0 and backs down as long as F offers x ≥ p− d+ r.
• F : if A supports fighting, F offers x = 0; if A does not support fighting,
F offers x = p− (1 + λ)(d− r).
First, I verify L’s choices of λ given its updated beliefs. Given A’s
support for fighting, L learns that A is the resolute type and thus would
choose λ = 1. F also updates its belief about A’s type. If the resolute A’s
support for war, we know from Proposition 5 that F would propose nothing
and fight given cF < r + dp, regardless of the value of λ. Therefore, L is
indifferent between λ = 1 and λ = 0, both of which brings L its war payoffs
with A’s support. Formally, we have
UL(λ = 1|fight) ≥ UL(λ = 0|fight) ⇔ p− d(1− p) ≥ p− d(1− p). (D.4)
If L and F observe that A does not support fighting, both believe that they
face the irresolute A. As F offers x = p− d + r, we can verify that L prefers
λ = 0 to λ = 1 based on the following inequality:
UL(λ = 0| ∼ fight) > UL(λ = 1| ∼ fight) ⇔ p− d > p− d− r. (D.5)
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Then, I verify F ’s strategies given its updated beliefs. A’s support for
fighting reveals its resolute type to L and F . Given λ = 1 and cF < r + dp,
there is no bargaining range between L and F , meaning that either x = 0 or
x = p − d + r would not be sufficient to make L back down. Therefore, F
would rather offer nothing. Formally, we have
UF (0|fight) ≥ UF (p− d+ r|fight) ⇔ 1− p− cF ≥ 1− p− cF . (D.6)
If A does not support fighting, given λ = 0, L will back down as long as F
offers x ≥ p − d + r. Therefore, F is able to make a peaceful agreement by
offering x = p− d+ r. The remaining portion of the goods is greater than F ’s
war payoff when
UF (p− d+ r| ∼ fight) ≥ UF (0| ∼ fight)⇔ 1− p+ d− r ≥ 1− p− cF .
(D.7)
This is true given d > r.
Finally, I verify A’s strategy consistent with its type. We have already
verified that if A chooses to fight initially, the other actors’ strategies will lead
to war, but no war will occur if A chooses not to fight in the first place. Given
the resolute type, A chooses to fight when
UA(fight) > UA(∼ fight) ⇔ p− cA > p− d+ r. (D.8)
This is consistent with one of the initial assumptions, cA < d − r. Given the
irresolute type, A chooses not to fight when
UA(∼ fight) > UA(fight) ⇔ p− d+ r > p− cA, (D.9)
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which also holds given cA ≥ d− r.
Proof of Proposition 7
Strategies and beliefs of the first pooling equilibrium are as follows.
• A: both A and A support fighting.
• Updated beliefs: Pr(cA|fight) = φ; Pr(cA| ∼ fight) = .
• L: if A supports fighting, L chooses λ = 1 and stands firm as long as
F offers x < p + d + dp + 2r; if A does not support fighting, L chooses
λ ∈ (0, 1) and backs down as long as F offers x ≥ p− (1 + λ)(d− r).
• F : if A supports fighting, F offers x = 0; if A does not support fighting,
F offers x = p− (1 + λ)(d− r).
Uninformed actors are unable to update beliefs in a pooling equilibrium.
First, I verify L’s choices of λ given its beliefs. Similar to (D.4), even if both
types of A supports fighting, Lmakes the ultimate move and has no preferences
about the value of λ. Formally, we have
UL(λ = 1|fight) ≥ UL(0 < λ < 1|fight)⇔ p− d(1− p) ≥ p− d(1− p).
(D.10)
Suppose that A chooses not to fight, I specify that λ ∈ (0, 1) is L’s off-the-
equilibrium strategy. As a result, L would back down as long as F offers
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x ≥ p−(1+λ)(d−r). F ’s off-the-equilibrium strategy is x = p−(1+λ)(d−r),
which I will verify soon. Below I show that L would not deviate from its off-
the-equilibrium strategy, that is,
UL(0 < λ < 1| ∼ fight) > UL(λ = 1| ∼ fight)⇔ p− (1 + λ)d > p− 2d.
(D.11)
This is true as long as 0 < λ < 1.
Next, I verify F ’s strategies give its beliefs. Similar to (D.6), if A
supports fighting, no bargaining range exists between F and L. Unless F
offers x = p + d + dp + 2r, which is impossible under this circumstance, any
other value of x does not affect the outcome. F would rather make a zero offer
and fight. Formally, we have
UF (0|fight) ≥ UF (p− (1 + λ)(d− r)|fight)⇔ 1− p− cF ≥ 1− p− cF .
(D.12)
Suppose that A chooses not to fight, I specify that F ’s off-the-equilibrium
strategy is x = p − (1 + λ)(d − r). F would not deviate to x = 0 as long as
this off-the-equilibrium strategy brings F more than its war payoffs, that is,
UF (p− (1 + λ)(d− r)| ∼ fight) ≥ UF (0| ∼ fight)⇔ (1 + λ)(d− r) ≥ −cF .
(D.13)
This is valid given d > r.
Finally, I check whether A’s strategy is consistent with its type. Given
the resolute type, A supports fighting when
UA(fight) > UA(∼ fight)⇔ p− cA > p− (1 + λ)(d− r) (D.14)
cA < (1 + λ)(d− r). (D.15)
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Given the irresolute type, A also supports fighting when
UA(fight) > UA(∼ fight)⇔ p− cA > p− (1 + λ)(d− r) (D.16)
cA < (1 + λ)(d− r). (D.17)
Combining (D.15) and (D.17), we have the following condition under which
this pooling equilibrium holds:
cA < d− r ≤ cA < (1 + λ)(d− r). (D.18)
Additionally, since 0 <≤ p− (1 + λ)(d− r) ≤ 1, (1 + λ)(d− r) ≤ p.
Proof of Proposition 8
Strategies and beliefs of the second pooling equilibrium are as follows.
• A: neither A nor A supports fighting.
• Updated beliefs: Pr(cA| ∼ fight) = φ; Pr(cA|fight) = θ.
• L: if A does not support fighting, L chooses λ = 0 and backs down as
long as F offers x ≥ p−d+r; if A supports fighting, L chooses λ ∈ (0, 1)
and stands firm as long as F offers x < p+ dp+ r + λ(d+ r).
• F : if A does not support fighting, F offers x = p − cA; if A supports
fighting, F offers x = 0.
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Again, L and F are unable to update their beliefs. First, I verify L’s
strategy given its beliefs. If A does not support fighting, L’s payoffs do not vary
with A’s type. Given λ = 0, L will back down as long as F offers x ≥ p−d+r;
therefore, L will back down if F offers x = p − λ(d − r). Given λ ∈ (0, 1), L
will also back down as long as x ≥ p− (1 + λ)(d− r) and F ’s proposed offer
fits in this range. In other words, L will accepts F ’s proposed offer in both
situations. Below is the condition under which L prefers λ = 0 to λ ∈ (0, 1):
UL(λ = 0| ∼ fight) > UL(0 < λ < 1| ∼ fight)⇔ x− r > x− r(1 + λ).
(D.19)
Note that x = p− λ(d− r). Now suppose that A supports fighting. I specify
that λ ∈ (0, 1) is L’s off-the-equilibrium strategy. Similar to (D.10), unless F
offers x = p+ dp+ r + λ(d+ r), which is impossible under this circumstance,
any other value of x does not affect the outcome. Formally, we have
UL(0 < λ < 1|fight) ≥ UL(0|fight)⇔ p− d(1− p) ≥ p− d(1− p). (D.20)
Next, I verify F ’s strategies give its beliefs. If A chooses not to fight,
F has two options: either it offers p − cA which guarantees peace with both
types, or it offers p−d+r with the risk of fighting with A. Formally, F prefers
p− cA when
UF (p− cA| ∼ fight) ≥ UF (p− d+ r| ∼ fight)⇔ cA ≥ (1− φ)(d− r)− φcF .
(D.21)
which is possible given d > r. Suppose that A chooses to fight, the off-the-
equilibrium strategy is x = 0. Similar to (D.12), F would rather fight than
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make L back down in the off-the-equilibrium scenario. Thus, F would pay its
war payoffs, irrelevant to the value of x. Formally, we have
UF (0|fight) ≥ UF (p− cA|fight)⇔ 1− p− cF ≥ 1− p− cF . (D.22)
Finally, I check whether A’s strategy is consistent with its type. Given
the resolute type, A does not support fighting when
UA(∼ fight) ≥ UA(fight)⇔ p− cA ≥ p− cA. (D.23)
(D.24)
Given the irresolute type, A does not support fighting when
UA(∼ fight) > UA(fight)⇔ p− cA > p− cA. (D.25)
Combining (D.21) and (D.26), we have the following condition under which
this pooling equilibrium holds:
(1− φ)(d− r)− φcF ≤ cA < d− r ≤ cA. (D.26)
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